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THE VITALITY OF ICE AND BONE:  
KNOWN UNCERTAINTY AND AWARENESS IN CHANGE THROUGH DOLPO, NEPAL 
 
At least one thousand years of caravanning yaks through the remote Himalayas have 
significantly shaped the practices of the Dolpo-pa, a culturally Tibetan population dwelling 
through the highlands of Midwestern Nepal. In turn, those practices have significantly affected 
how the Dolpo-pa conceptualize their world, the models by which they frame the experiences 
that effect those practices being directly and continuously synergized with the ecological realities 
of the existential present in persistently confirming, contesting or altering their awareness of 
those experiences. Physical reality at the biometabolic scale of ecological processes, therefore, 
which is as a rule perfunctorily and uncritically framed by observers descended from the specific 
histories of the European Enlightenment as the second-order reification labeled the environment, 
is schematized by the Dolpo-pa as something more like an “entanglement” in the uncertainty 
inherent to dwelling through that scale. As such, unlike the Cartesian divide elemental to the 
Western model that distorts reality by a cognitive trick of circular framing in reifying second-
order conceptualizations and taking those reifications as first-order realities in the world, 
ethnographic evidence indicates that the Dolpo-pa culturally model themselves as unique and 
distinct as humans but not as separate from their domain of metabolic entanglement.  
The difference in these representations is significant, not only because it highlights the 
emergent cultural model of the Dolpo-pa after extended engagement within that unforgiving 
mountain environment but also because it suggests what is being lost with the increasing 
contravention of the Western model of development into that domain. The Dolpo-pa’s increasing 
 
 iii 
acquiescence to the distortions of that model is beginning to disentangle at very basic levels their 
unique awareness, which is especially evident in new forms of social fragmentation that have 
only since around 2005 begun to influence how individuals in Dolpo constellate schemas of 
intra-entanglement arrangements and extra-entanglement connotations there. Worryingly, such 
new, second-order constellations have been concurrent with an increasing decline in the 
reliability of deep-rooted cultural models of known ecological uncertainties to effectively frame 
recent experiences with rapidly changing phenological conditions as average weather patterns 
(i.e. climate) have steadily altered in recent years. The Dolpo-pa’s cultural model of 
entanglement is unfortunately incapable of proficiently conceptualizing let alone adequately 
representing and responding to changes at the technometabolic scale of industrial processes, 
whence such phenological changes have originated but at which few among the Dolpo-pa have 
experience or proficiency negotiating. This thesis concludes with a brief discussion of how 
continued decline in the efficacy of the Dolpo-pa’s cultural model of entanglement is 
progressively leading to greater existential dissonance, a concept introduced here in conclusion 
that qualitatively gauges how such disentanglement gives rise to an increased likelihood of 
physical loss of life or livelihood within experiences no less physically entangled at the scale of 
ecological processes.  
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CHAPTER 1 – ADUMBRATIONS (IN LIEU OF INTRODUCTIONS) 
ADUMBRATION – THE ITALICIZED ENVIRONMENT  
The Dolpo-pa (the people of Dolpo), ethnically and culturally Tibetan transhumant agro-
pastoralists dwelling in and trading through the high Himalayas of Midwestern Nepal, 
conceptualize and represent their position within the environment very differently than do 
observers (like myself) from the European Enlightenment’s Cartesian tradition who trek in and 
over those still-remote vales and passes of Dolpo to observe the Dolpo-pa and propose in 
professional reports and academic publications and graduate theses (like this one) from 
interpretations based on those observations how the Dolpo-pa very differently conceptualize and 
represent the environment. The italics illustrates the difference, as it separates rather arbitrarily 
from the rest of the text that the environment in the previous sentence from that ‘the 
environment’ that is also a part of the text of that sentence but that is not so marked and is 
therefore not seen in separation from the balance of the text by the reader (look back; see for 
yourself).  
The point is not merely that the italics marks the text but that italics has itself been 
naturalized as a device for marking text and so is now perfunctorily accepted as such, emphases 
through italics operating on all but the most attentive of readers not so much by dictating 
emphasis (which it does) so much as by de-emphasizing words and ideas that are not so 
emphasized in having marked them. Such manipulation of a text can be distorting, of both 
intended and inadvertent understandings and interpretations and approaches to the text and its 
many possible meanings as interpreted and attended to within the physical realities of the 
terrestrial world.  
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As was that purposely placed italics, however, the circularity of meaning in the first 
sentence of the opening paragraph of this thesis was also very deliberate (look back; see for 
yourself). It linguistically suggests how the uncontested assumptions and unchallenged nuances 
of the Enlightenment’s Cartesian tradition of the ‘scientific observer’ are even now naturalized 
within the schematic constellations of cultural models as fixed ‘truth’ in perfunctorily and 
uncritically accepted reifications such as that second the environment. Such ‘truths’ are then 
perfunctorily and uncritically incorporated in the implicit assumptions and explicit claims of 
those reports and papers and theses (like this one) referenced in that first sentence above that are 
written about ‘peripheral’ (another schematic marking) people like the Dolpo-pa by such 
observers (like myself) from that Cartesian tradition that persists now at the scale of 
technometabolic processes.  
If, however, as anthropologist Alf Hornborg (2001:112; see also Marcus and Fischer, 
1986) argues, “the ultimate justification for anthropology is not the comprehension of others as 
an end in itself, but the possibilities of converting experience of cultural multiplicity into a 
critical scrutiny of our own, Western habits of thought,” then such uncritical acceptance of those 
most naturalized and entrenched schematic markings—such as the environment (among many, 
many others)—of that very specific tradition of Western Enlightenment thought through which 
such ‘scientific observers’ have become accustomed to and thus unduly uncritical in expressing 
themselves must be re-framed as egregious and unconscionable and intolerable. This requisite is 
especially necessary for those Westerners and Western-trained individuals oriented to that 
technometabolic scale of industrial processes who nonetheless claim to be most interested in and 
enthusiastic about advocating for subjugated and peripheral peoples (like the Dolpo-pa are 
quickly becoming) but who still perfunctorily and commonly frame such peoples as un- or 
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underdeveloped (or backwards or primitive, depending on the circumstance of the framing) 
because those people remain at this point not so technometabolically scaled or technologically 
progressed.  
As will be argued in the following chapters, such peripheral peoples (note the easy 
acceptance of the schematization) as the Dolpo-pa continue even today to frame the known 
uncertainties of the domains through which they dwell and of which they schematize that 
dwelling—the first-order physical realities which are far less rigidly framed than are those 
second-order conceptual ‘truths’ of Cartesian thought even as the uncertainties of those physical 
realities are far more existentially present—at that very different biometabolic scale of entangled 
ecological processes. Differences in the perception and framing of the forces and magnitudes of 
power possible at the disparate scales of ecological and industrial processes, therefore, provide 
insight into how the incursion of technometabolically-scaled change, both material/perceptual 
and conceptual, into the entanglements of people who schematically constellate their experiences 
and proficiencies through ecological processes disrupts those peoples’ emergent synergistic 
awareness at that biometabolic scale of power and magnitude. Such disruption pushes these 
peoples to disentangle from that scale and to settle—materially penurious and conceptually 
delegitimized—at the outer edge of the  increasingly hegemonic technometabolically-scaled 
global system with which they have neither experience nor proficiency.  
Such a piteous re-settlement is also pitiable, however, as peoples like the Dolpo-pa at the 
same time acquiesce to the pull of such a delegitimizing frame of scalar disparity in illusorily 
framing the short-term benefits of the products—like clothing and packaged foods—
manufactured through the power of that unknown technometabolic scale with the long-term 
promises of what might be called the ‘cognitive trick’ of the Enlightenment cultural model that 
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undergirds those productions. This trick circularly distorts the framing of such second-order 
reifications as first-order objects of physical reality in the terrestrial world. As such, this trick 
deludes with the promise of certainty even as it increases uncertainty by thus disentangling such 
peoples from the domain of their synergistic awareness of material experience and conceptual 
proficiency, especially in times and spaces of swift and accelerating change. 
 
ADUMBRATION – CONDITIONALLY-STRUCTURED SURFACES AT THE BIOMETABOLIC SCALE OF 
ECOLOGICAL PROCESSES & THE DISTORTED FRAMING OF REIFICATIONS  
 
In geological as in evolutionary time, neither of which is at the temporal-spatial scale of 
ecological processes but both of which is at its own scale of time and space, change occurs quite 
frequently, an adverbial expression meaningful only relative to an appropriate scale—quantum, 
biometabolic, evolutionary, geological, cosmic. Human conceptual proficiency, however, 
emergent through the evolution of the physiology of the cerebrum at the biometabolic scale of 
ecological processes, is itself oriented almost entirely to that scale of ecological processes, which 
means that change scaled to non-biometabolic times and spaces are all but invisible to such 
emergent conceptualizations’ not insignificant proficiencies. Because changes at the temporal-
spatial scales of the geological and the evolutionary (and the quantum and cosmic, for that 
matter) are more or less invisible to the emergent conceptual proficiencies of the first order 
human-surface, which has arbitrarily evolved in response to evolutionary pressures as the 
human-animal whose selective advantage is the synergy between its phenotype-surface and its 
conceptually proficient-animal being, both first-order experiences and second-order conceptual 
schemas transmitted and shared as the schematic constellations of cultural models tend to 
disregard changes at non-biometabolic scales as being more or less the equivalent of white noise, 
a fixed and ageless background to which none but passing (if any) attention need be paid.  
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Of course, interpreting and experiencing the expansive, dynamic arrays of non-
biometabolic scales in this way distorts the reality of the constant flux of physical force and 
magnitude at those other scales. But it also—and more advantageously in terms of genetic 
propagation—enables the human-animal to more efficiently and effectively synergize those 
evolutionarily emergent human-surface cum -animal characteristics in further augmenting their 
selective advantage of that synergistic awareness to thus ensure a continued thriving within that 
scale of life and livelihood that is the domain of ecologically entangled processes. 
At the biometabolic scale of ecological processes, therefore, the emergence of the 
vaunted conceptual proficiencies of the human-animal can be said to demark human-animal 
distinction only as much as material distinctions demark the uniquely human-surface phenotype, 
the true distinction of humanness being in the synergistic awareness effected of the two in the 
surmounting of the physical forces and magnitudes possible of ecological processes at that 
biometabolic scale. As such, that scale is unique in that, as Gibson (1979:16) argues, it can be 
described not in terms of the dubious idioms of classical physics, which models the universe as 
consisting of bodies in space, but “in terms of a medium, substances, and the surfaces that 
separate them.” Framing such a physical triad, Gibson (1979:22) continues, provides for both 
persistence and conditionality in the endurance of structure through time-space in that 
the medium is separated from the substances of the environment by surfaces. Insofar as substances persist, 
their surfaces persist. All surfaces have a certain layout . . . and the layout also tends to persist. The 
persistence of the layout depends on the resistance of the substance to change. If a substance is changed 
into the gaseous state, it is not longer substantial and the surface together with its layout ceases to exist. 
 
 Anthropologist Tim Ingold (2000:3), who calls Gibson’s influence on him “a revelation” 
(I concur), writes of Gibson’s approach, which in the late 1970s was rather contrary to the 
mainstream of psychological study: 
It was to throw out the idea, that has been with us since the time of Descartes, of the mind as a distinct 
organ that is capable of operating on the bodily data of sense. Perception, Gibson argued, is not the 
achievement of a mind in a body, but of the organism as a whole in its environment, and it is tantamount to 
 
 6
the organism’s own exploratory movement through the world. If mind is anywhere, then, it is not ‘inside 
the head’ rather than ‘out there’ in the world. To the contrary, it is immanent in the network of sensory 
pathways that are set up by virtue of the perceiver’s immersion in his or her environment. 
 
As such, as Gibson (1979:23) continues, within the triad of medium, substances and surfaces, the 
latter is so important because  
surfaces are where the action is. The surface is where light is reflected or absorbed, not the interior of the 
substance. The surface is what touches the animal, not the interior. The surface is where chemical reaction 
mostly takes place. The surface is where vaporization or diffusion of substances into the medium occurs. 
And the surface is where vibrations of the substances are transmitted into the medium. 
 
 Indeed, the existential present is physical reality by the intersection of surfaces in 
ecological processes, which occurs at a scale at which all perceptible experience leaves each 
dissipative structure either more dissipated or more structured in passage towards inevitable end 
in complete dissipation into the always outstretched arms of entropy. It is the scale at which 
ecological processes undergo what Martinez-Alier (2007:223) calls “biometabolism” through 
which the “genetic instructions regarding endosomatic energy use” in such dissipative structures 
play out through ecology. This scale contrasts markedly with what will be referred to in this 
thesis as the scale of “technometabolism” at which “exosomatic energy use, which can only be 
explained by history, politics, economics, culture, and technology” play out through industrial 
processes.  
 As such, all conditionally-structured surfaces cum dissipative-animal structures struggle 
from moment to moment to surmount the uncertainty of being so arrayed within the thin range of 
force and magnitude that shifts and cleaves asymmetrically those surfaces that constantly 
dissipate structures around them at that biometabolic scale of ecological processes. This reality is 
no less true for humans, of course, whose second-order conceptual proficiency is always, 
regardless of the distorted framings of the tautologies of the cognitive tricks it can delude itself 
with (and share and transmit culturally), grounded in and confirmed, contested, or altered by 
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such first-order material experiences of physical reality within the existential present at that 
scale.   
As argued in this thesis, therefore, the unique circumstances of that one particular place 
(Western Europe) at that one particular time (the Enlightenment) has yielded a historical 
trajectory by which the reifications made possible by this evolutionarily emergent conceptual 
proficiency of the human-animal are increasingly cognitively modeled as of first-order concern 
in just such a distortion of reality that continually deludes through the generation of a conceptual 
tautology that thereby confirms as first-order those second-order reifications of its own 
representational illusion. As such, climate change, for instance, as will be argued, cannot be 
reasonably construed as the problematic in a place like Dolpo (or anywhere else, for that matter) 
because, especially as circularly framed in current hegemonic quantitative discourse, such 
change has been distorted as a first-order concept through its reification as an object in the world 
even though climate has and can ever be no more than a second-order model that imprecisely 
adumbrates the very real first-order material experiences of physical change to such 
conditionally-structured surfaces in the entangled domain of terrestrial space such as Dolpo is. 
Climate, that is, cannot of itself change because it does not in itself actually exist in the physical 
reality of the object-world; the material change of which this thesis is concerned, that is, can only 
in fact occur within the physical reality of those perceptible forces at those biometabolically-
scaled ecological processes of dissipation and structure.   
Too often de-emphasized in over-accentuation of such illusory changes on the second-
order, however, is that within such an entangled domain as is Dolpo, two very real first-order 
physical changes certainly are possible at that biometabolic scale. First, material experiences of 
the physical force and magnitude possible within ecological processes can change. Second, the 
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qualitative characteristics of those possible first-order physical forces and magnitudes within the 
thin range of the biometabolic scale relative to the quantum and the cosmic can themselves 
change. These two changes are not the same, nor do they necessarily occur concurrently, though, 
clearly, the former is nested within the latter. Portentously, however, since the Enlightenment 
generation of that tautologically distorted frame in the 17th and the subsequent onset of the 
Industrial Revolution in the 18th century of the current epoch of Western European (hegemonic) 
experience (Taylor 1996), that latter change has also been increasingly (and very physically) 
nested within the former, the entropy of industry in the form of emissions (among other 
effluents) increasingly destabilizing the nonlinear physical systems of the atmosphere with the 
anthropogenic discharge of greenhouse gases that is resulting in generalized warming of the 
terrestrial surfaces of the world (IPCC, 2007).  
Even though this warming is causing clear and observable phenological changes to 
biometabolically-scaled domains of experience and perception around the world, because of its 
artificial force and magnitude and never-before framed technometabolic scale this industrial 
configuration cannot be so clearly schematized by the evolutionarily emergent proficiencies for 
synergistic awareness of the human-animal. This portentous configuration, that is, in circularly 
confirming a reification as a first-order physical reality by the evidence of its own generation, 
which is itself not scaled to the biometabolic scale of ecological processes, nevertheless has 
significant and worryingly underappreciated implications for those processes at that scale, of 
which the human-animal, like all terrestrial surface-life, is fully and enduringly (such is the hope) 
a part, regardless of the forces and magnitudes made provisionally possible by the production 
capacities generated by that industrial configurationi. As numerous reports and papers have 
shown, these changes have been especially swift and intense at the terrestrial poles and in what is 
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often called ‘the third pole’ of the Himalayas (Qiu 2008; Eriksson et al. 2007); significantly, 
therefore, ethnographic evidence adduced in this thesis not only confirms these observations but 
also illustrates how such technometabolically-scaled changes are having very real material and 
subsequent conceptual consequences for populations like the Dolpo-pa who even now remain 
entangled within those domains of biometabolically-scaled change.  
 
ADUMBRATION – THE PLAN, BOTH OSTENSIBLE AND FORTHRIGHT 
Ostensibly, therefore, the following chapters will expatiate how the Dolpo-pa, who by the 
biometabollicaly-scaled power of their yaks were for at least one thousand years brokers in the 
grain-for-salt trade networks between the Tibetan Plateau and the Middle Hills of Nepal, 
approach and culturally model their swiftly changing interconnections with the complex physical 
and social arrays that scale variably over the contemporary world. More forthrightly, however, 
the following chapters will not only expound an ethnographic interpretation, adduced through the 
mixed methodologies of cognitive anthropology, of how the Dolpo-pa’s cultural model of 
entanglement within the terrestrial domain of Dolpo derives from the asymmetries of first-order 
physical uncertainty with which they contend daily but will also suggest that perfunctory and 
uncritical acquiescence to the distortions of the framing of ‘progress’ as adduced by the cognitive 
trick of the European Enlightenment’s technometabolic scale of industrial production is 
increasing the Dolpo-pa’s existential dissonance, a concept introduced here that gauges how the 
disentanglement of synergistic awareness with the increased influences of technometabolically-
scaled industrial power also increases the likelihood of loss to life or livelihood within a no less 




CHAPTER 2 – METHODS & STUDY LOCATION 
 
PART I – METHODS 
. . . there are things we can learn about people by actively engaging with them, talking to them, and 
listening to them that we can learn in no other way. By taking advantage of peoples’ human capacity to 
reflect on themselves and their experience (an advantage we have over archaeologists or primatologists), 
we learn what they think about, feel, imagine, or obsess on and how these preoccupations affect their overt 
behavior, if at all. We learn how over-determined and motivationally complex conventional behavior can 
be, and how it can be used to divert attention from, or secretly gratify, other, less socially acceptable 
preoccupations or concerns. We learn that what people are willing and able to tell us about themselves 
changes as our relationships with them deepen and evolve over time. We learn what part of peoples’ minds 
and behaviors they have conscious access to and what part they do not, and how those parts are 
dynamically related. Not least, we learn what people most value, enjoy, fear, or dread in their lives. And 
how people who can look so similar in their overt behavior can be so different from a psychological or 
experiential point of view.  
                                  Douglas Hollan (2005:465) 
 
 A somewhat lengthy epigraph for the methods section of a thesis perhaps, but considering 
anthropology’s current and projected history, the clarity of Hollan’s statement in concluding his 
discussion of the pioneering methodologies of Robert Levy bears important witness to an 
approach to the study of culture that I advocate and earnestly expect to emulate into the future. 
Though analytical, it seeks first to learn and to know, drawing conclusions not in the dismissal of 
the practice that observation always is but of the mystification in framing of that practice that 
“converts a practical succession into a represented succession, an action oriented in relation to a 
space objectively constituted as a structure of demands (things ‘to be done’) into a reversible 
operation performed in a continuous, homogenous space” (Bourdieu 1990:90).  
 Not only is identification of this distinction imperative but so too is it practical in 
application to all “scientific” inquiry. Possibly led by the example anthropology provides in 
having reinvented itself over the last fifty years, such inquiry must continue to evolve 
methodologically in its pursuit of defamiliarized analysis of ‘the other’ that recognizes, by 
“objectify[ing] the objectifying distance and the social conditions that make it possible” 
(Bourdieu, 1990:14), that despite the benefits of such inquiry into the logic and significance of 
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the entanglements of beings that “do not exist at locations . . . [but] occur along paths” (Ingold, 
2006:14), such inquiry is subject to the same framing as is all interpretation of physical reality. 
Not data, I submit, therefore, but such defamiliarization, the ongoing process, enhanced by field 
study, by which the synergistic awareness through which a participant-observer reproduces the 
reasonable frames of his or her own assumptions is increasingly forestalled with the allaying of 
the naturalization produced of that synergy in the surfacing of tolerance and empathy, should, 
therefore, be the primary goal of inquiry, especially in the social sciences. 
 At first, I acknowledge, this proposal appears rather untenable, absurd even, academics 
and practitioners having become, even as their methodologies have made such apposite strides 
over the past several decades to overcome bias, so inured to the sonorous toll of the funding bell 
and the imperatives of ‘publish or perish’ that unreason often now overshadows the practices and 
passions of their training. Thinking on it further, however, this proposal is consistent with the 
growing understanding of how, though much of culture consists of internalized cognitive 
assumptions exploited in the fulfillment of the tasks of everyday life, “the other side of culture is 
the visible, but always partial and often cryptic, manifestations of [the] shared understandings 
that people produce” (Quinn 2005:4). Further on, Quinn asserts, referring specifically to 
discourse analysis, that one of the goals of cultural study is to “tease out” meaning. 
Defamiliarization has a similar goal, conceived of more broadly, claiming not that an observer 
could ever seamlessly superimpose his/herself over the culture being observed, which would 
result in little more than a super imposition of the form made infamous by the ghosts of 
anthropology’s past, but that the thwartwise overlay of observer and culture effected by such 
defamiliarization promises better outcomes as well as more and more apposite data than previous 
approaches have produced or could produce. This is, foremost, because defamiliarization 
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requires not a pathetic attempt at “going native” but a synergistic awareness that reflects in the 
synergy of its process the synergistic awareness of the material experience and conceptual 
proficiency by which culture itself forms through extended engagement within an environment. 
As Handwerker (2001:107) writes: 
Spending time getting to know someone opens the only door available for you to learn what that person 
sees and what it means when he or she looks out at the world. This calls for the personal sensitivity and 
creativity to allow people to feel comfortable with you, to communicate clearly to people whom you ask for 
assistance that you are nonthreatening. 
 
Current mixed-methodological strategies from Cognitive Anthropology, utilized in the conduct 
of the present study in Dolpo, provide a reasonable heuristic for engaging and experimenting 





Dolpo is one of the most physically remote areas in the contemporary world, lying well-
nigh at the periphery of the periphery of the world system, both logistically and economically. 
Far from untouched by time, as they are described in many trekking companies’ descriptionsii, 
however, the ethnically and culturally Tibetan Dolpo-pa are very much current, with each 
passing year becoming more and more engaged in the patterns of exchange that comprise the 
world system even as the entropy produced by that system increasingly circulates through and 
affects the known uncertainties of the physical realities through which the Dolpo-pa continue to 
dwell in subsistence at that periphery.  
My motivations for conducting research in Dolpo nearly all derive from these verities. 
Having for nearly a score of years been an informal student of Buddhist history and philosophy 
and having for about as long a time also been intrigued by Tibetan culture and history, in 2005 I 
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traveled to Lhasa for five weeks, taking two trips by Land Cruiser from the capital during that 
time, one to the sacred lake of Namtso and the other, to end the trip, down from the barren 
Tibetan Plateau and into the verdant lushness at the Tibetan-Nepali Border, where I walked over 
the Friendship Bridge into of the Nepali village of Kodari. After a several hours drive from the 
border, I remained in Kathmandu for several days before traveling on into India.  
This trip was very influential for three reasons: 1) It not only affirmed my appreciation 
for Tibetan culture but it also roused a deep admiration for how the Tibetan people I met, 
especially while traveling outside of Lhasa, approach living with abiding generosity and 
affirmation regardless of the deprivations and subjugations to which they are increasingly 
subjected, in both occupation and peripheralization; 2) It enticed me to want to return for a 
longer sojourn in Nepal, where in three days time I was met with genuine smiles from such 
atypical places as the immigration office at the border where I received a gratis transit visa, the 
restaurant in the small town on the paved road to Kathmandu where the driver of the car I hired 
pleasantly served as interpreter/guide/ lunch companion, the guards at the military checkpoints 
who beamed while clinging tightly to their M-16s once they checked my passport and confirmed 
I was not a Maoist insurgent, the bedraggled rickshaw-wallahs and spindly sadhus of Kathmandu 
who live and live on, again and again; and 3) It persuaded me that I had to begin the transition 
from writing and literature instructor with a long-standing interest in cultural studies, 
development issues, and environmental crises to trained authority on such subjects.  
Although I had made somewhat gratifying strides toward this goal before entry into the 
anthropology Master’s program at Colorado State University, in deciding in the fall of 2010 that 
I would endeavor such an elaborate field study in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the 
degree, I sought to fare further forward, a former English instructor voyaging further on and 
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rather higher up. I chose Dolpo not only because it facilitated recursion to those influences 
elucidated above but also because it enabled me to fulfill an abiding ambition to forgo the Land 
Cruiser and try my mental and physical resoluteness in trekking into the remote Himalayas. 
Returned now, my world could never be the same.  
THE SNOW LEOPARD’S PALIMPSEST: HINDU HILLS TO HIGH HIMALAYAS 
 The sky opened, and the big rain that had been threatening for days near the end of the 
unusually heavy monsoon season poured down. It flooded the streets and alleys of Kathmandu, 
dripping from the aging monuments and stone wraiths of Durbar Square, offering a muddled 
cleansing of our already untidy assembly of provisions (equipment, fuel, food for several weeks 
of trekking) and staff (5 porters and a translator/guide) and researchers (my assistant Jonathan 
and me) at the northern Gongabu Bus Park. I had actually been fool enough to believe that the 
two week delay in obtaining permits and permissions from the Nepali government bureaucracy 
might find us on the dry side of monsoon season. Mathiessen’s (1978) tribulations through a 
similarly unending monsoon nearly forty years earlier on the same route onto which we would in 
the morning embark pressed upon me, a fool among fools at 5:30 in the morning in the rain. 
 
QUALITATIVE RESEARCH 
 Although an airstrip at Juphal, a three hour trek from the provincial capital of Dunai, was 
built several years ago, I felt it was imperative to suffer the extra time and expense (and days and 
days and days of rain, unfortunatelyiii) to make the trek around the snowy spire of Dhaulagiri 
(8,167 meters) from Darbang in the Hindu middle hills through the Dhorpatan Hunting Reserve 
and into Dolpa, as the province in which the subaltern Tibetan agro-pastoralists of Dolpo reside 
is officially named. Impelled by Handwerker’s (2001:80) logic in coaching students of method to 
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“create multiple lines of evidence to assess the construct validity of [their] findings by using a 
variety of informants, different methods of data collection and analysis, and different questions 
bearing on the same issue,” my goal of defamiliarization seemed best initiated by engaging the 
liminal experience of crossing from a cultural and ethnic milieu exceptionally different from my 
own but still dominant within the arbitrary framing of space that is the nation-state and into a 
milieu produced by the schematized spaces of a subaltern population. Bernard’s (2006:366, 368) 
suggestions on maintaining naivete and on building rapport just by hanging out (well, in this 
case, trekking out) proved beneficial in realizing this goal. 
The greatest benefit of trekking into Dolpo was the experience not only of crossing 
through several ecological zones but of doing so in the presence of my staff and even more so of 
the various individuals met, traveled with, and observed along the way. With such individuals, I 
discussed issues pressing upon the practice of their daily lives as they, too, trekked over those 
hills and through those valleys, up into or down from the higher elevations to the north, 
confronting the same elements and hazards as I did in participant-observation, though their 
confrontations were neither for analysis nor holiday but for the practical performance of their 
lives and livelihoods. I carried a pen and small notebook, double-bagged in two Ziplocks (oh, the 
rain, the rain), in the left, zippered pocket of my hiking shorts, ready at an instant to jot the scene 
or notes from the dialogues, though remaining cognizant of Bernard’s (2006:211) entreaty to 
minimize the researcher-informant boundary: “When it comes to [informal] interviewing . . . you 
have to remember a lot; you have to duck into private corners a lot (so you can jot things down); 
and you have to use a lot of deception (to keep people from knowing that you’re really at work, 
studying them).”  
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Considering our unique (in the area) ethnic and cultural circumstance, especially as we 
moved further and further afield from the more popular trekking routes around Annapurna, 
neither physical nor occupational deception was, however, really possible, or necessary for that 
matter. For instance, on what was probably our longest day of trekking, a day when in nine hours 
of nearly constant rain we ascended from around 2,800 meters at Dhorpatan to just over 4,000 
meters at the pass over the Phagune Dhuri and then back down to ~3,100 meters at Takur, 
fording the furious river running fast down the mountain three daunting times, we met up and 
traveled with a gaunt, wrinkled woman in her forties and her eight-year-old daughter. They were 
from down in the valley and were making the ascent over the pass in order to shepherd their 
flocks back over the mountain to overwinter in their home valley. Our differences, especially in 
terms of the things we carried in making the ascent, the sturdy Gore Tex boots from REI versus 
the valueless flip flops from who knows where, were striking. 
At the first major river crossing, the torrent rushing in grays and thunderous whites over 
smooth granite that here and there barely broke the surface of the surge, I noticed simultaneous 
to my thinking to myself something about the impossibility of the task, the sheer force of the 
water and the reasonable but no less unforgiving tumble down the thrashing throws that would 
follow being swept away, that the woman had removed her daughter’s flip flops. Then, at the 
point of crossing that one of the porters had chosen after quick scrutiny up and down the river as 
the best and then dashed across, his nearly 90 pound load packed expertly in the straw dhoko 
(traditional basket), the majority of the weight borne by the namlo (tumpline) across his hairline.  
As I approached, poking my hiking pole timidly into the water and watching 
uncomfortably as it was swept laterally even as I pushed it down to discover the riverbed, 
wondering still how to complete this so very unreasonable undertaking and thinking about the 
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loss of my laptop, of my life, the woman stepped past me, her daughter’s flip flops tied now to 
her overgarment, her daughter held squarely by the shoulders in front of her, and into the water. 
She did not dash as the porter had, but she did move intentionally, keeping herself square to the 
water, clutching firmly to her daughter even as she lowered her center of gravity in bending her 
knees just so, deliberately, just so with each subsequent stride toward and past the middle of the 
torrent, the look on her face a mixture of concentration in faring forward and appreciation of the 
imminent existential crisis of continuity that she and her progeny faced in those moments—and 
her knowing nothing, I submit, of Eliot or Sartre, of the literature on DRR or even the basics of 
CPR.   
And I was having a figurative heart attack, wondering if I’d have to turn back because I 
continued to wonder how, even as the porter dashed back across, looked me in the eye 
scrutinizing my readiness, and then led me, inexpert as a child proffered a netless net, a 
harnessless harness, by the shoulders through the torrent and to the other side. On the other bank, 
as her daughter slipped her flip flops back on and I began to remove and drain my sturdy Gore 
Tex boots, now sopping through and through (and for days and days afterwards), the woman sat 
in the moss of a wet rock smoking some foul smelling weed wrapped loosely in some sort of 
discarded paper, chuckling.  
To me, being a human-animal, such a crossing was daunting and extraordinary, 
unreasonable, but to the woman and the porter, though no less daunting, their being no less 
human-animals, it did have a certain ordinariness to it, a reasonableness conceivable through the 
synergistic awareness of their entanglements that, in my observations both of them and of 
myself, provides a pertinent illustration of the “explicit awareness” (Spradley 1980:55) I needed 
to cultivate during the entire trip. Such an awareness would be necessary, I supposed, if I was to 
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benefit as I had hypothesized by focusing primarily on that defamiliarization of experience 
through the disorder of extraordinary experience that is so ordinary, so reasonable otherwise 
framed instead of merely on the acquisition of data as a researcher who, as an aside, almost once 
died in crossing a river while trekking to a study area across a mountainside.  
 As we ascended further, growing more and more fatigued with altitude and the terror of 
each subsequent river crossing, we stopped to rest with increased frequency. At each stop, we 
would exchange pleasantries with the woman, engaging in the small talk common in travel as she 
smoked that foul weed. She asked once what we were doing there, and through our translator I 
provided a vague explanation of study and research and university, to which she simply nodded, 
took a drag, and chuckled at the size of our packs, her store of provisions fitting loosely in a 
soiled piece of fabric the size of a shawl that she had tied and wrapped around her shoulders. Her 
daughter would sit beside her during these exchanges, relatively incurious about us, unsure, 
possibly afraid, Jonathan and me possibly being the first Caucasians she had ever seen.  
 We offered them some of our trail provisions (gorp and the like), and on our last break 
before making the final push to the pass, she offered us her bottle of rakshi (homebrew alcohol), 
which she declared through my translator was a most effective remedy for altitude sickness. 
Upon my declining, the thought of imbibing of such a distillate in such a place with so much 
longer to trek that day making my somewhat dizzy head dizzy, she only laughed, her eyes 
narrowing in amusement, smoke wafting up into them. At the pass, having just watched a goat 
being born through the mists of the low clouds, we exchanged well-wishes and took a 
photograph together beside the cairn that marked our end, showing her and her daughter their 
digital images to their further amusement. Then, we departed, she and her daughter descending 
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into the shadowy verdancy of a side valley awash in a multitude of cloud and green, we 
continuing on down the main trail into the isolated valley of Tarkur.  
 Such Participant-Observations continued all the way to Dunai, the capital of the Nepali 
Province of Dolpa, where we rested for two days before continuing north for three days along the 
Phoksumdo River into Shey-Phoksumdo National Park and Dolpo proper, where I took ill with 
flu for a week in the village of Rigmo at the boundary to the barren remoteness of Upper Dolpo.  
 Overall, a total of 26 semi-structured interviews were conducted in Dolpo, for a total of 
over 35 hours of digital voice-recording. The first interview protocol was derived from 
participant-observations during the trek into Dolpo as well as at least six preliminary, 
unstructured interviews and seven free listings that were focused on daily water usage. These 
were completed while recovering in Rigmo for just over a week before departing on the trek into 
the remoteness of Upper Dolpo. Then, on the first three days in Upper Dolpo, having sent our 
porters back to Kathmandu and hired four dzoa (yak-cattle hybrid) and their wrangler in Rigmo, 
we trekked the narrow trail carved into the rock several hundred feet above the impossible 
turquoise of sacred Phoksumdo Lake’s western shore, down onto the mixed forest and grazing 
land of the glacial flood plain east of the Kanjiroba Range, through nearly frozen water calf-deep 
past the collapsing world of ice cascading off melting glaciers, then up and up above the tree line 
and over the Nangda La (5,360 meters) to Shey Gompa.  
 In those days, we encountered only four traders, from whom we received essential 
information about the state of the flooded trail and of a washed out bridge along the way. Into the 
chill of each night, while dal bhat cooked in pressurized pots in the kitchen tent, I worked by 
headlamp to complete the first iteration of the semi-structured interview protocol. Subsequently, 
based on informant responses and clarifications over the course of the first four interviews of the 
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most current conditions in Dolpo, I modified the protocol, the final iteration emerging in time to 
conduct the final semi-structured interview in Upper Dolpo and remaining more or less firm for 
the next 13 interviews back in Rigmo. The final seven semi-structured interviews, conducted 
near the end of the field study, involved a combination of questions from the firmed-up iteration 
and follow-up questions based on that iteration as well as response patterns noted during initial 
structured interviews.  
Recruitment of informants for the first 5 interviews relied on a combination of 
happenstance (1) and the past contacts (4) my Nepali translator had made when he worked as a 
Ranger in Shey-Phoksumdo National Park for three years in the early 2000s (see Appendix I for 
recruitment script). Of those interviewed in Upper Dolpo, four were men and four were 
ethnically Tibetan while one was ethnically Nepali but had lived in Upper Dolpo for 18 years. 
Their ages ranged from 42 to 64. By happenstance in recruitment, I mean that out first interview 
was conducted with an elderly lama we happened to meet while touring Shey Gompa. He invited 
us up to the quarters of his lamasery, where his wife served Tibetan tea and, to our surprise, 
Snickerdoodle cookies transported down from Tibet in the previous year’s trade caravan. These 
first interviews were conducted in Nepali (3), double translation from Tibetan (1), and English 
(1) during our 2.5 week circuit of the restricted area of Upper Dolpo, the most remote part of the 
entire tripiv. Because each interview was conducted in a different area along the circuit, I was 
provided with a small but interesting sample of responses from around Upper Dolpo, each 
response providing greater lucidity for the lens of defamiliarization through which I hoped to 
observe the Dolpo-pa.  
Possible confounds in using the established contacts of our translator, though necessitated 
by time constraints and the expense of permits and sumpters for passage through the restricted 
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area of Upper Dolpo, were that we mingled little with local populations, though Upper Dolpo, as 
intimated, is so sparsely populated that this concern is rather self-limiting. Indeed, we did 
converse informally with several people for longer periods at several settlements along the trek. 
Another possible confound, however, is that my translator’s four contacts in Upper Dolpo were 
all community leaders or ranking lamas (including the head lama of the entire Bon faith who 
resides at Samling Gompa), all of whom were far better educated than most of the population, 
possibly skewing results. I was concerned, therefore, because, as Handwerker (2001:110) 
suggests, “To study the social construction of meaning, be careful to elicit information about 
how interactions are experienced by both the focus person and each kind of social actor.”  
A notable self-limiting factor to this confound is that regardless of leadership position or 
wealth or rank in Dolpo, all individuals still either engage directly in agro-pastoral practices and 
trade, did so for many years at some point in the past, or are fully entangled in understanding the 
requirements of life and livelihood even for the poorest and lowest ranking of the Dolpo-pa. For 
instance, one of the richest men and no doubt the poorest man in the main study village of Rigmo 
were known by most other villagers who were asked as being the best of friends (Field Notes). 
The point is that although there are divisions in wealth and rank in Dolpo, there is little or no 
disdain between classes (between people, sure, but not between classes), all being either well-
acquainted or at least familiar with most other inhabitants in a Village Development Community 
(VDC). In Dolpo, that is, despite its large geographic extent, six degrees or more of separation is 
all but impossible, the most separated an individual could be from another being likely half three.  
At Rigmo (3,733 meters), an ancient village of fewer than 50 families (adult population = 
185-200) inhabiting a collection of densely packed flat-roofed stone houses a short stroll from 
sacred Phoksumdo Lake, the projects final 21 semi-structured interviews were conducted, 13 of 
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which were over a one week period upon return to the village. Informants for these interviews, 
which ranged from 45 minutes to 130 minutes, with an average of around 100 minutes, were 
acquired by convenience. Indeed, the first seven informants were well-known by my translator, 
and he arranged our discussions as one of his duties. All of these interviews save one were 
conducted in Nepali, however, which disturbed me once I understood that only the more 
educated people in the village were fluent in Nepali, meaning that I was omitting a great deal of 
the opinions and experiences of those who were older or from poorer families. Of course, this 
could have proven to be a significant confound.  
Of these initial seven interviews, one was conducted in English with the main lodge 
owner’s daughter who had, while we were trekking through Upper Dolpo, happened to return to 
the village from Kathmandu for the first time in four years after having just completed her 
nursing degree. She was fluent in Tibetan, Nepali, and English and volunteered to assist with 
Tibetan translations for the remainder of the projectv. With her, I was able to conduct 14 
interviews in Tibetan with informants who would not have been accessible otherwise, and, as 
explained below, her assistance with structured surveys proved invaluable.  
Informants’ ages for the 21 semi-structured interviews conducted in Rigmo ranged from 
21 to 70. Thirteen informants were male and eight were female. Two were lamas (one a geshevi), 
five other males were tradersvii, three were yartza gumbu collectors, one was a lodge owner and 
trader, and one was a furniture maker. Two of the women operated seasonal teahouses, one man 
(a Nepali married to a village woman) was the village shopkeeperviii, and four older women 
tended house and the family plots. One had just finished nursing school in Kathmandu and was 
awaiting her exam results; hers was the only English interview conducted in Rigmo.  
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Because life in the village is a more or less a public affair that unfolds each day at the 
pace of practice, tasks being accomplished as they need to be accomplished—no faster and no 
slower—with villagers coming and going from others’ houses throughout the day, interviewing 
at times proved difficult because of the almost assured gathering of an audience. Many 
interviews were, therefore, conducted in places least likely to be disturbed like rooftops or 
kitchen gardens, though a few were conducted at the convenience of the informant, who would 
otherwise not agree to an interview, in front of a home or shop. Of the 26 total interviews, only 
one (the fourth overall) was significantly affected by the gathering of an audience, and I ended it 
less than 40 minutes in because I felt that the interjections and distractions, though offering quite 
a good observational experience, invalidated the interview space. 
 
QUANTITATIVE RESEARCH 
 Upon completing semi-structured interviews a week after returning to Rigmo, I spent a 
day and a half on the shores of Phoksumdo Lake listening to interviews, assembling and taking 
notes, watching the water, marveling at life in the Himalayas, and hurriedly writing structured 
interview questions. The first surveys were not, however, conducted in Rigmo but in Pungmo, a 
four hour hike down from Rigmo, past the Tapriza Boarding School and onto the route leading 
over the Kagmara La and the no less than seven day trek to the town of Jumla back in the Hindu 
Middle Hills. Pungmo is also in the Phoksumdo VDC, which consists of a total of four villages, 
and I wanted to at least make an effort to conduct some structured interviews away from Rigmo. 
I managed to administer four surveys in Nepali in less than 24 hours before returning back to 
Rigmo the next day. Over the following 10 days, another 50 adults were surveyed in Rigmo, 
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including three traders passing through from villages in Upper Dolpo. The 47 remaining 
individuals account for ~25 percent of the adult population of the village.  
 Although survey respondents were selected by convenience, a strong demographic spread 
was obtained. For example, the ages of respondents ranged from 21 to 70 with one individual 
claiming that she did not know her age. Of those, 31 individuals were under 40, while 16 were 
over 50 and six were in their 40s. In terms of gender, 37 percent of respondents were female, 
while 63 percent were male. Over half of all respondents had 1-3 children (55.6 percent), while 
only 14.8 percent had no children, 27.6 percent had 4-6 children, and one male respondent had 9 
children. Of all respondents, only eight had ever lived outside of Phoksumdo VDC. Interestingly, 
exactly 50 percent of surveys were conducted in Nepali and 50 percent were conducted in 
Tibetan, with all interviews with people with five years or more of education being in Nepali 
except the survey with the Geshe, which was conducted in Tibetan. The most common 
respondent was an individual with no formal education who was surveyed in Tibetan (46.3 
percent). Finally, 83.3 percent of respondents were married, 11.1 percent were not married, one 
individual was divorced and two were widowed.   
Surveys were conducted in pairs, with one pair consisting of the Nepali translator and my 
assistant and the other consisting of the Tibetan translator and myself. Once the survey was 
settled, my assistant and I spent a morning as scriveners, copying the questions in English into 
four separate pocket notebooks, one question or statement per page of each notebook. 
Afterwards, each member of the team received a notebook, and the two translators were 
instructed to read through the questions before we met later in the day to discuss them and clarify 
any possible confusion with meaning and translation. They then copied their translations into 
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their notebooks. Finally, I made two identical response matrices for each type of question: T/F 
question, 3-Point Likert Scale questions, and 5-Point Likert Scale questions (See Appendix II).  
When conducting surveys, respondents were given a pointer and asked to signal their 
answer to each question/statement on the matrix. In doing so, as each team member had an 
identical notebook, my assistant and I could then follow along with the survey as it was being 
conducted and record responses as they were being made, thereby providing a check that the 
order of each survey was being maintained as it proceeded. This strategy proved very beneficial 
in the end as the Nepali translator became less and less professional and attentive as the weeks 
progressed. My assistant caught him several times skipping questions. Each night my assistant 
and I would record the survey results from our respective notebooks into a spreadsheet on my 
netbook computer, which was charged all day with solar panels while locked in the national park 
office where we stayed.  
Survey data was analyzed using descriptive functions including frequencies and 
crosstabulations in SPSS v.16. The survey was also designed according to the protocols for 
conducting Cultural Consensus Analyses (CCA), a method in cognitive anthropology derived 
from a theory of the same name. As Weller (2007:339) states, it is “a collection of analytical 
techniques and models that can be used to estimate cultural beliefs and the degree to which 
individuals know or report those beliefs.” On the survey, responses to statements 32-45 and 46-
62 were run through the UCINet 6.0 social network analysis program developed by Steve 
Borgatti, Martin Everett and Lin Freeman and distributed by Analytic Technologies. 
PART II – STUDY LOCATION 
Complimenting cultivations of a short season’s bare crop of barley, buckwheat, millet, 
and hard winter wheat along with potatoes and radishes that poke meagerly through poor soils 
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(Bauer 2004:22), the Dolpo-pa’s primary production derives from the ubiquitous herds of yak 
and dzoa that forage the short grasses of the high ranges uplifting toward the Tibetan Plateau. 
Bauer (2004:26-27) claims that while large ruminants are central to and symbolic of life in 
Dolpo, “a family’s primary economic investment is in goats and sheep, which are used for wool, 
milk, and meat.” Because these local productions in the short growing seasons of a sparsely 
populated area 90 percent of which lies above 3,500 meters have largely proven inadequate in 
providing for their annual needs (Lama, Ghimire, and Aumeeruddy-Thomas 2001; Jest 
1978:361), however, the Dolpo-pa have also for centuries exploited their pivotal position 
between the Hindu hills to the south and the Tibetan Plateau to the north as brokers along the 
grain-for-salt trade to supplement their local productions and increase their successes despite the 
harshness of their local climes (Fisher 1986:89).  
To most inhabitants of Dolpo, which is comprised of four of the highest inhabited valleys 
on earth in the Nepali province of Dolpa with a subaltern population of around 5,000 (Bauer 
2004:1), this pattern of local production supplemented by regional trade describes how 
subsistence has been ensured for at least a thousand years. Since the midpoint of the 20th 
century, however, global geopolitical developments have significantly reshaped this intricate 
order, providing an acute illustration of the pressures brought to bear at the periphery by progress 
within the framework of the world system. Now, as Bauer (2004:2) indicates through his 
observer’s frame, life expectancy hovers just over 50 years, around 90 percent of people live in 
“poverty,” and literacy and family planning are relatively non-existent. 
 Ironically, with the defeat by Mao’s mighty People’s Liberation Army (PLA) of a small 
Tibetan force at the Battle of Chamdo on October 7, 1950, life as the Dolpo-pa had known it for 
at least 10 centuries began to change significantly. This is ironic because the Battle of Chamdo, 
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which pitted the armies of two then-sovereign states one against the other, was fought on the 
central plains of China’s Sichuan Province, many thousands of miles in distance from and 
hundreds of meters in elevation below the high frontiers of Dolpo. But this bit piece of history 
provides a superb illustration of how the world in 1950 had already begun to succumb to the 
compressions of post-WWII times and spaces. Indeed, in 1959, less than a decade after the 
Chinese invasion of the plateau, the spiritual and political leader of the high kingdom of Tibet, 
the fourteenth Dalai Lama, fled Lhasa through the Himalayas disguised as a soldier and was 
granted asylum in India and there established a government in exile in the northern city of 
Dharamsala. These events commenced a period of steadily rising tensions through the 1960s 
between the first two of the “third world” nuclear powers, India and China, each with aspirations 
to drift further core-ward in orientation to that world system.  
But these so global tensions at the lower elevations at either side of the great Himalayan 
divide reverberated up to the periphery of Dolpo, though not at all in the way that that shadow of 
foreseeable nuclear holocaust draped over the wonder years of the 1960s at the core. No, in 
Dolpo the concern was far less about nuclear annihilations and shoe-banging protestations than 
about the trickle down transformations that they were to both endure and counter in response to 
these global affectations. Indeed, the Dolpo-pa continued to drive their herds through their 
seasonal patterns of trade and production, engaging in life as it had seemingly always been 
framed even as the global aggregations of industrially-scaled power were aligning at those lower 
elevations all around them. And so, as Bauer (2004:107) rightly identifies, “during the second 
half of the 20th century, the emerging nation-states of Nepal, China, and India changed their 
frontiers into borders . . . [and] the pastoralists along the Nepal-Tibet border found themselves 
 
 28
living in a dynamic and contested space.” And within the liminality of that contested space 
change came ever more swiftly to their high-elevation periphery. 
The signing in Beijing of the “Boundary Protocol” between the Tibet Autonomous 
Region (TAR) and Nepal in January of 1963, an example of how negotiated national boundaries 
are the spatial equivalents to the mythological constructs that are the stories nations tell 
themselves about themselves in the maintenance of those constructs of themselves that they call 
their histories, had the most immediate and discernable impact. The Protocol stated that people 
living on the borders between the two countries could continue to “carry on . . . petty traditional 
trade on a barter basis” within thirty kilometers of the border, but required that both governments 
“abolish the existing practice of trans-frontier pasturing.” With the ascendance of the state as the 
default possessor of all natural capital within the circumscribed area of its new boundaries, 
therefore, with the stroke of a pen “Nepal and China did away with centuries of customary 
property and resource-use arrangements that pastoralists across the Himalayas had used to 
successfully exploit rangeland resources across [their] ecological frontier” (Bauer 2004:82).  
By the compression of global times and places, the ripples from that pen stroke were felt 
almost immediately in Dolpo. With it, their traditional transhumance routes of trade and 
subsistence into Tibet, where over long winters when little to no pasturage was available locally 
their netsang partners, as dictated by long held custom, looked after their herds in return for 
“payments” of grain and other necessities unavailable on the plateau (Snellgrove 1981:83), had 
been ended. With that pen stroke, the relationships of reciprocity they had fostered and formed 
with these partners over generations and which had provided a kind of insurance against the 
variability of climate and resource conditions in the high mountains had been ended. Never had 
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transhumant pastoralists in the Himalayas been in such a compromised situation (Bishop 
1990:264, 316; Bauer 2004:133). 
As Barry Commoner famously wrote of nature, “everything is connected to everything 
else,” and with the interconnections of times and spaces that form with the consolidations of high 
hegemony come a correspondence to this ecological law underlying the dissipative structures of 
living systems. What these temporal-spatial interconnections meant to the Dolpo-pa was that the 
closing of the Tibetan border through the machinations of the global reverberated down to the 
southern boundaries of their trade circuit, too. Indeed, in addition to leaving their herds with their 
partners on the plateau, the Dolpo-pa would also acquire large quantities of salt that their 
partners’ had harvested from the famed Tibetan flats, which the Dolpo-pa would then transport 
down into the Hindu hills at the southern end of their transhumant routes, some of which 
extended as far as into the fertile northern plains of India, to trade for grains (Childs 2004:36; 
Bauer 2004:40). This grain from the south was crucial to the trade circuit, as it was the 
commodity most desired by the Dolpo-pa’s Tibetan partners to the north and which was 
exchanged for those overwinter pastoral services, thus completing the trade circuit on a seasonal 
and steady basis over years and years and years. This is how things had always been. 
As Fisher (1986:98) explains, however, the price for Tibetan salt increased steadily with 
the decreased supply that resulted from the closing of the Tibetan border, providing an 
opportunity for salt traders from southern India, even though theirs was considered a lower 
quality product, to encroach further and further north into the Nepali hills, thereby lessening the 
demand for the Tibetan commodity. Improved national transport infrastructure as well as an 
increased focus on the health needs of the rural poor also increased this decline in demand. For 
example, supported by international development funding from both the West and China, the 
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Nepalese government initiated numerous rural development and health programs in the latter 
decades of the 20th century, including a program that regularly “deliver[ed] helicopter cargoes of 
subsidized foodstuffs—including packaged, iodized salt” from India – into the remote hills and 
mountains (Bauer 2004:124). Such internationally funded programs, according to Bishop 
(1990:310), led to the final and decisive collapse of the commodity circuit, “to the economic 
detriment of most mountain people,” as a reliable means of subsistence.  
Whereas the Dolpo-pa had for at least a millennium thrived within the high frontiers of 
their mountain climes, eking out difficult but locally adapted livelihoods as intermediaries in 
those trade networks that once interwove the livelihoods of very different peoples at vastly 
different altitudes across the region, the collapse of the grain-for-salt circuit with the closing of 
the Tibetan border in the 1960s and the increasing presence of iodized Indian salt in Nepal as the 
20th century drew to its close proved portentous, revealing the underlying reality in the high 
Himalayas of that Hobbesian insight into lives so lived, observed clearly now as being poor, 
nasty, brutish and short. And that insight, proof bestowed upon itself of the perspicacity of its 
uncritical but observable image of itself, provided the core with a model against which to 
construe favorably its own narrative of technological triumph. The Dolpo-pa, in contrast, were 
now palpably impoverished. Such obvious and dire poverty was, importantly, cognized by those 
centric sensibilities of the core according to the teleology of their singular models, which also 
described, in pronounced angles, how things had been naturalized as should be as outlined by 
those consolidations of the Enlightenment program of progress. Development, thereby, became 
the frame by which the core mobilized to make the Dolpo as they should be in lockstep with that 





CHAPTER 3 – THE VITALITY OF ICE & BONE, A THEORY IN METONYMY 
 
INTRODUCTION: NO WORD FOR CLIMATE 
In recent years, an ever-increasing consensus on atmospheric climate change has been 
built through the scientific process (IPCC 2007). Even though as recently as the early years of 
the 21st century uncertainties about the nature of such change and its long-term impacts 
remained quite high, recent studies have both confirmed and further revealed that the risks and 
realities of these global processes are at least as and probably even more serious than had been 
predicated only a few decades ago. As chemist Paul Crutzen claimed in his 1995 Nobel Prize 
acceptance speech, the earth has entered a new geological age, the Anthropocene. In so naming 
this new age, Crutzen was clearly referring to the impact of human activities on a schematized 
model of the terrestrial earth as a conceptual aggregate labeled ‘the biosphere’. He was most 
certainly not, however, referring specifically to the material reality of the Dolpo-pa of the high 
Himalayas of Western Nepal, who are physically human-animals and who on the whole have 
almost assuredly never heard of the IPCC or the Nobel Prize or Paul Crutzen or the 
Anthropocene or—as this study found—even climate change. Each of these ideas—even the 
“expert” Paul Crutzen—is a metonymical reification, a fictive representation regarded delusively 
as object-truth by a cultural model that in naturalizing the arbitrary emergence in the material 
human-surface of the human-animal’s evolutionary selective advantage of conceptual 
proficiency mystifies the ultimate rootedness of that animal as just one of a multitude of surfaces 
shifting and cleaving within the thin range of physical force and magnitude scaled to the 
ecological. As such, by the logic of one tradition’s conceptualization of reason through which 
truth is assessed circularly by the scientific, rational mind of its own generation, those thus 
trained to be so “scientific” come to conceptualize as reality such reifications as produced and 
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subsequently adduced by that circular invention. By this cognitive trick, the physical root of all 
conceptualization is de-emphasized by a distortion that confirms its own illusion by the arbitrary 
emergence as a selective advantage in the human-surface of its own capacity to so delude its 
human-animal self.  
Remarkably, however (and seldom ever more than perfunctorily considered, which is in 
many ways the point), ‘climate’ does not actually exist; it is a conceptualization, a statistical 
mean that has itself been reified as a material object in the world, which means, in other words, 
that it is really no more than an idiomatic expression used to represent a conceptual model of a 
physical reality in place and time that is not that model but that is often taken for it by the 
circularity generated by that same cognitive trick that lies at the core of the argument in this 
thesis. As has been widely reported of other cultures with amazement and wonder (and 
fetishizing exoticism) by observers accordingly deluded by this trick, the Dolpo-pa 
(unsurprisingly) have no word in their language that translates well as the English term ‘science’.  
Possibly even less precise is the translation for ‘climate’, the conceptual model of average 
weather over an uncertainly defined period of time in a specific place, which is, like human 
distinction in an environment, a concept certainly understandable to the Dolpo-pa but that is just 
not terribly useful or practical for them to consider in the conduct of everyday life. Such cultural 
differences in how certain experiences are prized while others are de-emphasized in 
conceptualization and representation fascinate not because of how they have traditionally been 
framed by analytical observers from one very specific tradition as the others’ exotic 
primitiveness or underdevelopment but because of how they illustrate the implication 
adumbrated in their very lack of equivalence, which is in many ways the fundamental idea this 
thesis will discuss.  
 
 33
Although ‘climate change’ has received so much attention, both positive and negative, 
from numerous sectors of society for two score and more years now, for example, climate, in 
fact, does not physically change; a reified statistical measure cannot of itself physically change—
it does not actually exist materially in the physical world. This is not to say that a schema like 
‘climate’ is not useful; it certainly is, for the same reason that schemas in general tend to be 
useful. It enables individuals and, when shared, cultures to conceptualize the diachronic physical 
force and material experience of weather through “a simplified representation of the world that 
allows one to interpret observations, generate novel inferences, and solve problems” (Kempton et 
al. 1996:10) related, in the case of schemas constellated as a model of climate, for example, to 
the physical force and magnitude of weather events. In so doing, such events are thereby 
synergistically entangled in material practices and conceptual models that can then be drawn 
from performatively and transmitted mimetically in extended engagement within an experiential 
domain of ‘holistic simultaneity’.  
Arguably, the arbitrary emergence of the synergy implied here (and to be expatiated more 
fully below) between the material and the conceptual is the selective advantage by which the 
second-order human-animal (the organism with such an evolutionarily emergent selective 
advantage) continues to surmount the same physical forces by which the cerebrum of the first-
order human-surface (the phenotypic form arbitrarily evolved through entirely physical selective 
pressures) evolved. This ongoing evolutionary process continues to drive all such conditionally-
structured surfaces at dissipative disequilibrium toward that entropic end of all such structures 




FRAMING THE COGNITIVE ANTHROPOLOGICAL STUDY OF CULTURAL FRAMES 
In anthropology, culture is sometimes defined as a process of shared and socially 
learned/transmitted beliefs, values, and practices. This definition is commonly operationalized in 
cognitive anthropology through frames or models theory. Frames or models are typically defined 
as intricate networks of schemas that the higher order synaptic functioning of the human 
cerebrum constellates in making possible in humans-animals among all other animal-surfaces an 
awareness of awareness in the world. As cognitive psychologist George Mandler (1984:55-56) 
states: “The schema that is developed as a result of prior experiences with a particular kind of 
event is not a carbon copy of that event; schemas are abstract representations of environmental 
regularities. We comprehend events in terms of the schemas they activate.” Strauss and Quinn 
(1997:6; see also Rumelhart et al. 1986:18) more recently have defined schemas as “networks of 
strongly connected cognitive elements that represent the generic concepts stored in memory.” 
They are, in other words, rudimentary components of cognition that enable individuals to 
establish coherence in the arrangement and management of diachronic stimuli through 
experience in the world.  
Possibly the most intricate of these schematic networks, one common to all humans the 
world over, is that which draws humans to other humans who have similarly constellated such 
networks, thereby generating that process of shared, social transmission that is culture. Such 
cultural transmissions emerge through a synergy of shared experiences and transmitted 
conceptual proficiencies gained through extended engagement, both personal and social, in 
surmounting physical forces and magnitudes contended with at the biometabolic scale of 
ecological processes. Such constellated networks interact with the dynamism of the arrayed 
surfaces of those physical realities in an ongoing regularity that imprints on subsequent 
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schematic constellations the recurrence and regularity of the experience of those physical forces 
and magnitudes, resulting in “humanly created products and learned practices that lead them to 
develop a set of similar schemas,” a process through which “it makes sense to say they share a 
culture” (Strauss and Quinn, 1997:7).  
As anthropologist Thomas W. McDade (2000:124) argues, however, “new models of 
culture change are needed that provide a better representation of the proximate person-
environment dynamics that define the lived experience of individuals.” Too often in cognitive 
anthropology, the proximate nature of this “person-environment dynamic” to which McDade 
refers is de-emphasized in over-accentuation of conceptual elements of cognition and modeling 
or, even more troubling, the too perfunctorily upheld Cartesian dichotomization of the body and 
the environment, which has only ever been one specific tradition’s cultural model. Regrettably, 
this model is too often accepted without contestation in investigations into, for example, the 
somatization of disease (Kirmayer and Sartorius 2007) or other medical anthropological analyses, 
even those that ostensibly identify and measure the effects of such a distorted perspective 
(Dressler and Bindon 2000). As Ingold (1992:45) rightfully identifies, however: 
According to [this cognitivism], we must first know the world before we can act in it, and knowing consists 
 in the organization of sensations impinging upon the passively receptive human  subject into progressively 
 higher-order structures of ‘representations’ . . . All knowledge of the environment has therefore to be 
 reconstructed from these inadequate and fragmentary data, and this is achieved through processing the 
 ‘raw’ sensory input according to cognitive schemata located in the head of the perceiver, not ‘out there’ in 
 the world. Thus whatever patterning, structure or meaning we find in what we perceive is contributed by 
 our own minds. 
 
The point is that the material-physical ground on which such schematic constellations are framed 
has been too uncritically de-emphasized in representations of lived experience and, as Forsyth 
(2003:3) suggests, in the way that “social and political framings are woven into both the 
formulation of scientific explanations of environmental problems and the solutions proposed to 
reduce them”; in truth, however, this ground is no less than the source of the continued vitality of 
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the human-animal. The functioning of the physical cerebrum that generates the constellated 
schemas of conceptual models both frames and is framed by such extended synergistic 
engagement within the biometabolic scale of ecological processes, transforming continually by 
those material interactions that conceptual awareness of awareness that is such a defining 
characteristic of the human-surface cum -animal.  
Only through such meta-awareness as is generated by the material functioning of the 
physical cerebrum evolved of the human-surface are human-animals thus capable of representing 
the perceptual world of their experiences and interpreting meaning through conceptualizations of 
those experiences. Significantly, such symbolic representations of perceptual experience as 
‘meaning’ or ‘meaningful’ are ultimately grounded in the happenstance of the arbitrary 
conditions within which and of which the human-surface (including, notably, its vaunted 
cerebrum) has and continues to physically evolve. Accedence to an understanding that is either 
idealist or consequentialist beyond the reality of this physicality is in every case no more than 
teleological, or, as Bourdieu (1977:164) asserted, the product of the “naturalization of its own 
arbitrariness.” As Strauss and Quinn (1997:18-19, emphases added) in pointing out the 
inconsistencies on this topic of symbolic anthropologists like Geertz continue: “It takes only a 
moment of thought to see that meanings cannot literally be found in symbols . . . Meanings of 
things have to be in people’s minds . . . There is no other place for meanings to be concretely, 
and they have to be concrete if they make a difference in the world.”  
This is not to say that symbolism is not important; indeed, it is crucial, but, as Shore 
(1991:11) claims, “Symbolic anthropologists . . . should be ready to place culture back in mind, 
where it has always belonged.” Crucially, however, these claims embody these authors’ own bits 
of reified illusion. They do not discount completely but certainly de-emphasize the evolutionary 
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physicality of the brain in over-accentuating the emergent conceptual proficiency modeled as the 
mind. Indeed, such grounding in the physical is vital because it restores experience to its primacy 
as the foundation of any certainty adducible in the physical world, a position that has, as Marx 
described in the Critique on Hegel’s Doctrine of the State (1843[1992]), been usurped for at least 
two-score centuries by the illusory and rather absurd reification of the conceptual as the ground 
of all being. 
The point is that although they are without doubt exceptionally important for the thriving 
expansiveness of the human-animal over the many climatological and ecological zones through 
which it dwells around the world, such conceptual representations as mental models and symbols 
should be understood as being actually only of second-order concern to each human-surface’s 
first-order material experience of existence amid the multitude of other physical surfaces that 
shift and cleave asymmetrically at the biometabolic scale of ecological processes (Gibson 
1979:18). Indeed, only through the physical evolution of the human-surface by those same forces 
could the human-animal have emerged at all, each individual constellating schemas in the 
genetic isolation (regardless of culture or copulation) of their being even as by phenotypic 
similitude those constellations frame related conceptual representations. Importantly, however, 
as Strauss and Quinn (1997:7) specifically point out, these schemas that emerge and constellate 
by this arbitrary genetic evolution of cerebral matter are not themselves genetically encoded, 
though they are, again, always rooted (and often transmitted) through first-order material 
experience. As Shore (1991:10) states, “meaning construction involves the perpetual encounter 
of a meaning-seeking subject and a culturally conventionalized object-world.”  
Too often de-emphasized by cognitive researchers in discussion of such models and 
meaning constructions, however, as noted with both Strauss & Quinn and Shore above, is this 
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indisputable first-order primacy of the human-surface as material over the human-animal as 
second-order conceptually proficient mind; the surface, that is, is a part of even as it dwells apart 
from that “object-world” regardless of how that world of objects is “culturally conventionalized” 
in conceptual understandings of that material grounding in the ecological processes of the 
biometabolic scale. Only through such extended, synergistic awareness of experiential contexts 
and schematic constellations, possible in the first instance only through the physical evolution of 
the cerebrum in the human-surface, has the human-animal even been thus enabled to experience 
such recursive awareness that has by that cognitive trick arbitrarily formalized by one tradition 
(to be discussed presently) so distorted the framing of that first-order ecological reality. Those 
mental models or frames of meaning that have emerged as conceptual outcomes of that physical 
evolution of experience further constellate with each subsequent experience, thereby confirming 
or contesting or altering those schemas as they continuously emerge and constellate in 
confronting each diachronically coherent awareness of how such awareness is grounded at all 
times within the entanglements of surfaces formed and transformed by the ongoing biometabolic 
flux of those ecological processes. To be sure, such meta-awareness is always experiential (and, 
in being shared and transmitted, cultural). 
Human-animals are, therefore (and foremost), as described in the introduction, on the 
first order no more than physical-objects within that biometabolic scale of ecological reality. 
They are conditionally-structured surfaces asymmetrically arrayed within that shifting, cleaving 
range of physical force and magnitude that array all other surfaces, from viruses to Antarctic ice 
sheets, through ecological processes. Indeed, they must be so in order to be able to even begin to 
conceptualize or represent or interpret any meaning at all from those asymmetrically arrayed 
surfaces that shift and cleave by those same processes of biometabolism of which they too are 
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consonant, both physically as surfaces and existentially as animals. In the end, that is, regardless 
of ‘rank or riverbank’, entropy slackens all, no less. Vitally, however, this asymmetrical array of 
surfaces should not be labeled, as it far too perfunctorily often is, the environment, a term that 
has come to connote an ineradicable separation of the human-animal from the physical surfaces 
of its existence both as arrayed in context (human/nature) and of itself existing itself as an 
asymmetrical surface within that asymmetrical array of surfaces (mind/matter) (see Bateson 
1972).  
Such a separation is impossible in any reality but that which is framed through a 
representational fancy that conceives of the human-animal first as human being, a distortion of 
order that has had and continues to have significant and, counterintuitively through at least one 
frame of reference, altogether negative consequences. Even though such separation remains 
fundamental to the model of an increasingly hegemonic (and seldom contested in practice) 
representation of the world born of a specific schematic constellation of Enlightenment ideals, it 
has transformed and continues to transform terrestrial metabolisms by the imprint of its own 
impression, which metaphorically suggests the circularity that sustains its illusion and that is a 
core focus of the argument of this thesis.  
The point being made here is that this distorted conceptual representation has been and 
continues to be exceptionally detrimental, not only in the theoretical considerations of academia 
but also ‘on the ground’, which is itself too often treated as a conceptual expression for what in 
reality is a terrestrial place in time and space where real human-animals (among millions of other 
n-animals) continuously struggle to surmount the influences of this conceptual representation’s 
ever-more hegemonic distortions. Indeed, this expanding hegemony is in many ways the basic 
problematic of this thesis, the core of which is that too-perfunctorily drawn upon and distorted 
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conceptual model of the environment that differs vitally from such delegitimized models of other 
traditions like that identified in Dolpo in the course of this study. As expatiated in Chapter 4, the 
Dolpo-pa’s model of entanglement posits the uncertainty inherent to living asymmetrically 
within the existential moment of ecological processes. Presently, however, a brief exposition of 
the singular history by which this distorted framing of the environment became so accordant with 
the circular model of the ever-expanding hegemony of European Enlightenment idealism around 
the world will provide context and language for the substantive chapters of the thesis. 
 
FRAMING THE ENVIRONMENT AS A DOMAIN OF ENTANGLEMENT 
As anthropologist Tim Ingold (2006:14) has argued, “What we have been accustomed to 
calling ‘the environment’ might . . . be better envisaged as a domain of entanglement.” The 
problem in using the noun phrase the environment is suggested by Ingold’s usage of the term 
“accustomed,” the environment, at this stage of social representation, too perfunctorily connoting 
how one cultural tradition has come, through its very specific experience of material surfaces in 
its very specific history, to conceptualize and model the relationship between “human beings” 
and “the rest of nature.” The phrase the environment evokes schemas constellated from the 
specific assumptions central to the models of that specific tradition, and those of us descended 
from and inured to that tradition have become far too accustomed to the particular (and peculiar) 
representations of those models that inform how each of us frames our interactions with the 
physical world.  
The noun phrase the environment, in other words, now too unthinkingly accepts without 
contest as truth one tradition’s representation, even though a distinct historical origin of that 
particular representation, the intellectual movements of Enlightenment Europe, is clearly evident 
 
 41
and adducible. Included in the assumptions founded in that origin, for example, is the Kantian 
dualism of first and second nature “that crystallized into the backbone of the bourgeois ideology 
of nature” in the 19th century (Smith 1990:12) and that is grounded in “the Cartesian ontology . . 
. that divorces the activity of the mind from that of the body in the world” (Ingold 2000:165). 
Through this Cartesian divide, as Harvey (1990:249) argues, “domination of nature became a 
necessary condition of human emancipation,” steadfastness toward the goal of which, as 
illustrated in Descartes’ Discourse on Method, eschewed the chaos of nature for the artifice of 
perfection and the concomitant “need for artifice to overcome the natural obstacles to autonomy” 
that was nature itself (Merrill 2008:98).  
Smith (1990:14) continues, discussing how the scientific methodology generated by that 
particular tradition of representation “treats nature as external in the sense that scientific method 
and procedure dictates an absolute abstraction both from the social context of the events and 
objects under scrutiny and from the social context of the scientific activity itself.” As such, by 
the logic of reason through which that truth is assessed circularly by the scientific, rational mind 
of its own generation, those thus trained to be so “scientific” come to conceptualize as 
commonsense space the absolute space of that tautological invention, “creat[ing],” as Ingold 
(2006:16) states, “the impression that life goes on upon the outer surface of a world that has 
already congealed into its final form, rather than in the midst of a world of perpetual flux.” In 
Western cultural tradition since the Enlightenment, therefore, the environment has been tied 
inextricably to one particular way of representing the world to which those in that tradition have 
become accustomed to representing the world but that is neither the only legitimate way nor, 
possibly, the most legitimate way to represent the worldix.  
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The environment as it has come to be represented must itself be understood, that is, as an 
interpretive model, a point noteworthy in itself but also in that it implies that such interpretive 
models are “largely tacit and unexamined, the models embed[ding] a view of ‘what is’ and ‘what 
it means’ that seem wholly natural—a matter of course. Alternative views are not even 
recognized, let alone considered. But more than naturalness, these . . . models grant a seeming 
necessity to how we ourselves live our lives” (Holland and Quinn 1982:11). As opposed to the 
assumption often made in subfields like medical anthropology of explanatory models as being 
explicitly known to informants, as Kirmayer and Sartorius (2007:833) contend, “knowledge is 
also encoded in various implicit ways [as] in patterns of association that are acquired outside of 
conscious awareness and that result in dispositions to respond to events in particular ways.” Such 
models “tend to appear as necessary, even natural,” that is, despite the arbitrariness of their 
history, which “produces individual and collective practices—more history—in accordance with 
the schemes generated by history” (Bourdieu 1990:53-54). 
 Through such schemes of history that generate such schemes of history in the forms of 
symbolic custom and traditional practice that perpetuate cognitive models in being shared and 
transmitted by such history, cultural models emerge and are perpetuated by extended 
engagement of individuals in a culture as a part of and apart from a specific, per Ingold, “domain 
of entanglement.” Such a domain is always at its root innately physical in being scaled 
biometabolically to the possible forces and magnitudes of ecological processes as evolved in this 
world (Gibson 1979:15). Kempton (2001:50) implicitly corroborates this notion of ‘extended 
engagement’ in his contrast of what he terms ‘indigenous’ with ‘state-level’ societies and their 
comparative depth and frequency of interaction with the natural world, the former being defined 
in part by their long-term engagement with a specific place.  
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As such, this idea is consistent with current cognitive anthropological framing of 
ecological relationships not in terms of classification by humans but, in contrast, in terms of the 
question: “What mental constructs does a culture use to understand and predict the ways in 
which species interact with each other and with human perturbations?” (Kempton 2001:59, 
emphases omitted). Argued here is that this shared and transmitted experience of first-order 
physical reality within a domain of entanglement, as, for example, the tactics emergent of 
traders’ practice in traversing with caravans of ware-laden yaks the remote high passes of Dolpo, 
is the foundation of the schemas from which cognitive and thereby culture models emerge as 
constellated networks of those schemas. Holland and Quinn (1987:105) suggest this ground, 
claiming that “cognitive constraints are important forces for the inertia of the cultural model 
[but] even more important are the constraints that derive from the social nature of the model.”  
Intimated in this recognition is that the social nature of the model must always be rooted 
within such a domain of entanglement that is always itself rooted in ecological processes, which 
is no less than that thin (relative to the extremes suggested by conceptualizations of the quantum 
and the cosmic) physical range of forces and magnitudes that are perceptible to phenotypic 
evolutions at that biometabolic scale. “So different, in fact, are environmental motions from 
those studied by Isaac Newton,” Gibson (1979:15) avers, “that it is best to think of them as 
changes of structure rather than changes of position of elementary bodies, changes of form rather 
than of point locations, or changes in the layout rather than motions in the usual meaning of the 
term.” Within such a thin range of motions, though the universal laws of motion identified by 
Enlightenment and deducible at those extremes remain continuous, those laws do not prove 
terribly useful in describing the physical forces and magnitudes distinctive to that biometablic 
scale, which is composed, as Gibson (1979:15) recognized, “mostly . . . of surfaces, not of bodies 
 
 44
in space. And these surfaces often flow or undergo stretching, squeezing, bending, and breaking 
in ways of enormous mechanical complexity.”  
Together, these surfaces array in ecological processes, a totality of entangled continuity 
in which an “animal is thought of as a highly organized part of the physical world but still a part 
and still an object” (Gibson 1979:8)x. These animal-surfaces are remarkable only in second-order 
reifications of the otherwise arbitrary first-order entanglements of their evolutions, ‘remarkable’, 
notably, being nothing more than a conceptual elaboration for what are no more than surface 
movements and emergent cerebral functioningxi. This noteworthy point suggests how that 
biometabolic complexity is rooted squarely in the physical reality of the ecological processes that 
enable such a response. Indeed, this is a remarkable evolution, but it is only possible through 
those selective processes of the material through which “every animal is, in some degree at least, 
a perceiver and a behaver . . . [though] this is not to say that it perceives the world of physics and 
behaves in the space and time of physics” (Gibson 1979:8).  
The point is that such shared models are actually little more than byproducts of that very 
physical cerebral evolution, the way by which the genetics of the human-surface has responded 
to evolutionary pressures of ecological processes at that biometabolic scale in emerging as a part 
of an evolutionary entanglementxii conducive to its particular means of adapting well to the 
asymmetries consonant with being thus a surface arrayed in the physical world. As Ingold 
(2000:19) writes: 
Organic life . . . is active rather than reactive, the creative unfolding of an entire field of relations within 
which beings emerge and take on the particular forms they do, each in relation to the others. Life, in this 
view, is not the realization of pre-specified forms but the very process wherein forms are generated and 
held in place. Every being, as it is caught up in the process and carries it forward, arises as a singular centre 
of awareness and agency: an enfoldment, at some particular nexus within it, of the generative potential that 
is life itself. 
 
Again, this is not to argue that schemas or models or cultures are genetic; they are by no means 
so. What is being argued is that such nested and synergistic cognitive mechanisms are made 
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possible only by that genetic happenstance of evolutionary pressures that has given rise to such 
highly complex functioning of the cerebrum of the human-surface. This happenstance enables 
such conceptual awareness of awareness that is so specific to and consistent in phenotypic 
human-animals that have endured for upwards of two hundred millennia across the always 
changing climatological and ecological zones of the world.  
 Animal-surfaces, that is, including the human, as reasonably durable dissipative 
structures (Prigogine and Stengers 1984) within an asymmetrically arrayed domain of 
biometabolic entanglement, are themselves better understood as conditionally-structured surfaces 
naturally selected by the emergent advantages that suit and shape their specific phenotypes 
within a specific ecology. This is true regardless of how adroitly an animal-surface occupies a 
particular position within that thin range of ecological forces relative to those quantum/cosmic 
extremes. This adroitness provides a significant selective advantage to the human-animal, but is 
no ‘better’ or ‘more advanced’ (though is possibly more complex) than the selective advantage 
of any other surface cum animal-surface that has survived genetically in surmounting those same 
ecological processes in evolving through space-time. Neither is such adroitness teleological, as it 
is typically construed in the distortion of the first- and second-orders of the material and the 
conceptual, respectively, the arbitrariness of its emergence only having been naturalized as such 
through the circularity confirmed of its own emergent capacity for conceptualization. As Ingold 
(2000:19) argues with due passion:  
A properly ecological approach . . . is one that would take, as its point of departure, the whole-organism-in-
its-environment. In other words, ‘organism plus environment’ should denote not a compound of two things, 
but one indivisible totality. That totality is, in effect, a developmental system (cf. Oyama 1985), and an 
ecology of life—in my terms—is one that would deal with the dynamics of such systems. Now, if this view 
is accepted—if, that is, we are prepared to treat form as emergent within the life-process—then, I contend, 
we have no need to appeal to a distinct domain of mind, to creatura rather than pleroma, to account for 
pattern and meaning in the world. We do not, in other word, have to think of mind or consciousness as a 
layer of being over and above that of the life of organisms, in order to account for their creative 




Such an honest understanding of the orders of the object-world in human-animal experience as a 
surface entangled in a specific domain has considerable implications for how what has become, I 
contend, an uncontested ‘schema of schemas’ is approached and contended with at this stage in 
the development of cognitive anthropology.  
 
REALITY : HOLISTIC SIMULTANEITY :: REIFICATION : LINEAR SEQUENTIALITY 
Schemas of perception, as cognitive anthropologist Stephen Tyler (1978:100) asserts, are 
“founded in holistic simultaneity” that differs markedly from the symbolic representations of 
rules, which are “founded in linear sequentiality.” By this distinction, Tyler suggests that such 
holism becomes practicable only after extended engagement within an entangled domain, which 
contrasts markedly with how the linearity of symbolic representations necessitates strictly 
articulated rules that derive from that same singular tradition that reifies a separate and fixed 
space called the environment. Representationally framing the environment as a separate space 
thereby necessitates the continual establishment of such rules in order for such separation to be 
successfully upheld and traversed, holistic simultaneity being unattainable by the very 
fragmentation of such a model’s conceptual fragmentation from its root material reality. In other 
words, through the necessity of framing the circularity, the conceptual becomes ascendant as an 
oxymoronic ‘concrete abstraction’ in the world, even as its delegation as a first-order 
phenomenon at the same time de-emphasizes the actual experience of physical objects in the 
world as peripheral, of only secondary and brute interest. In this way, the primacy of the physical 
as the root of all representation is mystified merely by the framing of its abeyance as such 
through the circular confirmation of its own conceptual proficiencies.  
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The most celebrated example of this mystification is the cogito, ‘I think, therefore I am’. 
Descartes’s is an interesting cognitive trick even as it remains the foundation of the Western 
approach to the world. The difference, as Casson (1983:431) emphasizes, is that “schemata, 
unlike associations, are organic wholes comprised of parts that are oriented to the whole and to 
other parts,” which is a synergistic awareness encompassing both material experience and 
conceptual proficiency. Schemata embody a holism that becomes more and more fragmented as 
engagement with the physical root of such reifications becomes less extensively defined as linear 
sequentiality becomes increasingly ascendant. In thus sundering the material from the 
conceptual, I am no longer because I am embodied in awareness but only delusionally because I 
think am I, which physically disembodies and cognitively de-emphasizes that physical 
foundation of all reality by a trick that belies what possibility actually is in dwelling ecologically.  
Tyler continues to develop this compelling intimation, averring that "the structure of 
knowledge cannot consist of a mere picture of the world or even of a set of concepts which refer 
to or stand in a one-to-one relation with elements of the external world" (1978:98). Linear 
sequentiality, however, through such rules of symbolic representation that endeavor to establish 
just such a one-to-one relation with an external world thus modeled as the environment, has had 
and can only have limited success. Despite Enlightenment schematic constellations that continue 
to model such reified spaces as fixed, the entangled domains of the material world of perceptual 
experience always scale to the biometabolic, which is, as Ingold well-recognizes, constantly in 
flux. The constancy of such flux necessitates a practical logic that “ensures the active presence of 
past experiences, which, deposited in each organism in the form of schemes of perception, 
thought and action, tend to guarantee the ‘correctness’ of practices and their constancy over time, 
more reliably than all formal rules and explicit norms” (Bourdieu 1990:54).  
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This is a very different, embodied logic from that of sequential rules and reasons that try 
but are incapable of keeping pace with the constancy of such flux. Such embodied logic is 
founded on a holistic simultaneity, as Tyler describes, as it is a logic that does not attempt the 
impossible in trying to keep pace but remains attuned and enskiled not to living linearly on a 
conceptual space called the environment but to dwelling first and foremost within a 
biometabolically-scaled domain of ecological entanglement. The conceptual byproducts (e.g. 
schemas and models and cultures) of such an entanglement provide human-animals through their 
phenotypic human-surfaces with a selective advantage that is strengthened by looping 
continually back in extended engagement of such ecological processes. This logic is well-
described by Bourdieu (1990:95), whose depiction of its dynamism complements Tyler’s 
adumbration of holistic simultaneity: 
produced by the practice of the successive generations, in a particular type of conditions of existence 
[through which] these schemes of perception, appreciation and action, which are acquired through practice 
and implemented in the practical state without attaining explicit representation, function as practical 
operators through which the objective structures of which they are the product tend to be reproduced in 
practices. 
 
The difficulty is that such fragmentation as is effected by the linear sequentiality of 
conceptual representation, ascendant as a circular distortion of the first-order even today, often 
continues relatively uncontested among practitioners and academics alike. This lack of 
contestation occurs because cultural models such as the environment have been too uncritically 
accepted as legitimate, reflecting in analyses awareness not as cognized by informants but as 
ascribed by analytical observers who are not holistically coincident with the material bases of the 
models current to such domains of entanglement as anthropological observers often study. Such 
coincidence requires extended engagement with such a domain and as radical a defamiliarization 
(Marcus and Fischer 1986) of observers’ own conceptual reifications as possible. Kempton et 
al.’s (1996:15) study on environmental values in American culture, for example, thoughtfully 
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indicates how “in the United States laypeople create models by mixing parts of the scientists’ 
models with parts that laypeople construct themselves,” though the authors are themselves 
American and so are ensconced within such a frame as both natives and observers.  
Chernela’s (1987:50) description of Tukano fishing taboos, on the other hand, though it 
well-presents and defends, as necessary, the Tukano model as legitimately framing in its context 
how “the river margin belongs to the fish, not to man,” still relies on terminology that frames 
Tukano practices as, for instance, ‘resource management’, which, argued here, is no less a 
subjugation to a Cartesian ideology as is those representations that delegitimize such models as 
irrational straight away. As such, I take Hornborg’s (2001:112; see also Marcus and Fischer 
1986) position quite literally: “The ultimate justification for anthropology is not the 
comprehension of others as an end in itself, but the possibilities of converting experiences of 
cultural multiplicity into a critical scrutiny of our own Western habits of thought.” So, for 
example, in concluding that “When authorities denigrate traditional indigenous belief systems, 
they do so in ignorance of the consequences to the environment,” Chernela certainly expresses 
an important point, but she undermines that point in her own acquiescence to the vocabulary of 
the subjugator. Words like indigenous and the environment make little sense to a people like the 
Tukano, as like the Dolpo-pa, who do not see such a space as the environment through the not so 
egregiously marked indigenous but just their quite apposite ‘knowledge’ as acquired through 
their awareness in holistic simultaneity of dwelling within their particular domains of 
entanglement. As Wittgenstein (1921[1971]:115) reflected, “The limits of my language mean the 
limits of my world.” 
 Bourdieu (1990:90) states that such representational fragmentation as effected still by 
anthropological observers “converts a practical succession [domain of entanglement] into a 
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represented succession [the environment], an action oriented in relation to a space objectively 
constituted as a structure of demands (things ‘to be done’) into a reversible operation performed 
in a continuous, homogenous space.” In such cases, importantly, a physical space becomes a 
representation of space that is confirmed by its own circular representation of truth, making it 
“something other than what it basically is, even though . . . consciousness does reflect the 
superficial and hypostatized configuration of society” (Taussig 2010:31) that constellates schema 
as such a fragmented illusion of material separation and perceptual abeyance to the reality of that 
surface asymmetry.  Although observers (see Bourdieu 1990:20-21; Turner 1967:7) have over 
the past two-score and more years cautioned against and criticized such cognitive bias in 
observations seeking to describe how cognition functions as an aspect of the 
intrapersonal/extrapersonal mental structures, as Strauss and Quinn (1997:6) characterize it, of 
schemas as constellated in such models, such bias insinuates itself still most commonly in what 
Casson (1983:430) calls “iconic representations.” In this phrase, Casson refers to those persistent 
and perfunctorily accepted representations such as the environment that, due to their de-emphasis 
of the physical, “are simply not rich enough to account for the complexity of human behavior” or 
the reality of the material asymmetries of human-surface entanglement. Hornborg’s (2001:118-
119) discussion (referencing Evernden 1985) of how Western cultural representations are the 
products of categorized perceptions of even their physical bodies is compelling here: 
The Western preoccupation with material forms is an expression of the sovereignty assigned to the sense of 
sight. Organisms, for instance, are visualized as bounded phenomena, confined within their skins, rather 
than as overlapping fields . . . The continuous but invisible flows of energy, oxygen, information, and so on 
that sustain and in fact constitute a human being are not the primary way in which she represents herself to 
the senses. The isolation of form from process and of part from whole is an aspect of the proclivity to 
objectify that has been so characteristic of Western thought. It produces an atomistic, reductionist 
worldview supremely adequate for technical manipulation but hardly for holistic understanding. 
 
The issue here may amount to the fact that such observers often apply, typically 
unconsciously, an unexamined ‘schema of schemas’ that they draw upon in schematizing not the 
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but an other and that contains several centuries of insufficiently explored undertone and nuance 
in such “iconic representations” as the environment that remain in those still-biased analyses still 
uncontested. As will be argued in this thesis through the experience of the Dolpo-pa, such 
unrecognized bias in representation is intolerable exactly because, though conceptual and treated 
as such through the distorted frame of its circular illusion, it has very real and very dire on-the-
ground impacts. Such impacts occur at the level of the holistic simultaneity of material practice 
and perceptual experience, that ecological scale of physical thriving and decay from which such 
representations always arise and onto which they prove exceptionally consequential within each 
specific domain of entanglement that fragments, as Tyler suggests, by a linear adducement of the 
conceptual what is always holistic in the perceptual. This fragmentation occurs even unto the 
entropic surface decay of physical life-surfaces that human-animals the world over tend to 
represent through a multitude of cultural models as death.  
As Donald Norman (1986:536, emphases added) argues, therefore, 
Schemas are flexible configurations, mirroring the regularities of experience, providing automatic 
completion of missing components, automatically generalizing from the past, but also continually in 
modification, continually adapting to reflect the current state of affairs. Schemas are not fixed, immutable 
data structures. Schemas are flexible interpretive states that reflect the mixture of past experiences and 
present circumstance. 
         Because the schema is in reality the theorist’s interpretation of the system configuration, and because 
the system configures itself differently according to the sum of all the numerous influences upon it, each 
new invocation of a schema may differ from the previous invocations. Thus, the system behaves as if there 
were prototypical schemas, but where the prototype is constructed anew for each occasion by combining 
past experiences with biases and activation levels resulting from the current experience and the context in 
which it occurs. 
 
The emphasized phrases in Norman’s excerpt are meant to underscore how Tyler’s ‘holistic 
simultaneity’ requires extended material engagement with a specific “domain of entanglement.” 
Each phrase adumbrates how “the spatial practice of a society secretes that society’s space . . . 
propound[ing] and presuppos[ing] it, in a dialectical interaction [that] produces it slowly and 
surely as it masters and appropriates it” through the ongoing recursion of lived experience “as 
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directly lived through [that society’s] associated images and symbols, and hence the space[s] of 
‘inhabitants’ and ‘users’” (Lefebvre 1991:38,41). Effective holistic simultaneity, that is, requires 
the sort of synergistic awareness that is obtainable only through extended engagement with the 
physical that is always the ground of such conceptual proficiency and that always feeds back in 
contesting, confirming or altering the awareness of the synergy through further experience. Such 
awareness is inherently relational, “not only constitutive of both the knower and the known . . . 
but that crucially also acknowledges this fundamental condition [of the material], and thus also 
the responsibilities that must always adhere to the very act of ‘knowing’” (Hornborg 2006:8).  
Time, hereby, is differently bound to space than in Harvey’s (1990:203) elucidation of 
the compressions of time-space because time is differently experienced in the synergistic holism 
of such an awareness. Indeed, by this practical logic, time is the only accumulative measure, but 
it is less a measurement as understood by a conceptual logic than an enskilment derived of living 
as a conditionally-structured surface grounded in experience and arrayed within an entangled 
domain of physical asymmetry. It is a practical mastery of material practice through the 
perceptual experience of practice that is “gained by moving about in [the entanglement], 
exploring it, attending to it, ever alert to the signs by which it is revealed. Learning to see, then, 
is a matter not of acquiring schemata for mentally constructing the environment but of acquiring 
the skills for direct perceptual engagement with its constituents” (Ingold 2000:55, emphasis in 
original).  
As such, time is accumulative not in a sense of acquisition but of existential continuity, of 
physical endurance through manipulations of the phenotypic capacities emergent of evolution in 
surmounting the pressures of such evolutions. Enskilment, that is, through the schematization of 
how past experiences of the material have been surmounted enables that holistic conceptual 
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modeling that increases selective advantage, making overcoming through such synergistic 
awareness a similar range of circumstances that is to be expected within a specific domain of 
entanglement after such an extended engagement more and more likely. Indeed, such phenotypic 
continuity through the capacities rendered of successfully surmounting the pressures of a specific 
domain of entanglement demands such enskilment as synergized through holistic awarenessxiii. 
This point is significant, as D’Andrade (1995:144) suggests in claiming that 
“anthropologists and social scientists sometimes ascribe rules to the actor when it is only the 
actor’s behavior that is being described . . . [and] there may be in fact no rules inside the actor—
only networks of certain kinds.” This connectionist conception of networks is approximated in 
Bourdieu’s (1977:85) notion of habitus, the process of  
inculcation and appropriation necessary in order for those products of collective history, the objective 
structures (e.g. of language, economy, etc.) to succeed in reproducing themselves more or less completely, 
in the form of durable dispositions, in the organisms . . . lastingly subjected to the same conditionings, and 
hence placed in the same material conditions of existence.  
 
Through such networks, as adduced in connectionist theory, meanings materialize in “mental 
states but are shaped by the learner’s specific life experiences and are sensitive to activity in a 
particular material context” (Strauss and Quinn 1997:50; see also D’Andrade 1995:147). 
Behavior, that is, regardless of motivation, is always at its root practice within a physical 
entanglement, when an animal-surface becomes aware of the sentience of the asymmetry of 
being both a part of and apart from its domain, which is always, from the discolored nail on the 
big toe to the gray matter of the relatively sizeable human cerebrum, foremost physical. As 
Holland and Quinn (1982:12) state, “cultural models of self and life organize what are, literally, 
vital understandings.” Such vitality materializes through experience of asymmetrically arrayed 
surfaces in space-time over which individuals conceptualize and share similar perceptual 
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experiences of those biometabolic entanglements, thereby effecting greater likelihood of their 
phenotypic perpetuation.  
Cultural models may be thought of, therefore, as “highly schematized, skeletal 
representation[s] of some cultural domain, including the elements, structure, associations, and 
processes within that domain” (Dressler and Bindon 2000:246). Such conceptual representations 
are socially arrayed and widely diffused in a dynamic, nested complexity of scale that interacts 
and constellates various other models in conferring the coherence of culture to the logics and 
practices of the experiences and perceptions through which they have emerged (D’Andrade 
1995; Holland and Quinn 1987; Shweder 2003; Strauss and Quinn 1997). Holistically 
simultaneous, these models are recursively generative, concurrently framing and framed by the 
concatenations of each successive generation of the aspects, both socially and materially, 
described by the model within a specific domain of entanglement.  
In this way, cultural models can be thought of as the conceptual byproducts of such 
prolonged (and ongoing) material interactions within a biometabolic domain of ecological 
entanglement. Thus arrayed, the material continually generates and substantiates the conceptual, 
bringing, by the framing enabled through such modeled conceptualizations, perceptions in the 
existential present in line with those material experiences from the past that proved effective in 
negotiating what similar physical conditions can be expected to be confronted into the future. As 
such, the cultural model provides the coherence that facilitates this synergistic awareness 
between material experience and conceptual proficiency within an entangled domain.  
This understanding seems to conflict with Strauss and Quinn (1997:7), who arbitrarily 
limit “what sorts of shared experiences are cultural” in stating that “[they] do not think it is 
useful to use ‘culture’ to refer to shared experiences of the natural world.” By the holistic 
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awareness described here, however, experiences of the material no less than the conceptual 
values and traditional practices of a culture derive on the first order from those ecological 
conditions that effect those values and practices by the conceptual representations of the material 
experiences of the biometabolic that constellate schemas as second-order models. As such, 
Strauss and Quinn’s appraisal appears to arise no less from that bias of “iconic representation” in 
perfunctorily de-emphasizing the material in pursuit of the cognitive elements of the conceptual, 
a significant distortion that derives, most likely, from an uncontested ‘schema of schemas’ that is 
no less grounded in that Enlightenment separation of the environment from conceptual 
representations of mind within a physical world that is thereby frozen somehow in the linear 
sequence of time. 
 
CONCLUSION: TREKKING ON TO DOLPO 
At least one thousand years of caravanning yaks on trade routes between the Tibetan 
Plateau and the Middle Hills of Nepal and even down to the Gangian Plains through the 
unforgiving physical conditions of the high, remote Himalayas have significantly shaped the 
practices of the Dolpo-pa. In turn, those practices have significantly affected how the Dolpo-pa 
conceptualize their world, the cultural models by which they frame the experiences that effect 
those practices being directly and continuously synergized with the ecological processes in the 
existential present of confirming, contesting or altering their awareness of those experiences. As 
such, therefore, the model of physical reality that is too uncritically framed by observers 
descended from those specific histories of the European Enlightenment as the reification of the 
environment is very different in Dolpo.  
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Indeed, ethnographic data indicate that the Dolpo-pa model the environment more in line 
with Ingold’s “domain of entanglement” than with Enlightenment’s bracketing out of human-
animals as somehow separate from the uncertainty inherent to living asymmetrically within the 
existential present of ecological processes. Without a doubt, the Dolpo-pa conceptualize and 
represent themselves as distinct and unique as humans—a category of existence itself 
schematized in a uniquely Dolpo-Tibetan way—within that domain, but certainly as no less 
entangled than any other conditionally-structured surface within it. In reality, therefore, the basis 
of the Dolpo-pa’s cultural model is arguably not that self-referentially distorted 
anthropocentricity that is the basis of that Enlightenment model that is the environment. In 
contrast, the basis of the Dolpo model is that uncertainty that becomes known in being thus 
conditionally structured in embodying an evolutionarily emergent awareness of awareness that 
has become so keenly aware through extended engagement with the asymmetries inherent to 
dwelling through the entanglements of that Dolpo domain.  
As will be discussed in the following chapters, the difference in these representations is 
significant, not only because it highlights the emergent model of a uniquely self-reflective 
human-animal culture that has thriven for at least a millennia within that unforgiving Himalayan 
entanglement at the biometabolic scale of ecological processes (Chapter 4), but also because it 
suggests what is being lost with the increasing contravention of that subjugating Cartesian model 
of separation into the Dolpo-pa’s entangled domain. With this intrusion, manifesting in greater 
access to products from the technometabolic scale of industrial production of which most Dolpo-
pa have little experience or knowledge and in greater deference to the “philanthropic hubris” 
(Niezen 2003:211) of the graftxiv of the International Development industry that is bearing down 
ever more forcefully from that scale, the Dolpo-pa’s increasing acquiescence to the circular 
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distortions especially of the framing of progress through that model is beginning to disentangle at 
very basic levels their unique awareness. As discussed in Chapter 5, this disentanglement is 
especially evident in new forms of social fragmentation that have only since around 2005 begun 
to influence how individuals in Dolpo constellate schemas of intra-entanglement arrangements at 
and extra-entanglement connotations of the biometabolic scale of their dissipating ecological 
awareness.  
Worryingly, the Dolpo-pa’s increasing accentuation and subsequent reification of such 
new, second-order models, as with contemporary schemas of status and progress, has been 
concurrent with an increasing decline in the reliability of deep-rooted cultural models of known 
physical uncertainties within that domain to effectively frame recent experiences with rapidly 
changing phenological conditions as average weather patterns (climate) have steadily altered in 
recent years. Chapter 6 will, therefore, expatiate the inherent and ecologically advantageous 
limits to the Dolpo-pa’s cultural model of their physical entanglement, especially in terms of 
their inability to conceptualize let alone adequately represent and respond to such ongoing 
changes in known phenological uncertainties that derive from the power of that technometabolic 
scale whence such alterations to climates that are producing such changes have originated. This 
thesis will conclude (Chapter 7) with a brief discussion of how continued decline in the efficacy 
of the Dolpo-pa’s cultural model of entanglement is progressively leading to greater existential 
dissonance, a concept introduced here that qualitatively gauges how the disentangling of 
conceptual proficiencies from experiences with the increased influences of technometabollically-
scaled power gives rise to an increased likelihood of loss of life and/or livelihood within a no 





CHAPTER 4 – UNIQUE A PART: A MODEL OF ENTANGLEMENT 
 
INTRODUCTION: COMPREHENDING UNIQUENESS, UNDERSTANDING DISTINCTION  
 To claim that Ingold’s (2006:14) metaphor of a “domain of entanglement” is a more 
accurate way to describe the Dolpo-pa’s model of what the progeny of the Enlightenment frame 
as the environment is not meant to intimate that the Dolpo-pa do not perceive or schematize 
human distinction among all other physical surfaces within their domain. To be sure, like 
individuals in any culture the Dolpo-pa do perceive an environment within which they (and other 
humans) are quite distinct and quite unique from other surfaces. To argue that they do not would 
distort the reality of the physical by uncritical acquiescence to a conceptual unreality no less 
illusory than that Enlightenment model of the environment is in the inverse; indeed, any claim by 
an observer that intimates that any culture does not appreciate the uniqueness of the human-
animal would have to be contested for the same reason (in the inverse) as established in the 
previous chapter: Such a claim would too perfunctorily de-emphasize an important and necessary 
component of cultural modeling, the reality of physical asymmetry in terms of both force and 
magnitude in the world and through which, with the evolution of the cerebrum, the human 
among all other animals is synergistically aware in perceiving and conceptually constellating 
schemas through cognitive models that are shared and transmitted as cultural models in 
surmounting the pressures of being so asymmetrically arrayed at that biometabolic scale.  
Appreciation of the uniqueness of the human-surface for the Dolpo-pa is observed not 
only in terms of the material/perceptual capacities of the human-animal, therefore, but also in 
terms of that capacity for representation that is an emergent property of those evolutionarily 
selective pressures of physical force and magnitude at that scale. This point is illustrated in that 
for the Dolpo-pa the human is the highest form of karmic birth in the terrestrial realm and the 
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only one capable of reaching the liberation from all suffering that is nirvana as attested to by the 
conceptual models of Bon/Buddhist Dharma. Without this understanding from the outset of this 
discussion, exposition of how the Dolpo-pa model their domain of entanglement could only be as 
superficial an ascription of a subjugating (romanticization is no less subjugation) observer as is 
the model that Westernized human-animals have become so accustomed to that claims that they 
exist somehow separately from the environment. And, in many respects, this is the point: The 
Dolpo-pa do not model themselves as separate from the environment but as distinct and unique 
in their awareness within the environment, karmically superior a physical birth but no less a 
physical birth and therefore subject to the physical asymmetries of force and magnitude that 
array across the entangled domain through which they dwell, which is why Ingold’s metaphor 
more accurately describes how they tend to model their own entanglement as part of an 
environmental domain of perpetual flux.  
 
SYNERGISTIC AWARENESS WITHIN THE DOMAIN OF A HIMALAYAN ENTANGLEMENT 
 That the Dolpo-pa culturally model themselves as distinct and unique but no less 
entangled within the domain of the environment was induced from participant-observations, 
semi-structured interviews, and structured interviews conducted over 70 days of field research in 
the fall of 2010 (see Chapter 2). According to survey data (n = 54), apprehension of such 
entanglement is of course nuanced among respondents, suggesting from the outset how material 
experience of the physical produces individual deviation from the proposed model even as the 
strong positive frequencies taken as a whole intimate that the model is indeed culturally shared. 
For instance, 83.3 percent (mean = 2.78) of survey respondents answered “agree” on a 3-point 
scale that humans are a part of nature, while 94.4 percent (mean = 2.89) answered “agree” on the 
 
 60
same scale that nature will continue to exist regardless of whether or not humans continue to 
exist in the world. As a 70-year-old woman in Rigmo stated: 
Yes, maybe humans are a part of nature because humans and insects or snakes are quite similar and are part 
of nature . . . Nature will exist regardless of whether or not humans exist. We all go down to the next 
village during winter but these trees and rocks, these lands always exist.  
 
Further supporting this induction is the response to the statement, “Humans and nature are 
mutually dependent on one another,” to which on a 5-point scale 83.4 percent of respondents 
answered either “agree” or “strongly agree.” Of respondents to that statement, 70.4 percent 
(mean = 4.52) answered “strongly agree,” while no one answered “strongly disagree.” 
Interestingly, however, 57.4 percent of survey respondents also answered “true” to the statement, 
“Nature cannot exist without humans,” while 81.5 percent also answered that “The primary 
purpose of nature is for human use” is also true. The final two survey responses are intriguing 
because they illustrate how, through a frame that “logically” separates humans from the 
environment, such responses can only be construed as being contradictory with the responses that 
preceded them, adumbrating how (and why) Enlightened Europeans have since the Age of 
Exploration interpreted cultural groups in places like Dolpo as irrational and primitive and 
backwards. Through a frame that sees humans as distinct and unique within an environment, 
however, this contradiction fades, nature being logically (and necessarily) for human use but 
humans being inextricably a part of nature. 
A similar resolution to this seeming contradiction was further intimated by the 38-year-
old Geshe at Tsova Gompa on the shores of Phoksumdo Lake near the village of Rigmo in his 
responses to similar questions in our semi-structured interview. To a question about whether 
nature can exist without humans, for example, he responded: 
It is written in our Dharma that nature is for humans to rely on and use. Some say god created nature for 
humans to use. Bon-po say that Seepa Khrigyal Khugpa created nature to ensure human survival, so if there 




Soon after, however, to a question about whether or not the purpose of nature is for human use, 
he responded: 
This is very complicated. We can’t say all nature is for human use. For example, birds and insects and yaks 
are primarily not for us. But we use yaks and our life almost depends on them, so we say those animals are 
for human use. We take them for granted.  
 
Though seemingly similarly contradictory to the previous survey results, the Geshe’s responses, 
reflecting the naturalness of the synergistic and nested interconnection between the 
material/perceptual and the conceptual within an asymmetrical domain of entanglement such as 
Dolpo is, lends support to the claim that the Dolpo-pa model themselves as distinct and unique as 
a part of nature. In truth, as exposited in the first paragraph of this chapter, humans are distinct 
and unique in the conceptual schema of the Bon/Buddhist faith, a schema suggested in the 
Geshe’s first statement, which frames nature as distinct from humans and reflects the karmic 
frame that humans, for whom other forms of nature are said to be created, are the highest form of 
terrestrial incarnation. The second statement, however, which is grounded in the material 
experience of being entangled as but one of a multitude of physical surfaces in a domain of 
asymmetrical ecological processes, implies the physical reality that underlies that conceptual 
schema of the Bon/Buddhist model, thereby qualifying the certitude of the frame as implied by 
the first statement. As such, the second statement acknowledges the physical reality of the 
human-surface that has been de-emphasized in the conceptual focus on the model of the karmic 
preeminence of the human-animal in the first statement, thus circumscribing even the conceptual 
schema of the karmic within the material experience of ecological reality.  
Through extended engagement over scores of generations within the ecologically 
entangled domain of Dolpo, in other words, schemas of material experience and conceptual 
representation have become synergistically coupled in schematic constellations that, as identified 
by Bourdieu (among numerous others), have over time been naturalized in their own 
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arbitrariness. In this way, as the Geshe remarked, awareness of those other animal-surfaces on 
which life for the human-animal in such an ontic entanglement depends has been ‘taken for 
granted’. Such seemingly contradictory statements as those made by the Geshe and as those 
implied by the inconsistent survey responses above support this observation, which itself coheres 
by a very different (but no less arbitrary) logic than that operationalized through the schemas of 
the Dolpo-pa’s model of entanglement. According to the Dolpo model, yaks, for example, “over 
the course of their long, useful lives . . . incarnate variously as means of movement, tillers of soil, 
providers of sustenance and shelter, and agents of the supramundane” (Bauer 2004:139).  
As such, yaks should be understood neither as merely beasts nor as purely symbolic 
representations but in how they adumbrate through the synergy of their material/perceptual and 
conceptual embodiments this very coupling. It constellates in schemas related to yaks that 
compose a small part of the overall model of the domain by which the Dolpo-pa perceive and are 
aware of reality in dwelling through that physical entanglement, which is always rooted, 
regardless of frame or schematic constellation, within the first-order ecological asymmetries of 
surfaces within that entangled domain. In this way, material experience and conceptual 
representation can thus be said to synergize in constellating schemas of entangling experience 
within such a domain, the latter functioning to ameliorate by augmenting through the schema of 
karma the trepidation adduced by the material experience of dwelling through the existential 
present of such asymmetrically arrayed ecological processesxv. Through this model, both the 
survey results and the Geshe’s responses above cohere, therefore, suggesting not only the 
importance of the constellation of schemas in producing such coherence but also the first-order 
ecological foundation of all such second-order conceptualizations, a ground implied 
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unequivocally by a 63-year-old woman interviewed in her kitchen garden in Rigmo who 
claimed: 
 Humans can’t exist without nature; nature exists without humans. 
Especially since such a model is only an adumbration of reality, a cognitive abstraction, 
that is, that channels individual thought and action in a certain direction but does not dictate the 
specifics of those thus channeled thoughts or actions, variance is anticipated in the embodiment 
and articulation of such a shared model. Unsurprisingly, therefore, the currency of the model in 
Dolpo of humans being distinct and unique but existing within the environment is supported by 
the results of two cultural consensus model analyses. Cultural consensus, a statistical 
methodology developed in cognitive anthropology, can be used, according to Weller (2007:340), 
“to estimate the culturally correct answers and the cultural knowledge or accuracy of 
informants,” not creating consensus, importantly, but assessing the degree of agreement that is 
present among respondents to a set of identical statements suggesting a shared model. In the first 
analysis, covering statements 32-45 of the structured interview (see Appendix II), which asked 
respondents about the interconnection between humans and natural physical forces on a 3-point 
scale, the absence of negative competencies and the large eigenratio (10.149) indicate that a 
strong consensus exists among respondents. The second analysis, covering questions 46-62 of 
the survey, asked respondents similarly about the interconnection between humans and natural 
forces but was more suggestive of the power asymmetries between them on a 5-point scale. 
Similar to the first, this analysis produced no negative competencies and an even larger 
eigenratio (11.923), also indicating the existence of a strong consensus. These two analyses 
support the currency of the model being suggested in this chapter and imply the primacy of the 




PHYSICAL ASYMMETRIES AT THE BIOMETABOLIC SCALE OF ECOLOGICAL PROCESSES 
Indeed, informants in Dolpo are intimately aware of the scalar asymmetries of physical 
force and magnitude against which they contend daily in dwelling through the uncertainties of 
the existential present in such an entangled domain; to be sure, their most fundamental schemas, 
regardless of conceptual convolutions of human distinction and uniqueness as modeled most 
consciously through the indulgences of karma, reflect the ecological asymmetries of this first-
order reality. As Kedarxvi, a 42-year-old Nepali who in 1993 founded and remains even now the 
principle of the Crystal Mountain School in the Tarap Valley (elevation: 4,000 meters), 
explained in one of the only English interviews conducted during the project: 
Well, for me, I don’t, um, I don’t believe that the human beings are the supreme or we are only the master. 
There is . . . on the top of the human beings there is nature, the nature has much more power . . . if we go 
against the nature, then we will cer-, certainly be destroyed, or we cannot exist ourself, going against the 
nature. So nature is the master for all the creature, all the . . . all of us. 
 
Kedar’s statement, coming just a few moments after he had adduced the timidity of the otherwise 
sinewy snow leopard in explaining how the top of the food chain and the master of all creatures 
is humans, not only further confirms the model of humans as entangled in the domain of nature 
but also echoes the commonly held view among informants that the physical forces with which 
they must daily contend in dwelling through the uncertainty of the entangled domain of Dolpo 
are more powerful than human-animals. This acknowledgement reveals an important dimension 
of the model: Though unique karmically and conceptually, humans are quite (relative to much of 
the ecological domain) small and vulnerable physically, significantly limiting their capacities or 
‘effectivities’ (Cutting 1982) within the entanglement despite those conceptual and karmic 
distinctions.  
As with the survey responses and the Geshe’s statements above, however, Kedar 
ostensibly (according to an observer’s logic) contradicts himself in his two juxtaposed 
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explanations, one of human’s position in the natural world and the other of their position on “the 
food chain.” Though subtle, this incongruity intriguingly reinforces the analyses of those 
contradictions above, the former statement here stemming from the existential reality of 
schematized material experience that acknowledges the asymmetry of humans against the 
physical forces and magnitudes of nature as they dwell through the entangled domain of Dolpo, 
the latter obfuscating the physical asymmetry in elevating the conceptual schema that frames the 
relationship between humans and snow leopards through the abstraction of “the food chain” 
model. Only after pressed in follow-up questions did Kedar qualify this conceptual frame of “the 
food chain” model through an ecological lens, conceding that humans, who are sometimes 
threatened existentially by snow leopards in Dolpo but are more fearful of the predator’s ongoing 
threat to pastoral wealth embodied materially in their herds, are stronger than snow leopards only 
because humans have guns.  
This qualification is remarkable for two reasons: First, firearms are quite uncommon in 
Dolpo; indeed, the few such arms I saw or heard about were very old and possibly not terribly 
functional or accurate, even those shared between the dozen or so Nepali soldiers garrisoned in 
the national park at Phoksumdo Lake. Second and more importantly, Kedar’s qualification 
suggests the crux of the argument being made here. Its framing as an acceptable and uncontested 
justification for the conceptual model of humans as superior to snow leopards on “the food 
chain” is traceable to that same cognitive trick that distorts the orders of concern in cognizing the 
world through a circular frame that unduly highlights the conceptual, thereby de-emphasizing the 
significance of the material/perceptual in surmounting the physical forces and magnitudes of the 
existential present at the biometabolic scale of ecological processes. Such a cognitive trick is 
discernable by a brief tracing of the evolutions and adaptations that were required of the human-
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surface cum -animal before such a qualification could be made let alone so perfunctorily 
accepted as justifiable, especially as it was made within such an entanglement of ontic 
uncertainty as Dolpo where illusions of separation and security are rather difficult to sustain 
considering the physical struggles faced daily in dwelling there.  
At a root level, the random evolution of the thoroughly physical cerebrum through 
selective pressures against what evolved as the human-surface over millions of years of 
phenotypic adaptation in domains of material-physical entanglement first had to occur (and need 
not have). Only then could such an awareness (as it exists in the material reality of the physical 
object-world) arbitrarily—the chances of it actually doing so as it has if at all being rather 
miniscule at all points along the line—emerge from that phenotypic evolution for humans to be 
able to perceive, design, and finally manufacture such a tool as a firearm, regardless of how 
rudimentary, or even fashion a less technically intricate tool like a knife or a slingshot, both of 
which were observed in use in Dolpo. Such awareness was a byproduct of evolution/adaptation 
of the first order, one beyond that physical root of arbitrarily arrayed surfaces.  
Of the second order, therefore, was the enhancement of an interpretive awareness—an 
awareness of awareness, that is—emergent from ongoing interaction between that phenotypic 
evolution and that emergent proficiency that could conceptualize how adopting such tools in 
material practice could level the physical asymmetries of human-animals dwelling through the 
physical force and magnitude of such a shifting, cleaving array of ecological processes in a place 
like Dolpo. Over extended engagement within such an entangled domain, this interpretive 
awareness was honed, through increases in both physical dexterity and ongoing transmissions of 
constellated schema that reflected such dexterity as proficiency, enabling human-animals for the 
first time not only to be more physically powerful in the high mountains than the much more 
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powerful phenotypic evolution of the snow leopard-animal but also to be aware of themselves as 
such. Only through extended thriving by such ongoing synergism of this meta-awareness, finally, 
did the naturalization of the conceptual emerge as an enduring cultural model that basically 
expresses that ‘humans with functioning tools are more powerful in confrontations with 
predators that are otherwise more powerful than humans’.  
By the circular distortion of the cognitive trick that frames Kedar’s response and 
subsequent qualification, however, in which he uncritically obfuscates the physicality of first-
order evolution by a second-order conceptualization that was only made possible by the 
awareness that emerged (and could only have emerged) in the first place from that first-order 
evolution of his root phenotypic surface, his reasoning and concurrent de-emphasis of the 
physical asymmetry almost passes unnoticed as sensible, reasonable. In this instance, which is 
even more interesting because Kedar is among all respondents in the study the most well-
educated within the pedagogical methods and standards of a Western comparative model, this 
trick played out in his original answer about snow leopards and “the food chain” and in his 
subsequent qualification of that answer with the response of “guns.” In his responses, therefore, 
Kedar illustrates how the arbitrary separation of the physical by a cultural model that over-
accentuates the conceptual is an illusion that, once scrutinized, can only be upheld by a 
qualifying allusion to a material production (guns) of the conceptual capacity emergent from that 
evolution (conceptual/representational proficiency). Significantly, neither the material product of 
nor the emergent conceptual capacity are that evolution (the cerebrum), which has itself evolved 
solely from the arbitrary fitness of the root surface that was conditionally structured and thereby 
naturally (read non-teleologically) selected by the pressures of physical force and magnitude that 
shift and cleave all surfaces within any domain of ecological entanglement. 
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The majority of my informants in Dolpo (Kedar included, despite the contradiction in this 
response and his pedagogical training) were found not to so distort the conceptual aspect of that 
synergistic awareness that is at the root of their model of entanglement. As such, they remain 
intimately aware of the physical asymmetries of scale against which they continually contend in 
perceiving and modeling their material existence and experience. Regardless of schemas of 
distinction or uniqueness, that is, the Dolpo-pa recognize within their synergistic awareness the 
physical root of reality in the object-world of ecological processes at the scale of biometablism at 
which they and all other terrestrial surfaces exist; the existential reality is that without (and even 
with) the capacities of conceptualization emergent through the evolution of the wholly physical 
cerebrum (the ‘science’ behind which they know not), they, as human-surfaces cum -animals, are 
quite conditional in the entropic disequilibria of their dissipative structures, succumbing quite 
swiftly and readily to the not insignificant range of physical forces and magnitudes they contend 
with in each day at that biometabolic scale of dwelling within the Dolpo ecology.  
The statement in response to a similar question about the relationship between humans 
and nature by Tserap Tenzing Lama, the head lama of the Bon-po Dharma whose ancestral line 
at Samling Gompa in a remote side valley of Upper Dolpo can be traced back at least 500 years, 
supports this point: 
Nature saves the human. Nature will make humans disappear, not other animals or other enemies of 
humans. Humans cannot save the nature completely but it is nature that saves us humans. Humans are born 
by nature. We acquire air, water, food from nature. If we don’t get these things human beings don’t survive 
. . . nature is not destroyed by human beings. Human beings are destroyed by nature. 
 
Several informants in the village of Rigmo near Phoksumdo Lake made similar statements: 
♦ In my point of view, natural forces have greater power [than humans]. [M, 42] 
♦ Of course nature is more powerful. [M, 30] 
♦ No, I don’t have power over nature. Humans are not more powerful than nature. [F, 62] 
♦ Nature is so vast that we can’t harm it. It is not possible for us to cut every tree and it is not possible to 




Similarly, the Geshe from Tsova Gompa near the lake stated: 
Nature is more powerful than humans. Maybe this is true because we rely on nature. For example, we can’t 
live without air. 
 
Intriguingly, Tserap at Samling Gompa, whose life as a high lama is focused on ritual and 
conceptual representation throughout the day and well into the chill of the night at ~4,200 meters 
(as we heard in the darkness of our tents pitched beside the gompa), punctuates this point in a 
story he told that indicates his awareness of the ecological ground of even the schema of Bon/ 
Buddhist deities when asked whether they are humans who have reached the nirvanic state of 
enlightenment or actually gods: 
Gods are only the belief of the Heart. I’ll tell the story about what god is: There used to live one mother and 
one son in a Mustang village. They have only a cow as their property. The son used to visit Bodhgaya 
[where Buddha became enlightened], India every year and return back . . . While he was leaving for India 
one day, the mother tells her son to bring some relic of Lord Buddha from India. The son says ok and 
leaves. When he returns home he forgets to bring the relic. The son says, ‘I forgot mother’. The next year 
when he was again going to India, his mother makes a promise that if he doesn’t bring any relic this time 
you won’t see my face again. I’ll die. But returning home he again forgets. Near his home, he remembers 
and thinking ‘what to do, what to do’, he sees a dead dog on the road and takes out the dog’s tooth and goes 
home. He then gives the tooth to his mother saying, “This is the tooth of Lord Buddha.” The mother 
becomes very, very happy and she puts it in the family shrine and worships the tooth with cow’s milk every 
morning and evening. So it’s the belief of the heart. What we believe is a god is god. It’s controlled by our 
own hearts . . . She put that tooth in the shrine and worshiped every morning and evening. When she died 
the tooth emitted a rainbow. . . the son and other villagers also saw the rainbow from the tooth. Her heart 
believed that the tooth was god, so, at last, that same dog’s tooth became that of god. People roam outside 
the heart in search of Buddha, but their . . . own heart is a Buddha. 
 
Tserap’s story is intriguing exactly because of its confirmation of the ecological root of 
conceptual/representational belief, even more compellingly so because it was told without 
dissemblance by such a high lama. 
Responses to structured interview statements positing the preeminence of ecological 
processes further support the awareness of such asymmetry among the Dolpo-pa. To the 
statement, for example, “Nature is more powerful than humans,” 83.3 percent of respondents 
(mean = 2.78) on a 3-point scale answered “agree,” while 11.1 percent did not know and only 3 
respondents answered “disagree.” On the same scale, to the statement, “Nature is more resilient 
than humans,” 75.9 percent (mean = 2.76) of respondents answered “agree,” while 24.1 percent 
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claimed they did not know; no one disagreed with this statement. Interestingly, a trend of 
decreasing concurrence becomes evident when survey statements become less conceptual and 
more empirically grounded, such as with the statement, “Nature is too vast for humans to be able 
to harm it,” which results in, on a 5-point scale, 57.4 percent of respondents (mean = 3.81) 
answering “strongly agree” and 7.4 percent of respondents answering “agree,” with 16.7 percent 
and 7.4 percent, respectively, answering “strongly disagree” and “disagree.” Only 11.1 percent 
of respondents answered that they did not know.  
Unexpectedly, inversion of the organization of structured interview statements, positing 
“human practice” as opposed to “natural force” as active subject, affirms this trend of decreasing 
concurrence, an outcome that at first appears to contradict but actually illustrates one of the 
primary arguments being made here. The statement, “Humans can destroy nature,” for example, 
though agreement remained dominate, saw significantly more respondents “disagree” on a 3-
point scale than any of the previous statements, with frequencies of 22.2 percent disagreeing and 
59.3 percent agreeing (mean = 2.37; 18 percent did not know). This trend suggests that as each 
statement drifts further from conceptual schemas (the first two statements) and becomes more 
grounded in physical schemas of the material experience of individual Dolpo-pa (the latter two 
statement, in order), the influence of those first-order schemas through which each subject has 
more unique practical as opposed to conceptual experiences begins to emerge. The reasonable 
next progression of this trend, as expected, arises with the statement, “Humans are too small and 
insignificant to be able to harm nature,” which resulted in, on a 3-point scale, the absence of a 
majority and near equivalence of opinions, with 48.1 percent (mean = 1.98) of respondents 
answering “disagree” and 46.3 percent answering “agree.” The remaining 5.6 percent responded 
that they did not know.   
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THE PERILS OF BEING A SURFACE 
 Despite this trend, “nature” and “humans” remain, even when humans are framed as 
active agents in the survey statements, far from the ecological reality of material experience as 
both are still quite conceptual in their abstractions. “Nature” is a wholly conceptual aggregation 
that can be, as adduced by different schemas and indeed cultural models of what constitutes 
nature, inclusive or exclusive. “Humans,” on the other hand, does not account for the differential 
nature of individual response within the no less conceptual aggregation that is schematized as the 
distinct human-animal. Neither “nature” nor “humans,” which are modeled aggregates no less 
than “science” or “climate,” that is, actually exist as objects in the world. Such conceptual 
schemas, though not foreign to are only of second-order concern to a cultural model rooted in 
material experience, which is oriented foremost to first-order ecological concerns. Such schemas 
are, that is, immediate and urgent only in terms of the existential present, which is their selective 
advantage within “the imminent future of the world, postulating the continuity of time . . . [and] 
thereby exclud[ing] the supremely real and quite theoretical possibility of sudden reduction to 
the present” of no longer being able to conceptualize because you no longer are physically 
existent (Bourdieu 1990:82). On the other hand, specific hazards contended with within an 
entangled ecological domain are of the first-order and primary to such experience within Dolpo. 
Survey frequencies pertaining to such awareness of the asymmetrical forces and magnitudes of 
such hazards within the physical array of the existential present are quite revealing to this effect, 
especially in how nuance intimates the material experiences that underlie how uncertainty is 
framed practically through such an entanglement. 
According to structured interview responses, for example, landslides are the most feared 
hazard encountered by Dolpo-pa informants, with 98.1 percent (mean = 4.98) of respondents 
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answering “strongly agree” on a 5-point scale to the statement, “If caught in a landslide, I would 
be lucky to survive.” The only different response to this statement was a single “agree,” making 
this hazard the only of all considered that was responded to unequivocally. This result is 
noteworthy because it reflects the constancy of the threat of landslides in material experience 
within the Dolpo-pa’s domain of ecological entanglement, which has few services or public 
projects to forestall or mitigate the uncertainty and high chance of this hazard’s occurrence. 
Indeed, the physical threat of landslides intimates the first-order preeminence of the physical to 
the existential present of human-surface life and -animal livelihood in dwelling through this 
shifting, cleaving array of uncertain surfaces.  
Nyma, the 25-year-old dzoa wrangler and trader who guided us through the barrenness of 
Upper Dolpo, illustrated this point in the daily regularity of his actions in forefending against 
such known uncertainties, especially at the end of a long day of trekking when, regardless of the 
exertions or tribulations faced in that day, he would first scan the surrounding slopes for signs of 
instability before we set up camp. I only noticed Nyma engaged in this practice in the second 
week of our journey, observing him for several days before querying him about it. In response, 
he paused for a moment and smiled widely as if to express my senselessness before thoughtfully 
responding in fits and starts that suggested he’d never thought about this practice in such a way 
as to articulate it to anyone before that it was just something he did, something his grandfather 
who taught him to wrangle yaks and dzoa did, something the Dolpo-pa have learned to do 
because, as he suggested, when a landslide will happen is impossible to know but there are signs 
to look for and read in the landscape. Such a practice could easily (and did) escape an observer 
like myself, which assumes unreasonably that even if it had not I, not having lived so long in 
such a place by such experiences or such models of such experiences as Nyma and other Dolpo-
 
 73
pa traders, would have been able to read such signs. In terms of synergistic awareness, in other 
words, I was trekking rather existentially blind.  
Similarly, but for a question posed in the negative, 96.3 percent (mean = 1.06) of 
respondents on a 3-point scale “disagreed” that “There is much I can do to stop a blizzard from 
forming when I am crossing a pass.” Again, such a scenario is recounted with trepidation by 
Dolpo-pa informants, who are inclined, as observed on a particular day in Rigmo in mid-
October, to abandon plans for travel or trade that takes them over the high passes between 
valleys if their schemas of weather expectations, which are themselves rooted in physical aspects 
of place and time and season, do not conform to current realities of physical conditions that make 
the journey seem unwise. This point is indicated with Magli Budha, a 21-year-old from Rigmo 
who had recently completed her nursing degree in Kathmandu and had not visited her family in 
Dolpo in four years: 
If I, I . . . if I have to pass, uh, cross the pass, then maybe we’ll get . . . it’s, nobody knows what will 
happen, what the weather does, you know? So maybe snow, heavy snowfall [will come unexpectedly]. 
 
Only one respondent disagreed with this statement about blizzards, possibly misunderstanding 
the question or possibly (and more suggestively, though unconfirmed) responding in terms of 
that synergistic awareness that would suggest that one practical strategy (“something I can do”) 
in such a circumstance as described by the statement would be to respect the asymmetry and 
forego the journey on that day. Postponing a journey is of course always a reasonable option in 
apprehension of a physical reality that bests even a culturally modeled frame of auspiciousness 
such as is determined by the lamas’ calendar, which two-thirds of survey respondents frame as 
controlling weather changes through each season. Regardless of the reason for this single 
disagreement, however, respondents’ trepidations of the physical realities that underlie their 
conceptual representations are reflected in the high disagreement with this statement. 
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Interestingly, the statement, “I can do little to stop an earthquake from destroying my house,” 
scored exactly the same (appropriately inversed) as the statement concerning blizzards, which 
suggests an interesting equivalence due to the nature of a hazard: Although earthquakes do not 
entail as great an urgency in the day to day experience of Dolpo, they do entail a far greater 
uncertainty and destructive force, striking without warning to terrible effect that does have 
immediate and inescapable consequences.  
Several additional statements from the structured interview further intimate the first order 
concern of physical asymmetry, especially in several questions focusing on livelihood, which 
within the entangled domain of Dolpo can only be separated from existential concerns through 
undue caviling by an observer. Statements such as, “I worry that a predator like a snow leopard 
will kill my herds” or “I do not worry about natural disasters like avalanches killing my 
animals,” for example, inquire to the very core of agro-pastoral existence and anxiety over that 
existence. This observation is especially true for herder-traders whose yaks and dzoa, because of 
how the geological forces of continental drift in the formation of the Himalayas some ~40-50 
m.y.a. (USGS 1999) formed steep slopes and narrow cultivable valleys, in many places range 
freely in patans (grasslands) at least several hours but often even further from settlements and 
are relied on more as sumpters than for secondary production. To such livelihood statements, 
therefore, agreement (or disagreement, as appropriate) was high, as expected. For the statement 
on predators, for example, 92.6 percent (mean = 4.87) and 5.6 percent of respondents, 
respectively, answered “strongly agree” or “agree” on a 5-point scale, while only one respondent 
disagreed strongly, that person having also answered that he does not own any animals. For the 
statement on natural disasters (a negative query, note), 87 percent (mean = 1.28) of respondents 
answered “strongly disagree” and 7.4 percent answered “disagree.” Similarly, the statement, 
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“There is little I can do to stop hail from destroying my crops,” possibly, as commented above 
concerning earthquakes, because hail is so unusual and unpredictable and crops are so 
immovable and easily damaged, also resulted in high agreement, with 88.9 percent (mean = 4.78) 
of respondents answering “strongly agree” and 7.4 percent answering “agree.” Only one 
respondent answered “strongly disagree” to this statement, though no explanation was given as 
to what she could do in this circumstance. 
Similarly, based on the anecdote that the 63-year-old lama interviewed at Shey Gompa 
related about how he had lost 10 of his 11 yaks in an avalanche the previous year, the statement, 
“I cannot do anything to prevent an avalanche from wiping out my entire herd,” also had high 
agreement on a 3-point scale, with 88.9 percent (mean = 2.81) of respondents answering “agree” 
and only 7.4 percent answering “disagree.” Answering that they did not know were only two 
respondents. As above, the four respondents who disagreed with this statement may have 
responded through a practical model that suggests that they can competently ‘read’ the landscape 
as Nyma did with landslides, thereby forefending against such losses. In the same way, on a 5-
point scale the statement, “I am powerless to do anything to stop the river from washing away 
the bridge I use regularly,” also had strong agreement (90.7 percent “strongly agree”, mean = 
4.72), with one respondent answering “agree” and the other four respondents split evenly 
between “disagree” and “strongly disagree.” That these statements imply some sort of agency in 
mitigating either uncertainty or the outcome of the queried hazard is telling, reflecting how such 
practical awareness is modeled. 
 The point is that the framing of such proficiency is immutably scaled to an awareness of 
the limits of being embodied within the dissipative, conditionally-structured surface of the 
human-animal, extended experience of being arrayed so asymmetrically within ecological 
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processes making “every being,” as Ingold (2000:19) avers, “as it is caught up in the process [of 
evolutionary entanglement] and carries it forward . . . a singular centre of awareness and agency: 
an enfoldment, at some particular nexus within [the process], of the generative potential that is 
life itself.” As such, statements intimating awareness of such scalar disparity within such an 
entangled domain would be expected to yield high agreement within the model, as with the 
statement, “A swollen river is more dangerous to me than I am to it,” which resulted on a 5-point 
scale to responses ranging from “strongly agree” to “strongly disagree,” strongly skewed to the 
former (79.6 percent). The remaining responses were spread rather evenly across the range, from 
“agree” (5.6 percent) to “neither agree nor disagree” (5.6 percent) to “disagree” and “strongly 
disagree” (3.7 percent and 5.6 percent, respectively). The fact is that the river is more dangerous 
than any individual is to it, but with such awareness as derived from the synergy of material 
experience as well as the proficiency derived from previous and conceptualized of similar 
experiences through the shared schematic constellations of culture, the river is not necessarily 
dangerous at all. Indeed, the river like the mountain in the blizzard does not have to be crossed 
but can be waited out or otherwise circumvented based on such synergistically acquired 
awareness. 
 
THE HUMAN POWER OF SYNERGISTIC AWARENESS WITHIN AN ENTANGLED DOMAIN 
At the same time, however, my Dolpo-pa informants do not model themselves as 
powerless within that entanglement, far from it really, their power deriving exactly from that 
emergent synergistic awareness acquired in dwelling through that ecological domain. Evidence 
of such awareness is arrayed not only in the built environments that fleck with the physical 
indicators of such awareness the landscape—the valley settlements of stone houses and faded 
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chortens and scrupulous plots, the improved trails of wood and stone that hang precariously over 
precipices and lakes of turquoise blue, the cairns and prayer flags that crest every soaring pass. It 
is also in the very material experiences of practice that assemble and shape those indicators and 
in the proficiency acquired through those models that are shared and transmitted in that 
awareness within that domain. Arguably, then, the power of the human-animal can be said to 
largely emerge in the synergy between material experience and conceptual proficiency in 
engaging with practice, an awareness acquired both through physical experience as well as, as 
Dressler and Bindon (2000) have theorized, through continued consonance with culturally 
constellated schematic arrays.  
This synergy was intimated by Gotza, a retired schoolmaster and community leader in the 
hamlet of Namdo a few hours south of the trading hub of Saldang in Upper Dolpo, who claimed: 
Different people have their different opinion [about what knowledge is]. In my view, knowledge is strong 
power. This strong power [is the] thread of knowledge. [People who do not go to school] also need some 
knowledge traditionally to properly cultivate and herd cattle. They get knowledge from their family or 
ancestry. He himself has not acquired it automatically. In agriculture, also, he needs to know how much 
water is needed for plants in which season, which plant are to be cultivated, how much fertilizer is needed. 
This knowledge is not all gained by him. He gets this knowledge from his ancestral traditional knowledge . 
. . Specifically [in Dolpo], this knowledge is for herding cattle . . . agriculture, rituals, conservation 
practices for both wildlife and nature . . . in transportation through yaks to China for trade. 
 
Luhuk, a 31-year-old woman who runs a seasonal tea house on a slope above Phoksumdo Lake, 
reiterated the gist of Gotza’s point, referring similarly to how the knowledge of practice is 
obtained through the synergism of both material experience with such practice and the 
transmission of the proficiencies to engage in such practice through conceptual models of such 
practical experiences, which are, importantly, both physical and cognitive: 
Knowledge means wisdom . . . [acquired] in seeing the work done by others, by the oldest people. I have 
knowledge of doing a little bit of working, trading, making bags. In the past I used to do farming . . . one 
third of our life is related to the rituals and that depends upon the tradition that our ancestors gave and that 
we follow. 
 
 Through such synergistic awareness, therefore, knowledge can be reasonably articulated 
as “The skills that help a person to survive in the world,” a survey statement that 98.1 percent of 
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respondents said is true. As such, knowledge truly can be conceptualized as power (knowledge is 
power, in truth), the evolutionary advantage that renders human-animals synergistically aware in 
thriving after extended engagement within their particular domains of entanglement. The 62-
year-old woman interviewed in her kitchen garden in Rigmo explained a little about the process 
through which such awareness is shared, suggesting the synergy of the material/perceptual and 
the conceptual in the transmission of the constellated schemas through which cultural models are 
passed both intra- and inter-generationally: 
I have been working on the farm since my childhood. Firstly, I used to help my parents in every small task 
and then when I was in the stage of teenager, I learnt everything like when to plant seeds, when to harvest, 
etc., which eventually made me skilled in such things.  
 
A 25-year-old farmer and herder, interviewed on the rooftop of the house that had been passed to 
him by his mother and that has been in her family line for generations, similarly indicated this 
synergism in the telling of how he became skilled as a yak wrangler:  
T: I learned this knowledge from my grandfather, my mother’s father. I started when I was nine     
     years old, following my grandfather in trading. After seven years of practice running a caravan     
     of yak with my  grandfather, I did it by myself for two years and it was very difficult to handle  
     the yaks for me.   
 G: How many yaks did you have at that time? 
 T: Three. And it was very difficult. 
 
A 25-year-old new mother who runs a seasonal tea tent near Rigmo stated that her own practical 
awareness lies in making blankets and working the fields but not in doing much else, though, 
interestingly, as Gotza stated above in claiming rituals as a part of traditional knowledge in 
Dolpo, she did claim that the knowledge of the lamas in performing rituals is not merely 
conceptual but is also a type of practical awareness that is no less grounded in material 
experience of physical reality than are those previous examples of power.  
Such a framing of the representational spaces of ritual as a practical awareness as 
suggested separately by both the new mother and Gotza, among other informants, is seldom ever 
drawn attention to in academic or development discussions of traditional knowledge, which tend 
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to focus on practical skills as conceptualized through models of observers who are grounded in 
the cogito and whose predominant schemas model humans as separate from the environment in 
distorting the physical root of the conceptual. Through such a frame, practical awareness in 
Dolpo is seen only in such skills as farming, herding, handicraft work, etc. As such, observers 
tend to dismiss, usually as mere superstition or performance, the no less practically framed 
knowledge of ritual and representational belief, even though the Dolpo-pa (and, I suspect, many 
people like them who similarly model humans as being distinct within the environment) frame 
such awareness no less synergistically as any other. Through such a frame, lamas are 
schematized as being able to control by their conceptual/representational proficiencies such 
physical forces as the weather through ritual practice in the same way that farmers in Dolpo are 
able to cultivate their plots by their awareness of the synergy between, for instance, their plows 
(material experience) and the transmitted and shared schematic constellations that indicate how 
to make and when to use them (conceptual proficiency) to sow their meager barley and potato 
crop. 
Indeed, 78 percent of survey respondents agreed that “Great lamas can control local 
weather events,” including 89 percent of respondents with no formal education and 80 percent of 
respondents with eight years or less of education. Interestingly, the Geshe, the most highly 
educated survey respondent with 17 years of formal education, also agreed with this statement, 
notably reflecting how he frames his world predominantly through his Bon-po training and faith. 
On a 5-point scale, of the 30 respondents with no formal education, only three answered that they 
“disagree” or “strongly disagree” that their beliefs affect the amount of snow that falls in the 
mountains each year. Of those who believe that great lamas can control local weather events (n = 
42), 30 either “strongly agree” or “agree” that their beliefs affect the amount of snow that falls in 
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the mountains, while the percentage of respondents who were unsure (14 percent) was the same 
as the total number of respondents who answered “disagree” (3 percent) or “strongly disagree” 
(11 percent) with this statement. The correlation of education levels to consonance with such 
models is significant here because of the role of formal education in altering how the world is 
framed by individuals, a point that will be discussed further in chapter 5.  
Here, this idea need only be adumbrated in affirming how several informants similarly 
described the conceptual power of lamas as having very practical material/perceptual effects over 
forces such as weather. The Geshe, for instance, commented that:  
Great lamas can control weather events. For example, lamas can bring rain when there is need of rain 
during the growing season. Local weather events fluctuate if spirits are not happy, so lamas do rituals and 
speak the mantras to make the spirits feel good and happy. 
 
The older lama at Shey Gompa in Upper Dolpo commented similarly, particularly differentiating 
between the power of lamas and that of normal people: 
Normal people can’t affect the weather but very great lamas stop rain and snowfall but the bigger lamas can 
stop it by their mantras. 
 
The anecdote recounted by Tserap at Samling Gompa illustrates this schema: 
Yes, last summer there was no water up here. You see the hill up there, we worshiped god there for the rain 
. . . and it started to rain and it rained continuously for some days and there is relation between God and 
precipitation.  
 
As Gotza from Namdo stated: 
 
Rituals are important for overcoming every sort of problem, every sort of trouble. I will give you three 
examples. First, when I am sick there are rituals, and it’s essential that some rituals are accompanied by 
amchi [traditional doctor] medicine. The second example is that if I am travelling to new places or if I am 
starting a long journey, there are essential rituals to overcome any problem on the way. The third example 
is that if I have loss in every year, if I am loosing my yaks, losing crops, I have to do rituals to control that 
lose, to conserve those things. 
 
The practicality of this synergy of material experience and conceptual proficiency in 
effecting meteorological realities is perhaps best illustrated, however, in the explanation from the 
51-year-old lodge owner in Rigmo who mentioned in our conversation that if the villagers do not 
take care of and keep clean the water taps recently installed around the village as a public 
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improvement by the provincial government, then the gods of the mountain will be annoyed and 
will not protect from landslides or other hazards the hoses of the water system that run from the 
glacier-fed mull (spring) in one of the mountains (~4,500 meters) to the west of the villagexvii. He 
said that the villagers are careful not to urinate or defecate near the taps and menstruating women 
are forbidden to use them. If, however, a landslide does occur (which happens sometimes, he 
said, even if no one is known to have despoiled the taps) and disrupts the flow of water, then 
several men from the village including the lamas from the local Bon gompa will climb up to the 
mull to repair the damaged works and perform rituals. Both of these are framed as practical 
actions that are schematized as complementary and necessary to resolve the problem. 
Intriguingly, the lodge owner also said that the villagers will only make the climb to repair the 
works if the water stops from late spring to mid-autumn because otherwise, although he made no 
mention of the apparently diminished vitality of the protector gods in other seasons, the mull is 
frozen and no water is available to the villagers from it. Indeed, the village of Rigmo is 
abandoned in these seasons, the residents all migrating down to overwinter near the provincial 
capital of Dunai, the wealthier in homes they own in town and the poorer in rudimentary 
structures traditionally belonging to the villagers an hour or so away. 
Not only are great lamas modeled as having the power to control physical events, 
however, but they are also schematized as having power to affect the physical circumstances of 
rebirth through the karmic round of conceptual time. Tserap Lama of Samling Gompa strongly 
suggests this point in his explanation of the Tulku, a schema of Bon-po belief that synergistically 
interconnects the material/perceptual and conceptual aspects of the cultural model of karma, 
introducing a dynamic of agency that overcomes through conceptual representation the physical 
asymmetries of entanglement in the Dolpo-pa’s domain. Showing me in example the tooth of a 
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great lama from Tibet who he said lived 750 years ago, Tserap avowed that in worshipping the 
tooth the great lama peers down from heaven and ameliorates any troubles or difficulties the 
worshipper is having in this life. If, however, problems in this life are too great, then, because 
those problems, according to the model of karma, will be even greater in the next incarnation,  
in your next birth the great lama is born along with [the worshipper] as a Tulku. [They] grow up together 
and become friends, and he shares his knowledge with [the worshipper] to ensure a better [subsequent] 
birth. 
 
Importantly, as Tserap stressed, within that same schematic constellation of karma, any physical 
form—including humans—can be incarnated in the next life as any physical form possible 
within the domain, from a human to a rock to an insect to a cloud, though, as noted previously, 
humans are the highest incarnation because of their capacity to be aware of and intentional in 
their awareness. Conceptualizations of karma, in other words, accumulate in the material 
experiences of practice within the physical world. As Tserap commented quite logically to my 
question about what determines future birth: 
 It depends upon your practices in the present. 
 
SIN AND THE SIN OF SINNING 
Despite such limitations as the physical asymmetries of entanglement pose, therefore, the 
synergy between the material/perceptual and the conceptual should be understood as not merely 
a means of surmounting the uncertainties of ecological forces and magnitudes within the 
entangled domain but also as a means of forefending against the uncertainties of the karmic 
implications of engaging in practice within such a domain. In other words, not only are human-
surfaces asymmetrically insignificant in comparison with forces and magnitudes arrayed in such 
ecological uncertainty, but they also themselves embody significant force and magnitude relative 
to lesser surfaces such as insects and physically slighter creatures that are likewise entangled 
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within that domain. Being karmically distinct and unique, consequently, humans are responsible 
for the physical welfare of all such lesser creatures because they are modeled as being entangled 
with themxviii, both experientially and karmically (the difference being more analytical than 
actual), a schema that is well-understood by respondents, who unequivocally answered “true” to 
the statement, “It is a sin to kill wildlife.” Furthermore, 94.4 percent (mean = 2.91) claimed that 
they “agree” on a 3-point scale that cutting down even one tree is a sin, while 98.1 percent (mean 
= 2.98) of respondents answered affirmatively on the same scale that their faith prohibits them 
from intentionally harming nature. Of note is that the sole divergent response to that final 
statement did not disagree but answered with the middle value, that they did not know or were 
not sure.  
Semi-structured interview responses further support this schema. Tenzing sitting cross-
legged in his empty stock pen, for instance, responded briskly to the question of whether plowing 
his plots is a sin: 
Of course! Plowing land is a sin. It’s killing so many lives. Yes, cutting trees is a sin and harvesting grass is 
also . . . it is true that mountains don’t have life but some spirits exist there. Spirits can’t be killed but when 
we disturb them they may try to harm us. 
 
Concurring with this opinion is Gotza, the retired schoolmaster and community leader in the 
hamlet of Namdo near Saldang in Upper Dolpo, who said: 
In our tradition we say that cutting trees is a sin. We say one green plant has life, too. To kill any wildlife is 
a big sin for us, and we’ll go to hell when we kill wildlife. 
 
In addition, the 70-year-old woman in Rigmo said: 
 
Cutting trees is a sin because it’s like killing life as the tree gets dried up . . . [It] is true that plowing plots is 
also a sin because then we are killing a number of insects. 
 
The Geshe adamantly referenced the model underlying these contentions in his own response: 
Of course [killing wildlife] is a sin because we are Buddhist. According to our beliefs and the Dharma, 
there are ten big sins, and the biggest one is to kill the life of animals. Killing wildlife is obviously a sin but 




Sin, in this way, is framed as a transgression of material schemas against conceptual 
schemas within a reality that extends well-beyond the material and into the representational, 
looping seamlessly in a continuity that propagates concatenations of that synergism between the 
material/perceptual and the conceptual as synergistically arrayed in each existential present of 
the entangled domain. It is, in other words, a transgression within a karmic ontology in which, as 
Tserap avowed, each conditionally-structured human-surface can be reborn as any other surface 
that has formed or evolved (physical root processes both) within the thin range of that 
biometabolic scale of ecological processes. As such, the karmic essentially provides a frame for 
self-reflection of the schema of “no self” that is the conceptual basis of Buddhist/Bon 
epistemology, as the material/perceptual self can literally be (or have been, or will be) through 
the innumerable rebirths of the schematic constellation of the karmic turn any surface, 
enduringly coupling, thereby, the epistemological schema to the ontological in confirmation of 
the synergistic dynamism of the model. In such a way, the power asymmetry of the human-
surface cum -animal to lesser creatures becomes no less synergistic as a physical reality as it is a 
conceptual reality. This suggests that sin is representative within the karmic ontology of human-
animal asymmetry against a schema of nested power in the entangled domain as it is modeled 
thus synergistically, both intera- and extra-personally (Strauss and Quinn 1997:6).   
 
LIMITS AND NESTED POWER 
Practice within such a domain of entanglement is, however, subject to the limits defined 
for schema by ecological force and magnitude as they have themselves been schematized by how 
the affordances of the biometabolic have been conceptualized and modeled, again through that 
synergy of extended engagement with material experience and conceptual proficiency. This 
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includes, as has been discussed, karmic representation as an expanded practical engagement. 
Statements like the following, for example, made by several informants in response to questions 
about personal experience and belief, are representative of how influential material experience is 
in altering conceptual models of one’s entangled domain:  
♦ I don’t believe this is possible because I have never seen anything like it before (49, M). 
♦ If I see the real object or action then I believe (51, M). 
Gotza from Namdo, a devout Buddhist practitioner who believes in the practical power of ritual, 
openly differentiated, for example, between those circumstances that ritual can effectively 
manipulate and those in which ritual is powerless, claiming: 
Humans cannot control natural disasters; it’s a natural phenomenon. The disaster is due to nature not by 
any other reason. If it is done by other medium, like if someone causes the fall of hail . . . if it is so due to 
other medium, then lamas can control it. If it’s due to nature no one can control it. 
 
Tenzing in his empty stock pen thus responded to a statement about the limits of great lamas’ 
authority over lived experience:  
No, I don’t think lamas could stop the seasons from changing.  
 Responses from a structured interview statement querying scalar limitations of 
experience supports this observation, revealing an interesting and informative variance: on a 5-
point scale, 42.6 percent of respondents either “strongly disagree” or “disagree” (38.9 percent 
and 3.7 percent, respectively) and 42.6 percent of respondents either “strongly agree” or “agree” 
(33.3 percent and 9.3 percent, respectively) that “A great lama could stop the seasons from 
changing.” Although 14.8 percent of respondents were unsure (actually supporting the point), 
that the exact same number of respondents were so disparate in their beliefs about power and 
seasonal change, especially considering the concentrations of those who either “strongly” agreed 
or disagreed with the statement, provides compelling support for the contention being drawn here 
about the acknowledgement of the physical ground of reality regardless of schematic 
constellations. The Geshe seems to agree, also stating:  
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Probably a great lama could not stop the seasons from changing. Great lamas could protect themselves 
from cold, hot, rain, but not seasonal change. 
 
Similarly, Tenzing sitting cross-legged in his empty stock pen spoke of the limits to human 
knowledge: 
God has created air for humans, whose composition [of air] are unknown. Air is not like vehicles or meals 
which are manmade and so we can know about their formation. 
 
Finally, a 30-year-old trader in Rigmo stated unequivocally: 
 
I can confidently say that a lama could not stop the seasons from changing. 
 
 When asked a follow-up question to her reply that her faith in the Bon dharma is very 
important in reducing problems in her daily life but sometimes rituals are not effective in helping 
her to overcome her material troubles, the 25-year-old new mother who runs the seasonal tea tent 
near Phoksumdo Lake responded quite impassively: 
  Sometimes lamas don’t do the rituals in the proper way. 
 
Another informant, the 62-year-old woman interviewed in her kitchen garden in Rigmo, 
similarly commented on the schematized bounds of lamas’ power, intimating in so doing how 
recent social changes have begun to influence the schematization of material experience there: 
Young lamas are not as great as lamas before. These days lamas don’t meditate, they have less power and 
less dharma. 
 
The boundedness of this schema of nested power clarifies the seeming disparity found in 
responses to structured interview statements positing the preeminence of the physical power of 
greater surfaces and those querying the opposite about the physical power that human-animals 
possess within the entanglement. For example, although most respondents claimed that nature is 
too vast for humans to be able to harm it, 59.3 percent (mean = 2.37) of respondents answered 
“agree” on a 3-point scale to the statement, “Humans can destroy nature,” with 22.2 percent and 
18.5 percent answering “disagree” and “Neither agree nor disagree,” respectively. Compellingly, 
the statement, “Humans are too small and insignificant to be able to harm nature,” resulted in a 
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near equivalency with no majority, with 46.3 percent and 48.1 percent of respondents answering 
“agree” and “disagree,” respectively, on a 3-point scale (5.6 percent did not know).  
This result is especially compelling because a crosstab (Table 1) with “Nature is more 
powerful than humans” reveals that of the 45 respondents who agreed with the latter statement in 
the previous paragraph, only 19 also agreed that humans are too small and insignificant to harm 
nature, though of the 32 respondents who believe humans can destroy nature, only 15 believe 
that humans are too small and insignificant to do harm to nature (Table 2). As expected, this 
nested divergence becomes especially evident when such a statement pertaining to human power 
 
Table 1. Nature is more powerful than humans * Humans can destroy nature 
 
Humans can destroy nature 
Total Disagree Neither/Nor Agree 
Nature is more powerful than 
humans 
Disagree 0 1 2 3 
Neither/Nor 1 1 4 6 
Agree 11 8 26 45 
Total 12 10 32 54 
 
 
Table 2. Nature is more powerful than humans * Humans too small and insignificant to harm nature  
 
Humans too small and insignificant to harm nature 
Total Disagree Neither/Nor Agree 
nature is more powerful than 
humans 
Disagree 1 0 2 3 
Neither/Nor 1 1 4 6 
Agree 24 2 19 45 
Total 26 3 25 54 
 
is framed through practice: “I destroy nature every time I plow my plots.” Responses to this 
statement ranged, on a 5-point scale, from 66.7 percent of respondents who “strongly agree” to 
9.3 percent who “strongly disagree,” with 11.1 percent agreeing, 9.3 percent not being sure, and 
3.7 percent disagreeing. Crosstabs (Table 3) reveal an interesting further outcome: Of the 45 
respondents who claimed that nature is more powerful than humans, 31 answered “strongly 
agree” and 5 answered “agree” to the statement that they destroy nature every time they plow 
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Table 3. Nature is more powerful than humans * I destroy nature every time I plow my plots  
 
I destroy nature every time I plow my plots 
Total 
Strongly 
Disagree Disagree Neither/Nor Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
Nature is more powerful than 
humans 
Disagree 0 0 1 0 2 3 
Neither/ 
Nor 1 0 1 1 3 6 
Agree 4 2 3 5 31 45 
Total 5 2 5 6 36 54 
 
their plots. Interestingly, although 35 respondents claimed that nature is too vast for humans to 
be able to harm it, 42 respondents claimed that they destroy nature every time they plow their 
plots (Table 4), again suggesting this schema of nestedness as an essential component to the 
model of the domain of entanglement in Dolpo. 
 
Table 4. Nature is too vast for humans to be able to harm it * I destroy nature every time I plow my plots  
 
I destroy nature every time I plow my plots 
Total 
Strongly 
Disagree Disagree Neither/Nor Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
Nature is too vast for 
humans to be able to harm it 
Strongly 
Disagree 0 0 0 2 7 9 
Disagree 1 1 0 0 2 4 
Neither/ 
Nor 0 0 0 1 5 6 
Agree 1 0 1 0 2 4 
Strongly 
Agree 3 1 4 3 20 31 
Total 5 2 5 6 36 54 
 
 
Suggestive of the root physical reality underlying this schema of nested power is how 
Dolpo-pa respondents do not see themselves as powerless within their entanglement, as 
suggested by responses to a final statement that metaphorically queries the nature of this schema: 
“Like an insect is to me, so am I to the forces of nature.” To this statement, 74.1 percent of 
respondents (mean = 4.46) answered “strongly agree” on a 5-point scale. The 14 remaining 
responses were divided fairly consistently between the four remaining points, with 5 respondents 
(9.3 percent) answering “agree,” the same number answering “neither agree nor disagree,” and 
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the remaining 4 responses divided equally between “disagree” and “disagree strongly” (3.7 
percent each). These frequencies suggest that informants in Dolpo are generally well-aware of 
their physical position within their domain of entanglement. As the Geshe off-handedly 
commented to this final survey statement:  
Yes, we are like insects in relation to nature. Nature is very vast. 
 Several crosstabs support his conclusion. First, 39 respondents both agreed that nature is 
more powerful than humans and that insects are to them as they are to natural forces; of those 
respondents, 35 strongly agreed with the latter statement (Table 5).  
 
Table 5. Nature more powerful than humans * Like an insect to me, so am I to natural forces 
 
Like an insect to me, so am I to natural forces 
Total 
Strongly 
Disagree Disagree Neither/Nor Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
Nature is more powerful than 
humans 
Disagree 0 0 1 0 2 3 
Neither/ 
Nor 0 1 1 1 3 6 
Agree 2 1 3 4 35 45 
Total 2 2 5 5 40 54 
 
Significantly, of the three respondents who disagreed with the former statement, two strongly 
agreed with the latter. Second, of the 53 respondents who strongly agreed they would be lucky to 
survive if caught in a landslide, 39 also strongly agreed that they are like insects to natural forces 
(Table 6). The one respondent who only agreed that he would be lucky to survive a landslide 
nonetheless strongly agreed that he is like an insect to the forces of nature, while five other 
 
Table 6. If caught in a landslide, I would be lucky to survive * Like an insect to me, so am I to natural forces  
 
Like an insect to me, so am I to natural forces 
Total 
Strongly 
Disagree Disagree Neither/Nor Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
If caught in a landslide, I 
would be lucky to survive 
Agree 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Strongly 
Agree 2 2 5 5 39 53 




respondents both strongly agreed that they would be lucky to survive a landslide and would be 
like insects to the forces of nature (Table 7). Finally, a large overall majority of 29 respondents 
strongly agreed both that they destroy nature every time they plow their plots and that they are 
like insects to the forces of nature, with no other answer receiving more than four responses and 
no respondent either disagreeing or strongly disagreeing to either answer. 
 
Table 7. I destroy nature every time I plow my plots * Like an insect to me, so am I to natural forces  
 
Like an insect to me, so am I to natural forces 
Total 
Strongly 
Disagree Disagree Neither/Nor Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
I destroy nature every time I 
plow my plots 
Strongly 
Disagree 0 0 1 0 4 5 
Disagree 0 0 0 0 2 2 
Neither/ 
Nor 0 0 1 1 3 5 
Agree 1 1 0 2 2 6 
Strongly 
Agree 1 1 3 2 29 36 
Total 2 2 5 5 40 54 
 
CONCLUSION: THE NATURE OF THE UNIVERSE, BIOMETABOLICALLY SCALED 
“In a universe such as this,” as Bourdieu (1990:76) contends, “people never deal with 
‘nature’ as science understands it—a spatial representation that is the historical product of a long 
process of ‘disenchantment’” or, more appositely here, a reified conceptualization confirmed by 
the cognitive trick of its own circularly distorted framing. Indeed, in Dolpo the cultural model of 
the separate and fixed landscapes of the environment as understood through the cognitive 
delusions of Enlightenment schematic constellations from which the methodologies of Western 
‘science’ became renowned in propagating such tautological distortions, as Gotza intimated in 
our interview, make only a little sense to only a few people.  
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As this chapter has demonstrated, the Dolpo-pa model what that singular tradition’s 
model interprets (and distorts) as a separate and fixed space reified as the environment more as a 
domain of entanglement within which humans, though phenotypically distinct and karmically 
unique, are but one surface arrayed within that thin range of physical force and magnitude within 
that ecological domain. As such, the Dolpo-pa can be said to be holistically simultaneous with if 
not always explicitly aware of how the scalar asymmetries against which they contend daily in 
dwelling through the uncertainties of the existential present in such an entangled domain shape 
the model through which they interpret the world. Within such an entangled domain, as 
Kirmayer and Sartorius (2007:832) state, such schematic constellations as expatiated in this 
chapter “function as both resources for and constraints on individuals’ constructions and 
construals of experience.”  
As data will show in the following chapter, however, the millennia-long and traditionally 
consonant resource-function of the Dolpo-pa’s cultural model of their entanglement is 
increasingly exhibiting a constraint-function with rapid social changes that have been observed 
there since about 2005, which is worrying because of how such change is rapidly fragmenting 










 CHAPTER 5 – MY, WHAT ODD HERDS YOU HAVE:                                     
SOCIAL CHANGE IN DOLPO 
 
INTRODUCTION: THE SOCIAL FRAGMENTATION OF INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS 
Every one of my Dolpo-pa informants, from the youngest at 21 to the oldest at 70, has 
over the past five years begun to wear industrially produced clothing imported into the area from 
manufacturing centers in China, India, and Kathmandu. This change from traditionally 
handmade woolen to industrially manufactured clothing over that short period provides a 
remarkable illustration of how introduction into a domain of entanglement that has been 
metabolically stable for centuries of ostensibly trifling but no less alien (and astonishing) 
products manufactured at the unknown technometabolic scale of industrial processes tends to 
have seismic and even exponential effects on how human-animals synergistically adapted to the 
biometabolically-scaled continuities of that entangled domain schematize conceptually and 
choose to integrate materially/ perceptually those alien goods and unfamiliar changes into their 
everyday lives.  
Further survey data suggests an interesting pattern in this seemingly negligible but 
expanding transition that reflects how the increased availability of alien products from that 
technometabolic scale also has emergent though often all but unrecognized social effects that 
accrue in short time in the first order and precipitate a second-order conceptual break in the 
framing of existence within the domain. On a 3-point scale, for example, 75.9 percent of 
respondents answered “disagree” to the statement, “Compared to my old woolen clothing, the 
clothes I wear today are warmer,” while 59.3 percent also answered “disagree” to the statement, 
“Compared to my old woolen clothing, the clothes I wear today are of better quality.” In 
contrast, the same percentage (59.3 percent) answered “agree” to the statement, “Compared to 
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my old woolen clothing, the clothes I wear today are cheaper to buy.” In contrast, with 42.6 
percent and 46.3 percent of respondents, respectively, answering “disagree” and “agree,” no 
majority existed for the statement, “Compared to my old woolen clothing, the clothes I wear 
today are more durable.” Interestingly, however, to the statement, “Compared to my old woolen 
clothing, the clothes I wear today are a sign of status,” a slight majority of 51.9 percent of 
respondents answered “agree,” while only 35.2 percent answered “disagree.” To each of these 
statements except the first, more than 10 percent of respondents answered that they did not know 
(14.8 percent, 16.7 percent, 11.1 percent, and 13 percent, respectively). 
What these responses suggest is that the industrially manufactured clothing nearly 
everyone in Dolpo now wears (including all informants in this study) is of lower quality but is 
cheaper than the handmade woolen clothing they wore so recently. The slight majority in terms 
of status and success suggests the possible emergence of a trend in the schematization of a newly 
emergent social indicator of material experience. These frequencies intimate, in other words, an 
inchoate conceptual shift in the schematization of the object-world in Dolpo that increasingly 
focuses on second-order concerns of the conceptual reifications of cost and status (conceptual) 
and de-emphasizes the first-order concerns of existential endurance in the entropic 
disequilibrium of energy conservation expressed as warmth (material/perceptual). Such a 
transition, if verifiable (further study is required), would indicate a possible point of transition 
from a holistic simultaneity in the practical logic of entanglement. In this transition, the 
synergistically proven efficacy of such handmade woolen items as the lokpa (coat) and sumpa 
(boots) within the unpredictable ecological domain of Dolpo is unreasonably being replaced by 
the allure of the cognitive trick of distorted framing as represented in Dolpo by those material 
products of the technometabolic scale and reinforced by the graft of development discourse. The 
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high ambivalence or lack of surety among respondents answering with the middle value supports 
this analysis, implying the recency and swiftness at which such change has occurred and how it 
is confounding long-entangled models of survival. 
A similarly significant change over the past five years in Dolpo that reinforces this 
interpretation is the influx of newly and increasingly available packaged foods like biscuits, 
bottled beer and ubiquitous Coke products, candies, instant noodles, etc. Of Dolpo-pa 
respondents, all of whom said that five years ago they seldom (2-3 times a year or so at the 
maximum) ate or drank packaged products, only 14.8 percent claimed that they never eat 
packaged foods in a month in the year preceding the study and only 22.2 percent claimed that 
they never drink packaged drinks. At the same time, respectively, 33.3 percent and 29.6 percent 
claimed that they consume packaged products 1-3 times a month, which was the median 
response for food. The median response for drinks was 4-10 times a month. Claiming that they 
consumed over 20 packaged items a month at the time of the study were 7.4 percent and 16.7 
percent of respondents for food and drink, respectively.  
Survey data further indicates that although 70.4 percent of respondents “disagree” that 
“Packaged foods are healthier than locally grown foods,” 77.8 percent “agree” that “Packaged 
foods are easier to prepare than locally grown foods” and 75.9 percent “agree” that “Packaged 
foods are more convenient than locally grown foods.” In terms of taste, significantly, no majority 
was found, with 46.3 percent of respondents answering “agree” to the statement, “Packaged 
foods are tastier than fresh foods.” To that statement, 35.2 percent answered “disagree” and 18.5 
percent answered that they neither agreed nor disagreed. Such high ambivalence was also 
observed in the data from the previous statements, with, most interestingly, 20 percent of 
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respondents not knowing if packaged foods are healthier and 14.8 percent of respondents not 
knowing if packaged foods are more convenient than local foods.  
Because packaged foods continue to be schematized more as luxury or specialty items 
than are now commonly accessible industrially-manufactured clothing, survey results querying 
opinions about these items provide even greater insight into how experience with such alien 
products from the technometabolic scale leads to new schematizations of intra-entanglement 
arrangements at and extra-entanglement connotations of the biometabolic scale. Novel frames of 
status, for instance, are emerging in new synergies of material experiences and conceptual 
proficiencies that distinctively constellate both older biometablically- and newer 
technometabolically-scaled schemas in response to still quite limited experiences with such 
products. These novel frames are especially intimated by the contrast and skew observed in 
responses to statements about packaged foods in terms of social relations instead of, as in the 
previous survey statements, merely about usage and opinion in terms of personal distinction.  
For instance, to the statement, “Packaged foods are more interesting than local foods,” 
81.4 percent of respondents answered “agree” on a 3-point scale, while only 9.3 percent 
answered “disagree” and the same percentage answered “neither agree nor disagree.” Similarly, 
to both statements, “Packaged foods are changing how people in Dolpo are living their lives” and 
“Packaged foods are making some people wealthy,” 74.1 percent of respondents answered 
“agree” on a 3-point scale. To the former statement, only 7.4 percent of respondents answered 
“disagree” and to the latter statement only 5.6 percent of respondents answered “disagree.” 
Interestingly, response percentages of “neither agree nor disagree” were quite high for both of 
these statements at 18.5 percent and 20.4 percent, respectively. Quite the opposite, the statement 
“Packaged foods are a sign of status and success,” which still had a majority of respondents 
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answering “agree” (63 percent), otherwise saw a reversal of response compared to the previous 
two statements, with 29.6 percent of respondents answering “disagree” and only 7.4 percent of 
respondents answering “neither agree nor disagree.” Bourdieu (1984) might argue that this 
reversal suggests inchoate “classificatory struggles,” individuals associating with newly 
emerging classes trying to differentiate themselves in the construction of new lifestyles framed 
based on what Neil Smith (1987:168), referring to a new urban ideology but no less applicable 
for the shifting of frames in Dolpo, calls the “pursuit of difference, diversity and distinction.”  
Suggested by such classificatory struggles is an increased focus on the conceptual over 
the material at the root level of the physical domain of Dolpo that intimates, especially 
considering both intra- and extra-entanglement realities there, a nascent acquiescence to the 
circular distortions of the technometabolic framing of experience. The first statement in the 
preceding paragraph (foods more interesting), for instance, only asks about personal distinction 
in terms of such foods, expectedly eliciting a quite high positive response. The two paired 
responses that had the same response rate, on the other hand, both implicitly asked respondents 
to reflect on the nature of social relationships in terms of lifestyle and wealth, with the relatively 
high percentages of agreement suggesting how the increased availability of those new material 
goods were increasingly being perceived at the time of the study through a shifting frame. 
Similarly suggestive is the relatively high rate of response of “neither agree nor disagree” as 
opposed to flat out “disagree,” which suggests the influence of the extended ontology of the 
karmic frame of Bon epistemology, through which, as the Geshe commented, not only acting 
toward but also speaking poorly of other individuals is a sin.  
As such, this older, biometabolically-scaled Bon frame might limit definitive response to 
these new social arrangements that the majority of respondents, based on their replies to the 
 
 97
survey, do explicitly schematize as leading to social disparities like have never been seen before 
in Dolpo. The final statement on “status,” therefore, which results in the intriguing reversal of 
response rates of “neither agree nor disagree” (7.4 percent) and “disagree” (29.6 percent) from 
the paired statements preceding it, reinforces this observation. As “status and success” can 
readily be framed self-reflectively, the reversal suggests a schema indicating individuals’ desire 
not to appear greedy or showy and therefore sinful (as in the paired statements) even as the high 
overall rate of agreement still implies the majority opinion, indicating a change in how those 
within that physical domain of experience schematize such luxuries, which are becoming more 
and more commonly valued not for their material benefits in terms of ecological entanglement 
but for their conceptual benefits in terms of status. 
This analysis is bolstered by two further structured interview statements. To the first, 66.6 
percent of respondents answered “true” to the statement, “I am envious of my neighbor’s 
increased wealth,” while to the second, “I sometimes drink bottled beer or soda to show that I 
can afford such things,” 74.1 percent of respondents answered “true.” Crosstabs (Table 8) of 
these two statements are even more revealing, however, with 24 of the 40 respondents (60 
percent) who claimed that they do not consume bottled drinks to show that they can afford to do 
so nonetheless claiming that they are envious of their  
 
Table 8. Envious of neighbors' wealth * Sometimes consume bottled drinks to 
show off my increased wealth 
 
Bottled drinks to show off wealth 
Total True False 
Envious of neighbors' wealth True 12 24 36 
False 2 16 18 
Total 14 40 54 
 
neighbors’ increased wealth, the highest value in the table. In contrast, only two respondents 
claimed that they do drink bottled beverages to show that they can afford to do so but do not also 
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envy their neighbor’s wealth. Such comparative disparities reflect an inadvertent outcome of this 
valorization of industrial products as status, an emerging conceptual frame of competition the 
likes of which numerous respondents commented has never before been observed in their 
experience of Dolpo.  
This frame is, however, looping back into the material experience of the Dolpo-pa in 
generating palpable and ever more seamlessly naturalized schemas that validate the ensuing 
social fragmentation and thereby reinforce, in again looping back, the emerging schematization 
of the material products imported from the perceptually unknown technometabolic scale of 
industrial processes as indicators of status. Tellingly, numerous informants in Rigmo referred, 
both explicitly and implicitly, of an emerging sense of competition and subsequent fragmentation 
among villagers. For example, to a question from our semi-structured interview asking if there is 
anything negative about the new clothes everyone is wearing nowadays, the owner of the village 
shop in Rigmo responded: 
These clothes are not durable, more money is expended, and there is unfair competition among villagers 
about these things. In past days, all people wear wool clothes but today all wear different kinds of clothes, 
so we can easily say that this person is rich and this is poor. We can distinguish unlike when they used to 
wear self-made clothes, there was no way to distinguish and to buy the new clothes costs much money. 
These are the negative impacts. 
 
A 49-year-old harvester of yartsa gumbu spoke similarly: 
With increased wealth, people have become more active rather than lazy. Before, the only thing we used to 
do was farming but now everybody has a comparative attitude to do better than others . . . like more 
competitive.  
 
The Geshe commented similarly to a question about Rigmo villagers’ work ethic nowadays: 
Firstly, what I want to say is that people in our village have got an easier life now but that doesn’t indicate 
increased wealth. There is no one who deals with millions and billions. And people are not lazy now; 
instead of that, they are more competitive and comparative [than in the past]. Everyone is keen to be more 




On the rooftop of her home, a 50-year-old woman in Rigmo made a most apt comment to this 
effect, implying the ambivalence many are feeling toward the repercussions of such emerging 
schemas of fragmentation: 
Yes, everyone has become independent, which is good from my perspective. Nobody has to go anywhere to 
ask for money or food [anymore]. If something like that [a crisis or emergency] then I do not expect the 
villagers to help me, but yes, I do have good kin and relatives who would help me in needy situations . . . 
but it’s really bad not to help out your neighbors. 
 
Despite its being a sin, such inchoate fragmentation is also reflected in survey data that 
suggests how villagers in Rigmo are beginning to frame their neighbors’ doings and 
undertakings. For example, 75.9 percent of respondents answered “strongly agree” and 7.4 
percent answered “agree” on a 5-point scale to the statement, “People in [Rigmo] are lazier now 
that they have increased wealth and incomes.” Only 14.8 percent of respondents answered 
“strongly disagree” and 1.9 percent answered that they were not sure; no one answered 
“disagree.” A similar statement about doings and undertakings reflective of changing feelings 
toward neighbors in the village—“With increased wealth people are less interested in their 
spiritual development and duties”—also had a high affirmative response, with 68.5 percent of 
respondents answering “strongly agree” and 13 percent of respondents answering “agree” on the 
same scale. Only eight of the 54 total respondents answered negatively, with 13 percent strongly 
disagreeing and 1.9 percent disagreeing (3.7 percent answered that they did not know). 
 
HERDING MYCOTIC CATERPILLARS: YARTSA GUMBU & NATURE COMMODIFICATION  
 
Such recent alterations to the intra-social entanglements of Dolpo, which despite such 
ambivalence are framed altogether positively by Dolpo-pa informants, are remarkable; indeed, 
such changes were all but inconceivable even as recently as the beginning of the 21st century, at 
which time, “amid sweeping geopolitical and socio-economic changes, the continuing viability 
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of Dolpo’s pastoral and trade economies [seemed] slight, compared to the likelihood that many 
would divest their herds and migrate to urban centers” (Bauer 2004:192). In the late 1990s, so 
dire was the situation in Dolpo that the people were considered close to famine on several major 
food security indices (FAO/WFP 2007; WFP 2006). Illegible to those indices, however, was how 
within a few short years, as Bauer continues, “a one-dimensional economic recovery, dependent 
upon an anodyne, that of yartsa gumbu,” had enabled the Dolpo-pa to arrest their own seemingly 
certain demise in the Faustian exchange of further disentanglement from their domain for this 
first significant commodification of the environment. As such, the Dolpo-pa therewith became 
for the first time peripheral suppliers within the extra-entanglement world framed by the global 
economic systemxix.  
Selling for upwards of $5,000 a pound as “Himalayan Viagra” on the international 
traditional medicine market (Magistad, 2011), many Dolpo-pa and tens of thousands of others 
who migrate in from the Middle Hills and Terai spend upwards of six to eight weeks every 
spring digging for the hybrid caterpillar-fungus in several areas across Upper Dolpo to then sell 
to brokers in Tibetxx. In Rigmo, for example, to the survey question, “How much of your current 
wealth do you attribute to yartsa gumbu,” a total of 46.3 percent of respondents claimed over 10 
percent (31.5 percent answered “10-50 percent” and 14.8 percent responded “over 50 percent”), 
while 35.2 percent responded “less than 10 percent” and only 18.5 percent responded “zero.” To 
the statement, “Yartsa gumbu is the biggest reason why I have had more money to spend over the 
last several years,” 63 percent of respondents answered “true.”  
Clarifying these frequencies is that 29.6 percent of survey respondents, all of whom were 
either farmer-traders or furniture makers before 2005, claimed collecting yartsa gumbu as their 
primary occupation by 2010. Also consequential, however, is that another 29.6 percent of 
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respondents opened small businesses ranging from tea houses to lodges to shops in that same 
period, indicating a multiplier effect through the increased wealth secured in commodification of 
yartsa gumbu. An unsolicited reference from the Geshe in response to a general question about 
whether he is jealous of the increased wealth of villagers in recent years supports this inference: 
No, I am not envious of my neighbor’s wealth. It is not a good thing to do. If I am envious of my 
neighbor’s wealth then it means that I am not happy for what he is and what he has gained. We lamas do 
have more money from doing rituals and rites, but for villagers yartsa gumbu is the biggest reason [for 
more money]. So, maybe not directly but indirectly due to yartsa gumbu we [lamas] have more money 
 
To be sure, 85.2 percent of respondents answered that it is “true” that they “can earn more 
money now than [they] could five years ago.” On a 5-point scale, 68.5 percent (mean = 3.85) of 
respondents also agreed that “Yartsa gumbu will continue to provide higher incomes to people in 
[Rigmo] indefinitely,” with 53.7 percent answering “strongly agree” and 14.8 percent answering 
“agree.” Interestingly, 18.5 percent of respondents answered “strongly disagree” but no one 
answered “disagree,” though 13 percent answered that they did not know. The majority of 
respondents, however, echoed the claim of the 30-year-old trader from Rigmo: 
 Yes, yartsa gumbu will continue to help people of our area. 
That the majority of those surveyed and observed in Dolpo conceptualize yartsa gumbu 
as either directly or indirectly providing higher living standards indefinitely into the future 
suggests how ostensibly trifling changes in the experience of a place like Dolpo by so small a 
material alteration can seismically and even exponentially affect conceptual proficiency within 
that domain. This destabilization creates, in turn, through the reification effected by so subtle a 
shift in frame, new constellations of schemas that frame the once distinct human-animal within 
as a human being in separation from that reified frame that is the environmentxxi.  
Looping back circularly, such a shift confirms the international development model of 
progress that insinuates from beyond the entanglement and, by the cognitive trick of such 
reasoning, shifts focus within it from that first-order material experience of dwelling within the 
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ecological asymmetries of the biometabolic scale to the second-order conceptual proficiency that 
is only confirmed through that frame by the evidence of the existence of that frame. As such, the 
essential necessity for a human-surface cum -animal becomes not to subsist well, which is 
increasingly framed as a backwards and benighted means of being in a present that is not quite 
present, but to progress by evolving into the second-order constellations produced by that 
distorting frame, which justifies its own ersatz reality by reifying the schemas that produce such 
delusional separations from physical reality but which are only ever the impracticable (in the 
long term) cognitions of the technometabolically-scaled framing of its underlying graftxxii. 
‘Wealth’ within such a frame transforms as if magically (it is a trick, after all) from a 
concept embodied materially by physical objects valuable for use or by the physical symbol of 
money that is schematized like any other physical object that is valuable in representing the 
concept of ‘wealth’ in exchange-for-use. By this transformation, however, wealth is reified as 
actually existing materially as an object in the world in cash or coin, a trick circularly confirmed 
in how transactions are schematized as ‘use by exchange’. This trick represents a reversal 
through that distorting frame of the long-schematized symbolic role of money in many cultures 
that has over the past five years insinuated itself more and more into the constellations of daily 
life in Dolpo as the only viable form of wealth. Yaks, for instance, are less often framed now in 
and of their physical animal-surfaces as wealth than, distortedly, as being somehow symbolic 
embodiments of real wealth that is found, as is increasingly framed, in those papers printed and 
coins minted by the Nepali state and indicating (and reinforcing) naught but the array of 
reifications constellated in schematic representations by its conceptual reification of Rupees.  
As Simmel (2004) recognized over one hundred years ago, the increasing influence of 
this curious material/conceptual, oxymoronically physical-idea of money—valued conceptually 
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as a symbol of material exchange that is perceived as having no value unless it is possessed 
physically—has only over these past five years really also begun to influence in Dolpo how 
individuals frame their relationships with material goods and with one another. Indeed, 
synergistic awareness within the domain is beginning to disentangle, as evidenced by the 
slackening of no less than the traditional netsang (trade partnerships) relationships with salt 
harvesters on the plateau and farmers in the Middle Hills with whom schemas of trade were once 
shared and transmitted inter-generationally in defining the Dolpo-pa’s cultural relationships with 
the world beyond the remote Himalayan domain through which even today they continue dwell 
(Snellgrove 1981:83).  
 The shifted focus that has recently arisen in Dolpo with new material experiences of 
wealth as money through the commodification and sale of yartsa gumbu has, however, also had 
its downsides, which is important to recognize because of how these downsides have thus far 
been underplayed by the Dolpo-pa. Notably, these downsides have also been downplayed by the 
distorted frame of International Development that continually reinforces the benefits of such new 
experiences of wealth as money. Without a doubt, nonetheless, these downsides are evident, as 
the 62-year-old woman in her kitchen garden in Rigmo stated: 
Yes, people of Rigmo are wealthier now than in the past. Now, everybody has a stock of local foods and 
packaged foods both to sell and to use that we never had before. I have experienced an increase in income 
but with this the cost of living also has increased. Before, I rarely saw NRs 500 [~$7USD] but now NRs 
500 means nothing. 
 
The 30-year-old trader similarly made reference to certain downsides of life today: 
In the past, I used to worry about what to eat and wear, but now I have enough to eat and wear, which is a 
blessing of god. With this increased living standard, every person is keen to do every new task like doing 
business, which has also increased the things to be worried about. 
 
The Geshe suggested this same point of increased stress in his semi-structured interview 
response to a question about standard of living: 
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My standard of living is the same as before. It’s true that people have increased wealth but simultaneously 
they have more tension and stress. As for my life, it is quite similar. 
 
 Survey data appears to confirm the downsides of such experiences with money as 
conceptualized through this distorted frame. To the statement, for example, “I spend more money 
on food now than I did five years ago,” a significant preponderance exists, with 92.6 percent of 
respondents answering “true,” while the statement, “I spend more money on clothing now than I 
did five years ago,” had an even higher preponderance, with 94.4 percent of respondents 
answering “true.” As expected, these increasing expenditures have led to greater stress, with 83.3 
percent of respondents answering “true” to the statement, “I worry more now than I did 5 years 
ago,” while 92.6 percent of respondents answered “true” to the statement, “I worry about 
different kinds of things now than I did five years ago.” 
 
HUXLEY AND FAUST GOING NOWHERE: SHORT-TERM GAINS FOR LONG-TERM CHAINS 
In analyzing such changes as have since the early 2000s descended so swiftly into Dolpo, 
the basic dichotomy of Everett Lee’s (1967) seminal push-pull theory of migration provides a 
useful heuristic through which to examine how this distorted framing of second-order conceptual 
constellations gradually more often now defines the Dolpo-pa’s relationship with the world 
beyond their domain of entanglement, especially in terms of the disentangling effects of 
development discourse. Indeed, the reification of the concept of wealth as an object in the world 
that is literally contained in the material paper and coins we perceive as money increasingly pulls 
the Dolpo-pa toward the schematic regularity of a model defined by the linear sequentiality of 
that distorted frame that confirms through its conceptual tautologies of fixed truths and separate 
spaces the assurances of the cognitive trick that makes those reifications seem so real. 
Concurrently (and increasingly), that frame also pushes them away from the evolutionarily 
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emergent synergies of experience and proficiency through a model defined by the holistic 
simultaneity of extended engagement within their entangled domain. Within such a shifting 
cognition, new second-order schemas continually constellate through a sequential linearity that 
does not self-correct in looping back to material experience with ecological reality but confirms 
the distortions of its own framing through the circularities it conceptualizes of itself. In such a 
way, it begins to reject as irrational—benighted, backwards and primitive—the emergent 
synergy of known uncertainty that is the simultaneity of looping back holistically in awareness 
through experience and proficiency.  
Constellations of these new second-order schemas, thereby, through the unassailable 
evidence of linear progression in the manufacture of more complex and advanced material 
products by the forces and magnitudes made possible by social organization at the scale of 
technometabolism, frame such distortions as they embody in reification (a trick of shifting 
cognition that is continually confirmed at the level of everyday) as a fixed truth upon first-order 
ecological reality. Kreutzmann (2001:134), for example, argues that “quality-of-life indicators 
are based on the assumption that development is based on universal categories and not on 
localized experiences and different value systems.” Such indicators intend to effectuate distorted 
understandings of reality based on such reified fixations as. As Scott (1998:32) notes, “the idea 
of equal citizenship, the abstraction of the ‘unmarked’ citizen, can be traced to the Enlightenment 
and is evident in the writings of the Encyclopedists” like Diderot, de La Chapelle, and Voltaire.   
As Hornborg (2006:10), drawing from Latour (1993), concludes, however, if such 
Enlightenment and “modernist convictions were indeed to collapse” our technometablically-
scaled orientation and “the agency of these cornucopian ‘productive forces’” would be exposed 
“as a transmutation and deflection of the agency of other humans, [rendering] morally suspect 
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that which modernity had couched in the deceptive neutrality of the merely technical.” As 
framed through the development model of progress, nevertheless, such a singular and 
perfunctorily accepted promise as perceived through material evolution and linear production at 
the technometabolic scale of industrial processes is grafted (v.) over the ‘underdeveloped 
world’—quite literally in terms of their being literally reified conceptual distortions—by a 
conceptual discourse of Huxleianxxiii subjugation that is the graft (n.) in the reification of that 
discourse as the industrial process that is International Development.  
In Dolpo, such Huxleian subjugation through developmental graft has over the last 
several years increasingly enthralled the Dolpo-pa, pulling and pushing them with greater 
insistence to focus more and more on the illusion of truth in the distortions of the trick of the 
frame. The 49-year-old harvester of yartza gumbu from Rigmo, for instance, intimated this 
emerging schematic constellation, even providing specifics of what such progress looks like 
through the circularity of the distorted frame: 
Increased wealth is good for everyone. With money, we can buy what we want and nowadays we can even 
visit Kathmandu, which we never did in the past.  
 
He did not, however, elaborate on the benefit to him of visiting Kathmandu. Most telling in this 
cognitive shift is the point made by the 56-year-old woman interviewed on the roof of her house 
in Rigmo who claimed: 
Without money . . . nothing is possible. We don’t cultivate everything that we need, so money is necessary 
to buy barley, rice, oil, etc. that we need to have a comfortable life. People getting wealthier is a good sign 
of progress. 
 
Important to understand is that the change illustrated in these informant statements is not that the 
Dolpo-pa now cultivate only a small part of their own subsistence nor that they now trade to 
supplement that small part, both of which have been defining practices of the synergistic 
awareness that emerged within the entangled domain of Dolpo for upwards of a thousand years; 
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no, the change is that the basis of such trade is increasingly thought of and substantiated by that 
distorted frame, through which such subsistence—a means of surviving; the state of existing 
in reality—is pejoratively equated with penury as deduced through the circularity of the frame (a 
push), even as wealth in money has no less through that frame come to define how success must 
be adjudged through that distorted understanding of the world (a pull).  
 Indeed, the Dolpo-pa became “poor” only after their limited access to money was framed 
as a deprivation, a conceptual shift that engaged the circularity of the development model of 
progress just as it de-emphasized the little changed physical reality of the Dolpo-pa’s synergistic 
awareness of their domainxxiv. An excerpt from my conversation with the 42-year-old owner of 
the shop in Rigmo is quite telling to this effect: 
G: Was there anything wrong with the locally made clothes and shoes [the Dolpo-pa] used to  
     wear? 
 I: There was no kind of problem but they were hard to make and they took more time. In past  
     days, people did not have enough money, so they used these things but today they get  
     economically strong and they ignore locally made goods.   
G: What were the self-made clothes made from? 
 I: From [yak] wool. Everything was made from wool. 
           G: Wow, was there anything positive about homemade clothes? 
 I: Positive things were that they were warm and more feasible from an economic point of view.  
     They did not have to invest money to make those things. 
 
Undeniably, as with the altogether positive conceptual framing of phenological change 
that has been experienced as beneficial even as physical uncertainty in the existential present has 
palpably risen in the last five years (see Chaper 6), so too has increased access with higher 
incomes to technometabolically-scaled products been framed positively by nearly everyone in 
Dolpo as an increase in standard of living, as making those with greater access a little more less-
poor than their neighbors. As the 49-year-old harvester of yartsa gumbu and former trader 
claimed:  
People of Rigmo have got a far better standard of living than in the past. People have got more money, 
different kinds of clothes and a variety of foods. Before, we never used to have horses but now everybody 




The 62-year-old woman interviewed in her kitchen garden in Rigmo provided similar evidence 
of such an increase to living standards, stating affirmatively: 
Yes, yes, standard of life is also increased. Before we used to wear one woolen pair of clothes for almost a 
year but now many new clothes are brought from Kathmandu and China and worn. In the past, we used to 
eat whatever is on hand but now people have choices of foods, some are from China and some are from 
Kathmandu. 
 
The 50-year-old woman interviewed on the roof of her house also spoke of her higher living 
standard, though her response also suggests how the benefits of increased wealth have resulted in 
fragmentation in Rigmo: 
When I was with my first husband, we never had our own home and used to struggle for survival. Now, we 
do have a house, more money and previously unseen foods to eat and clothes to wear. The fact is that my 
second husband has his own house and farm but really worked hard to earn some profit. I earn a little 
money through small business and from yartsa gumbu. Other people in the village also have increased 
standard of living. Compared to me, though, other villagers have a better and easier life. 
 
 Survey data supports the general conviction among informants that their standard of 
living has increased since 2005, with 87 percent of respondents answering “true” to a statement 
querying just that understanding. How informants comprehend the concept of standard of living 
proved additionally corroborative, with 72.2 percent of informants (mean = 4.39) on a 5-point 
scale answering “strongly agree” and another 11.1 percent answering “agree” to the statement, 
“Increased standard of living means increased consumption of previously unavailable goods.” 
Only four respondents answered “strongly disagree” and one answered “disagree,” while the 
remaining four respondents answered that they did not know. Tellingly, to the general statement, 
“Increased standard of living equals increased incomes,” 75.9 percent of respondents answered 
“agree” on a 3-point scale, while only 9.3 percent answered “disagree” and 14.8 percent 
answered that they did not know. In fact, the Geshe’s response to a question asking what one 
thing would improve the quality of his life today is most revealing: 
The most important thing is knowledge and then money. But, practically, money is more important to buy 




 Similarly suggesting this conviction that increased standard of living is the result of 
access to more money are several responses to satisfaction indicators asking about the same five 
year time period in which wealth increased markedly through the sale of yartsa gumbu. For 
instance, to the statement, “My life is easier now than it was five years ago,” 90.7 percent of 
respondents answered “true.” To the statement, “I am happier now than I was five years ago,” 
94.4 percent of respondents also answered “true.”  
 
THE COGNITIVE TRICK OF THE WESTERN EUROPEAN ENLIGHTENMENT TRADITION’S 
DISTORTED CIRCULAR FRAMING OF BIOMETABOLIC REALITY . . . OR BHO JHA IS GATORADE® 
FOR THE SCIENTIFICALLY UNINFORMED & ECONOMICALLY UNDEVELOPED  
 
In many ways, this strong consensus on these indicators and those positive assessments of 
social change by Dolpo-pa informants demonstrates one of the main argument being made in this 
thesis: The cognitive trick of the European Enlightenment tradition’s distorted circular framing 
of physical reality has, as it has invariantly in each domain of entanglement into which it has 
encroached around the world since the Age of Exploration (Guha 2000:28), begun to delude the 
Dolpo-pa into compromising their emergent synergistic awareness by impelling them to reify 
second-order conceptualizations as objects actually in the world. This trick compels them, in 
turn, to de-emphasize first-order ecological reality at the biometabolic scale in concentrating on a 
perception of greater certainty in short-term gains of standard of living through the alien products 
of the little-known technometabolic scale. Notable in this transition is how each of those 
previous positive assessments of new living standards explicitly frames the benefits of this new 
way to conceptualize in terms not of the technometabolic scale of power of which (see Chapter 
6) most Dolpo-pa have little experience or understanding but of the industrial processes of that 
scale that produce the products of which they do have personal experience.  
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Strengthening this assessment is how such products immediately became more 
immediately obtainable to the Dolpo-pa with two simple acts: Commodifying the environment 
(in yartza gumbu) and accepting the reification of wealth in money. No doubt in the short term 
these acts are perceived as far-surpassing in a labors-to-limits ratio the definitely restricted 
possibilities for production of surpluses that had emerged at the biometabolic scale of ecological 
processes within that entangled domain of Dolpo. At the same time, however, acquiescence to 
this new frame with its very definite, explicit short-term benefits is rendering the Dolpo-pa more 
existentially vulnerable in the long term by diminishing the effective functionality of that 
evolutionarily emergent synergy of experience and proficiency within their Himalayan domain 
of entanglement. 
Importantly, the explicit advantages of more readily available industrial products are at 
the same time implicitly framed in terms of metabolic energy savings, which intimates a 
compelling re-constellation of both old entangling and new disentangling schemas that 
nonetheless always function, because of the compelling first-order benefits of such energy 
savings, to reinforce the advantages of the distorted frame. That the Dolpo-pa are implicitly 
aware of the metabolic and symbiotic constraints they must continuously surmount as human-
animals and herders dwelling through such a steep and rugged physical domain of entanglement 
as is Dolpo is evident to anyone who has experienced their hospitality. Ubiquitous on any visit to 
any home or tent or alpine encampment in Dolpo is an initial offering (without taking no for an 
answer) and continued refilling (without taking no for an answer) of cups of bho jha (salt butter 
tea), which has been a staple of Tibetan culture in the mountains and across the Plateau since at 
least the 13th Century (Mayhew and Kohn 2005). Combined with field observations, this history 
supports the inference that, despite the Dolpo-pa’s not having explicit awareness of the ‘science’ 
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of electrolyte loss or caloric intake, the ubiquity of bho jha throughout the day everyday has 
emerged as a physical response and shared schematic constellation in the synergy between 
experience and proficiency over generations of extended entanglement within the domains into 
which Tibetan cultural knowledge and practice have been and continue to be transmitted.  
To be sure, such synergistic awareness has been especially crucial to the everyday 
thriving of individuals in a physically challenging domain like Dolpo, where, regardless of 
modeled entanglement or karmic solace, perpetuation as a conditionally-structured surface 
within the entanglement is excruciatingly hard, requiring not only mental perseverance and 
tenacity but also and often tens of cups of bho jah a day to replace what is lost metabolically in 
caravanning through its steep, forbidding geographical uncertaintyxxv. Indeed, such a simple and 
easily available high sodium, high caloric drink well-complements tsampa (roasted barely flour), 
the traditional staple of (and often only food available to) Tibetans. This implicit frame of 
metabolic and electrolyte requirements extends no less to the ubiquitous herds of yak and dzoa 
with which the Dolpo-pa exist symbiotically.  
Indeed, I observed such symbiotic awareness, for instance, after a long, hot day of 
trekking in the scorching sun from Bhijer (~4,000 meters) to the high camp (~5,100 meters) 
below the Nengla Bhanjyang (5,368 meters) in Upper Dolpo, the highest pass over which we 
trekked in conducting this study. Upon finding a spot near a trickling water source to set up 
camp, the first thingxxvi our wrangler Nyma did after untethering their upwards of 90kg loads was 
provide salted water to the four dzoa in our caravan, his knowing through experience and cultural 
proficiency the specific needs of his herd in that particular situationxxvii. The point is that 
although few in Dolpoxxviii have the explicit knowledge of the science of electrolyte and caloric 
loss and replacement that Western knowledge has ascertained through experimentation in its no 
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less synergistic awareness—regardless of how it circularly frames those second-order conceptual 
competencies as somehow ‘scientifically objective’ and removed from the everyday world of 
material experience (Ross et al. 2010:18; Turnbull 1997:557; see also Kuhn 1996)—the Dolpo-
pa have discovered through their own implicit logics and practical awareness the similar benefits 
in the replenishment of electrolytes and calories through biometabolically-scaled production of 
bho jah as Westerners have discovered through the technometabolically-scaled production (and 
marketing and packaging and . . .) of sports drinks like Gatorade®xxix.  
The important differences between these discoveries is in the constellation of the schemas 
of experimentation, the framing of discovery and the subsequent scales of production; in other 
words, the difference is in fact little more than in how knowledge and knowledge legitimacy are 
modeled and operationalized (Turnbull 1997:553; Agrawal 1995:421). This is especially true as 
framed by those peripheral people like the Dolpo-pa who are currently contending with such 
enormous choices (framed, of course, only as ‘opportunities’) as the first- and second-order 
pressures and expectations of the graft of International Development increasingly advances on 
them. As Bodley (1998:20) perceptively observes, however, “Individuals can be made to reject 
their traditional values if outside interests create the necessary conditions for this rejection.” But, 
as Knauft (2002:44) finely articulates: 
At issue here is not force or coercion in a direct sense but a modern sense of self and personhood associated 
as if naturally with the hope of a new kind of cultural success. This success is based on new forms of 
authoritative knowledge and informs a new moral hierarchy that inculcates contextual subservience in those 
who are not already distinguished. As such, modern hierarchy draws upon the ostensibly best and most 
earnest strains of modern liberalism to create new forms of cultural hegemony actualized through 
subjective domination. 
 
In Dolpo, the assurances of this new, circularly distorted conceptual frame are increasingly 
sundering the evolutionarily emergent synergy of material experience and conceptual proficiency 
in pulling the Dolpo-pa away from their known first-order physical reality as conditionally-
structured surfaces entangled through extended engagement within such an asymmetrical domain 
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at the biometabolic scale. In doing so, they are increasingly becoming deluded through the 
reifications of the cognitive trick to accept as truth the second-order constructs of what Knauft 
terms “authoritative knowledge.”  
 Doing so thus inclines the Dolpo-pa to schematize from the short-term benefits perceived 
through limited experience with the material products of the technometabolic scale an overall, 
long-term advantage in acquiescing to that scale by schematizing a model based on those 
reifications that so distort the orders of the frame but that no less underlie the first-order forces 
and magnitudes made possible through those second-order perceptual delusions that undergird 
the industrial productions of that scale. As Hornborg (2001:94, emphasis in original; see also 
Georgescu-Roegen 1999) argues with élan: 
The Second Law of Thermodynamics states that all processes of energy conversion must entail a net 
reduction of order in the universe . . . Industrial technology and its products, though suggesting local 
accumulations of order, entail an overall decrease of order in the biosphere. In other words, industrial 
goods represent less order than the energy and raw materials that went into their production. The same, of 
course, is true of living things, but the implications are entirely different. In subsisting on an extraterrestrial 
source of order, organic structures—or economists concerned exclusively with pre-industrial societies—
need not worry about the Second Law. By comparison, technomass ultimately derives its order from within 
a finite, inorganic realm, and the economists of industrialism have every reason to be concerned with 
thermodynamics. 
 
This is an important though seldom honestly appreciated reality that neither cognitive trickery 
nor neoclassical economic pleading nor development intrusions can overcome in the end, even as 
those thus engaged in the world continually de-emphasize its first-order preeminence through the 
distortions that undergird the frames of that technometabolic scale of industrial power.  
As Hornborg (2001:124) further states, however, “industrial growth is founded on an 
asymmetric, social exchange of negentropy,” which exposes the basic graft of the development 
model of progress. Increasing rejection by the Dolpo-pa of their synergistic awareness of 
entanglement actually consists, therefore, of a schematic constellation that is part Huxleian and 
part Faustian, an ecstatic submission to the allure of the modernizing program of that one 
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European tradition’s Enlightenment that schematized “the idea of progress, and actively sought 
that break with history and tradition which modernity espouses . . . [in] the demystification and 
descaralization of knowledge and social organization in order to liberate human beings from 
their chains” (Harvey 1990:12-13). Within such spaces of disentanglement, the Faustian push 
and the Huxleian pull increasingly fragment how knowledge is schematized and subsequently 
constellated in models that distort how legitimacy is framed. Only through such a distortion 
could the physical realities of holistic entanglement be reified as conceptual chains that restrain 
progress; indeed, only through such a conceptual distortion could reification be delusively 
framed as the first-order root of material experience.  
 Further ethnographic material from Dolpo illustrates this re-constellation of fragmented 
knowledge through such a distorted frame. For instance, although 90.7 percent of survey 
respondents answered “true” to the statement, “Knowledge of the Bon Dharma is more important 
to me than knowledge that enables me to earn more money,” 83.4 percent answered “true” to the 
statement, “The knowledge I learned from my parents and neighbors is less important than the 
knowledge children learn in school today.” A crosstab (Table 9) of these statements is especially 
suggestive, as by far the most common response at 76 percent (41 of 54 respondents) is that 
knowledge of the Bon Dharma is more important than making money but knowledge from one’s 
parents is also less important than knowledge children learn at school today. 
Table 9. Knowledge of Bon dharma more important than knowledge for making 
money * Knowledge from parents less important than knowledge from school 
 
Knowledge from parents less 
important than school knowledge Total 
True False  
Knowledge of Bon dharma 
more important than 
knowledge for making money 
True 42 7 49 
False 3 2 5 




Tellingly, the only operating schools in Dolpo are funded almost exclusively by 
European foundations and nonprofits and administered based on Western models of pedagogy. 
The ostensible purpose of these schools is to provide opportunity to the rural poor through 
education, which is framed nearly the world over as an appropriate objective for development; 
what is often too perfunctorily dismissed, however, is that this liberal aspiration is no less a 
product of that distorted frame, such schools in fact functioning more as hubs through which 
students are enthusiastically disentangled from their domains and optimistically inculcated as 
eager propagators of that linear sequentiality of progress through that graft of the development 
model of progress that delegitimizes, concurrently, their own holistic knowledge as backwards 
and primitive and underdeveloped. What such indoctrination produces, as a result, are more and 
more peripherally emplaced second-order circular spaces through which progress is further 
schematized and constellated as both the claim and the evidence for its own authority as keeper 
of what becomes an ever more hegemonic reification of knowledge as an object in the world. 
Through that same cognitive trick, the distortions of that trick increase its technometabolically-
scaled social organization through the many-headed Hydra of liberalism that is delusionally 
framed and that delusionally frames what material opportunities it can provide over the long 
term. This is true even as it further encroaches in the short term into the very real and very 
physical existential present of places like the remote Himalayas where first-order uncertainty 
continues to define reality for those human-surfaces cum -animals who dwell there regardless of 
the many dissimulations of that model of progress.  
Significantly, few if any of the donors, organizers, officials, teachers, principles, or 
parents who support such schools as operate in Dolpo are deliberate in their assent to this 
distorted frame of liberalism or the Huxleian/Faustian havoc it wreaks through engagement with 
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its best intentions. Although, for instance, such schools like Kedar’s Crystal Mountain School in 
the Tarap Valley have increasingly included lessons on the cultural importance of traditional 
practices, as the former schoolmaster Gotza in Namdo commented of his school in our interview 
such lessons are now often only recited from a textbook as a part of Tibetan Language lessons 
and no longer consist of that mimetic enskilment of which Ingold (2000:55) writes and through 
which such children do not acquire awareness of living in the environment of Dolpo but become 
synergistically aware by being Dolpoxxx. In such classes, Dolpo-pa children only learn about 
their culture, practicing their language in what becomes a sad second-order attempt to salvage it 
as learning Nepali and/or English is framed as more a skill for progress in the eschewing of 
subsistence as backwards. Similarly, staging traditional performance has become not a 
synergistic transmission of being within that domain of entanglement but a burlesque in being of 
or from that exotic, timeless environment that is Dolpo. Such performances are viewed favorably 
as possible entertainment for an inchoate ecotourism industry that is discussed now (as in many 
places) as a possibly viable development strategy to provide jobs and futures for those at the 
periphery who are increasingly framed conceptually as and thus bodily become penuriousxxxi.  
Such a shift in the framing of culture, from what you holistically are in a dynamic 
synergy of awareness within a domain of entanglement to something you know about in a 
sequence of linear comprehensions, only reinforces this reification of culture as an object. 
Among other concerns, this shift enables such comparative schematizations as envisioned 
through the distorted frame by which the culture in Dolpo indeed does appear not to have 
progressed in respect to those cultures that exist at the core of the world as assessed through the 
circularities of that distorted frame that confirms itself by being both the evidence and the claim 
for itself. The consequences of such disentanglement are profound, as evidenced by the voices of 
 
 117
that large majority of Dolpo-pa who enthusiastically support the ‘opportunity’ promised 
metonymically by these schools in subjugation through such new constellations that frame their 
own knowledge as illegitimate or as not even valuable enough to be considered a form of 
knowledge. For example, a 70-year-old man from Rigmo claimed: 
Yes, knowledge that children learn in school today is obviously more important than our knowledge which 
was passed to us from our parents.  
 
The 30-year-old trader echoed this response, exemplifying how the distorted frame of the 
cognitive trick de-emphasizes the physical in confirmation of the distortion, stating: 
Nowadays, everybody gives more importance to the knowledge that school children learn in school, so I 
think maybe our knowledge is less important. 
 
Even more compelling in this regard, however, was the response from the 62-year-old 
woman interviewed in her kitchen garden in Rigmo who explicitly stated how acquiescence to 
this new frame of knowledge remains no less rooted in the harshness of material experience in 
dwelling within the physical asymmetries of Dolpo: 
Our knowledge is less important as compared to the knowledge of school students because we put every 
single physical effort [in working to acquire our knowledge] but school students can apply their knowledge 
by sitting in a chair.  
 
The 63-year-old woman who collects yartsa gumbu made a similar statement: 
The knowledge that school children learn in school is more important than our knowledge because we exert 
physical effort with our knowledge but school children stay in their chairs and work. 
 
Such framing of school is remarkable, as it not only bolsters the argument about the underlying 
pull of knowledge subjugation through framing discussed above but also represents the reversal 
by which those opportunities of development are themselves re-framed as a push by those newly 
subjugated to the distortions of that development model of progress, suggesting the active 
process by which this re-constellation of schemas in the cognitive shift of cultural flux occurs by 
those being increasingly influenced by it. In this way, development can be modeled not only as 
pulling the Dolpo-pa as they acquiesce to their re-framing of their own synergistic knowledge as 
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illegitimate but also as pushing them by its promise of providing a new form of thriving at the 
technometabolic scale that conserves physical energy by demanding less labor in surmounting 
the no less contentious asymmetries of the biometabolic scale.  
Such a push as was observed in Dolpo suggests the same phenomenon of assimilating 
new information into existing models that Kempton et al. (1996:77) found in their study of 
environmental values in American culture. They found that new information, even if contrary to 
the basic claims of a culture’s model, is far more readily integrated into existing frames than are 
the premises of such frames amendable in regards to new information. In a development context, 
however, wherein a conceptual model is itself in the process of shifting (or being shifted) to an 
entirely different scale—such as in this case from the biometabolic to the technometabolic—of 
force and magnitude of physically being in the world, inevitable unknown or misunderstood or 
misrepresented information due to material inexperience with the scale being shifted to is 
integrated into the new frame based on the coherencies of the old. This is true even if the old 
model is conceptually unsuitable to accurately model material experience at that new scale.  
For those Dolpo-pa respondents quoted above, therefore, among others who intimated a 
similar understanding of the benefits of less energy consuming physical labor, school is 
schematized not as providing greater opportunity as it is framed by the development model of 
progress from the technometabolic scale of industrial production (of which again most have little 
understanding) but as being a means through which to physically labor less in a life lived 
entangled at the biometabolic scale of ecological processes, which, in Dolpo, suggests that 
school is framed as a means to mitigate the uncertainty of being a physically structured surface 
with metabolic limits within the asymmetries of a shifting, cleaving domain of constant surface 
flux. Indeed, most informants have only a little if any understanding of what students learn in 
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school, their assessments stemming solely from their experience of seeing children physically 
laboring less in doing their school ‘work’. 
 
CONCLUSION: ‘THE EASY LIFE’ AT THE TECHNOMETABOLIC SCALE OF INDUSTRY 
Acquiescence to the development model of progress does not necessarily mean explicit 
acceptance or even understanding of its distortions, though implicit acceptance of the model 
inevitably results in acquiescence to the frame that is the distortion that becomes the basis of all 
further incoherence between the material/perceptual and the conceptual in the disentangling of 
synergistic awareness in Dolpo. Indeed, extending from a scale never before experienced by 
biometabolic dissipative structures at any scale of entanglement (ecological, evolutionary, 
geological), the force and magnitude of progress modeled technometabolically further deludes by 
providing the push of short-term physical benefits of the products from that new scale without 
providing an understanding of what limits or drawbacks are known of the long-term effects that 
have resulted from acquiescence to it by peoples around the world long-since deluded into 
acquiescing to it.  
To be sure, many respondents intimated how their acceptance of the technometabolically-
scaled development model of progress is little more than a matter of how life becomes physically 
easier for them through it. The point is that to a dissipative structure at the edge of ecological 
uncertainty in everyday life, an easier time of it is progress. This is true even though it is not (and 
no one in Dolpo suggested it) anything like the Enlightenment origins of how progress has been 
for centuries framed at that all but unknown scale of technometabolism of which only a handful 
of people at most in Dolpo is at all knowledgeable. This unawareness is not because the Dolpo-
pa are conceptually ignorant or primitive or backwards but because they have never had material 
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experience at that technometabolic scale of industrial processes that probably pushes more than 
the distorted frame of that scale pulls them. In essence, therefore, the development industry is 
graft because it entices people like the Dolpo-pa with the short-term benefits of the products of 
an unfamiliar scale of what it recognizes will be advantageous to its masters in the long-term 
unequal exchange of negentropy that promises progress but firmly keeps its core economies in 
power at the center of the system (Hornborg 2001, Bunker 1985).  
Comments from the 62-year-old woman in her kitchen garden in Rigmo echo numerous 
respondents suggesting this interpretation of how development is pushing the Dolpo-pa to 
acquiesce in their framing of its promise of a less physically demanding life: 
We feel that our woolen clothes are more important but woolen clothes are really hard to make. People 
prefer an easier life, so they just exchange money for new clothes [from factories far afield] that are very 
easy to get and light to wear. 
  
Further into our discussion she also stated: 
People don’t have to struggle for survival like in the past. Some have more wealth, some are average, and 
some people have got sufficient wealth to live life happily . . . [People are] lazier in the sense that they 
don’t prefer to put physical effort in and don’t have patience any more. Young people have the sense of 
earning money rather than farming and waiting for a long time. 
 
To this effect it can be said that people in Dolpo frame the promise of development not as a way 
to escape the chains of the past in reaching a benchmark present of greater evolutionary 
development through science and technology but as a way to have a less labor-intensive life. The 
Dolpo-pa remain entangled within their domain even as they are both pulled by the disentangling 
circularities of the distorted frame of industry and pushed to pursue the long-term benefits they 
schematize through the metonymical experience of the products of that frame. Their frame, that 
is, remains very much local and biometabolically-scaled. 
Despite such positive re-constellations of old and new schemas, however, such change 
will in the long run have done with them, both materially/perceptually and conceptually. Indeed, 
belying the certainties promised by its distorted frame, the inevitable physical shortcomings of 
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such shifting conceptual frames as have already begun to emerge will only intensify with the 
continued exuberance by which most of the Dolpo-pa are acquiescing, even as many of them 
intimate by their own acknowledgments of what unknown uncertainty they will face in the 
future. As a 63-year-old grandfather, who collects specimens of yartse gumbu for extra income 
during the season but did not make the connection between this new physical reality and the 
future, at least explicitly, stated in our conversation: 
There is no way of having more money [here] rather than from yartsa gumbu. It is the biggest reason why I 
along with all people [in Dolpo] have had more money [over the last five years]. 
 
The 62-year-old woman in her kitchen garden in Rigmo, who does collect specimens to sell in 
Tibet, commented, however, on the limits of yartsa gumbu that so many informants in Dolpo do 
not schematize, stating: 
No, I don’t think yartsa gumbu will continue to provide income to the Dolpo-pa. It’s almost disappearing. I 
don’t get the kind of quality and quantity like I did in the past. 
 
Despite his participation in harvesting, the grandfather feels similarly: 
I don’t think yartsa gumbu will continue to provide higher incomes to people. It will disappear within 2-3 
years. 
 
Indeed, the woman in her kitchen garden in Rigmo intimates this outcome: 
Overall, yartsa gumbu has had a positive [effect] on life here, but I think if yartsa gumbu disappeared then 
it would be hard for local people to lead a normal life like before.  
 
 Arguably, the normal life to which she refers is that emergent synergistic awareness 
through extended engagement within the high Himalayan domain of entanglement that is Dolpo. 
It is a life based on reality at the biometabolic scale of ecological processes, which array 
asymmetrically the shifting and cleaving of physical surfaces of which human-animals are 
unique and distinct from but no less a part of as conditionally-structured surfaces within the 
array. For at least one thousand years since migrating into that domain of Dolpo, those human-
surfaces cum -animals who are the Dolpo-pa, the people of Dolpo, have become exceptionally 
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well-adapted to the harsh physical conditions they face thus entangled there. Indeed, they have 
thriven through their holistic simultaneity, each new experience looping back to either confirm, 
contest, or alter the conceptual framing of each subsequent experience in facilitating conceptual 
coherence through awareness to surmount those arbitrarily arrayed asymmetries of the forces and 
magnitudes of that biometabolic scale of ecology in that entangled domain.  
But the entirety of the Dolpo-pa’s entangled experience within that high Himalayan 
domain has always been at the biometabolic scale, at which their selective advantage as human-
animals thriving thereby as Dolpo-pa has always been in their having materially/perceptually 
identified and conceptually modeled the known uncertainties that have come to be expected after 
extended engagement there. This is true even as the emergent arbitrariness of that synergistic 
awareness has over that time also become naturalized as the only possible way to be in 
surmounting those known uncertaintiesxxxii. Scaled differently, however, such biometabolically-
scaled advantages can be readily and no less arbitrarily distorted, become limitations that are 
both material/perceptual and conceptual within the range of ecological reality.  
In truth, therefore, the disentanglements and fragmentations of recent social changes 
analyzed in this chapter are worrying foremost not because they are altering the Dolpo-pa in 
significant ways as assessed by an outside observer keen on salvaging their culture or saving 
their glacier-strewn mountain environment; no, recent social changes are worrying foremost 
because they emanate from that technometabolic scale of industrial power that is not only all but 
materially/perceptually unknown to the Dolpo-pa but that can also produce forces and 
magnitudes that are certainly beyond the capacity of the Dolpo-pa’s cultural models to accurately 
conceptualize let alone adequately represent and respond to in the short term. As the following 
chapter will argue, therefore, the Dolpo-pa are now in the process of rapidly disentangling from 
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the synergistic awareness of their entanglement, caravanning now through their model darkly not 
only by their own acquiescence to the cognitive trick of the circular distortions of reasoning as 
illustrated in this chapter but also by the very real entropic consequences (i.e. warmer 
temperatures, less snowfall, etc.) of production at that technometabolic scale that most 
individuals there see quite plainly in their material experience. Most Dolpo-pa, however, also 
remain conceptually blind in modeling such changes exactly because of their lack of experience 
and proficiency at that technometabolic scale, leading to confusions and an increase in what will 

































CHAPTER 6: THE SPIDER TRILOGY 
 
   Oh, what a tangled web we weave, 
   When first we practice to deceive! 
                 - Sir Walter Scott 
 
PART I - THROUGH THEIR MODEL DARKLY 
INTRODUCTION: THE LIMITATIONS OF EXISTENCE WITHIN A PHYSICAL ECOLOGY 
 
The Dolpo-pa’s cultural model of entanglement within their high mountain domain, 
though well-adapted to conditions there, is significantly limited as an interpretive, generative 
frame of observation and inference in resolving issues that are inconsistent with the known range 
of uncertainties that have come to be expected as framed by that model after extended 
engagement within that domain of entanglement. This limitation has seldom if ever before been 
discernible in their millennia-long engagement with the physical forces and magnitudes of the 
high mountain landscapes of Dolpo because the synergy of material experience and conceptual 
proficiency that emerged in and that has been shared and transmitted among the human-animals 
who migrated to those high mountains became adaptive to what became the expected range of 
physical conditions of that domain in those whose progeny continue to dwell there 
synergistically even today. In this way, the Dolpo-pa can be called autochthonic, having “existed 
in the same region and interacted in similar ways with the same natural environment for many 
centuries . . . [and] under these conditions . . . have well-developed and sophisticated cognition 
of the natural world” (Kempton 2001:50) xxxiii.  
As if on cue, however, in his quite accurate statement, Kempton engages in the same 
reifying illusion of which his fellow cognitive anthropologists Strauss & Quinn and Shore were 
guilty as pointed out in the theory chapter of this thesis (see Chapter 3): The Dolpo-pa do not 
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have “well-developed and sophisticated cognition of the natural world” but are a well-developed 
and sophisticated phenotypic evolution whose emergent selective advantage is the awareness of 
the awareness of themselves enduring synergistically (the ‘cognition’ Kempton suggests) as 
distinct and unique but as no less a part of a domain of entanglement into which their forebears 
migrated so long ago and which is often too perfunctorily still reified by one tradition’s 
methodological standard of observation as some separate space called ‘the natural world’, or, 
more often, the environment. This distinction (of framing, no less) is no mere caviling; indeed, it 
provides an elegant retort to such similar reifying illusions as are promulgated by, for instance, 
the circular discourse of international development by re-framing the distorting premises rather 
than the inexplicable claims of the cognitive trick of linear sequentiality that is not grounded in 
first-order physical reality but in the second-order symbolic representations of rules typically 
implied in traversing the existential present at the biometabolic scale of ecological processes.  
More importantly, this distinction also more honestly admits to limits by acknowledging 
the physical root of all holistic simultaneity in the entanglements of domains across the world, 
which is often, as within the entangled domain of the existential present of experience in Dolpo, 
a product of the naturalized arbitrariness by which ways of being and ways of thinking become 
schematized and then constellated as explicit but often also implicit conceptual models of how 
the world is or must be or always will be. When shared and transmitted, such models are 
described as being cultural, and as Kempton et al. (1996:77) found in studying American 
environmental values (see Chapter 5), are difficult to extricate because new and even contrary 
information is far more readily integrated into existing frames than are the premises of such 
frames amendable in regards to such new information. In a place like Dolpo, as was almost 
assuredly the case in all such places the world over until the onset of and subjugation by the 
 
 126
current hegemonic cycle and technometabolic unequal exchange of the industrial world system 
(Taylor 1999; Chase-Dunn and Grimes 1995; Hornborg 1992), such resistance to destabilizing 
change has proven advantageous, as the holistic simultaneity of such synergistic proficiency has 
been honed for generations of extended engagement with the known range of uncertainties that 
could be expected within that domain of entanglement.  
Phenotypic human-animals in Dolpo, in other words, have thriven by the synergy of 
material experience and conceptual proficiency, looping back through generation after 
generation by consistent physical encounters with what became conceptually naturalized in 
framing the materially/perceptually known uncertainties of asymmetrical surface change within 
that thin range of physical force and magnitude at that biometabolic scale. This synergistic 
awareness not only defined what was known to be possible by material experience but also came 
to culturally model through conceptual proficiency the very limits conceivable of physical 
possibility in how the world could be and must be and always would be. Crucially, even though 
they do not know it explicitly, such limits to how the Dolpo-pa see have always been thus scaled 
biometabolically to the ecological processes of the Dolpo entanglement.  
 
EXPERIENTIAL LIMITS AND THE FRAMING OF ENTANGLED POSSIBILITY 
As expected from the Dolpo-pa’s model of entanglement, therefore, the physical 
asymmetries of force and magnitude in the domain of Dolpo figure highly in informants’ framing 
of spatial possibility. Responses to a statement from the structured interview—“Humans can 
destroy local environments but cannot have global impacts on the natural world”—illustrate this 
point, with 63 percent (mean = 3.94) of respondents answering “strongly agree” and 7.4 percent 
answering “agree” on a 5-point scale. Of the remaining respondents, 12 answered “disagree” or 
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“strongly disagree,” with 16.7 percent of the total answering the latter (four did not know). Of 
course, the vagueness of this statement does not indicate exactly what ‘local’ and ‘global’ entail 
within the Dolpo-pa’s model, ‘global’ possibly framed only as those most extreme limits of 
physical asymmetry within the entanglement, the highest mountain peaks or the most isolated of 
canyons where Yeti are still rumored to roam and of which not one of my informants has 
material experience. Such a conceptualization differs considerably from how ‘global’ is framed 
within the circular discourse of illusory reification such as that of an observer/ researcher whose 
‘global’ space is scaled not to ecological processes but to the conceptual distortions of the 
aggregated ‘biosphere’ or metonymic ‘village earth’ or some other such deluded twaddle that is 
confirmed only through the cognitive trick of that distorting discourse as it loops back on itself in 
confirmation of itself.  
Although over 70 percent of respondents agreed that humans can have only local 
environmental impacts, in other words, a better understanding of how such variables scale 
conceptually to the first-order physical reality of ecological processes in Dolpo will better clarify 
how conceptual limits of physical possibility are perceived through the Dolpo-pa’s model of 
their entangled domain. Fortunately, several statements made in semi-structured interviews do 
ground this polysemy in the first-order root of the physical. For example, the 70-year-old woman 
interviewed in Rigmo claimed: 
If we destroy the local environment, that can’t have global impacts. The impact will be here to us. 
 
Similarly, a 49-year-old trader illustrated how limits, especially of human agency, are framed 
through the Dolpo-pa’s entanglement model based on the physical asymmetries of force and 
magnitude in terms of surface entanglement and material experience, stating unequivocally: 
No, we can’t harm distant nature like the high mountain; it’s even hard for us to reach there. And I don’t 




Reflecting how the model also depicts human agency as a nested power among such surfaces 
within the entanglement, the 30-year-old male trader and harvester of yartsa gumbu asserted: 
When we plow plots then there might be little destruction to nature, but we can’t harm those high 
mountains and big rocks. 
 
 The spatial range suggested in such explicit statements also implicitly intimates a 
considerable temporal framing through the Dolpo-pa’s model; in other words, the physical 
asymmetries of force and magnitude are known uncertainties not only in terms of rigidity but 
also ephemerality, which can be but are not necessarily related characteristics. As such, 
ubiquitous surfaces like glaciers and lakes and mountains that change constantly at the 
geological scale but appear as all but unchanging at the biometabolic scale of ecological 
processes of a human-animal lifetime or even of a conceptually extended cultural or karmic 
engagement are framed by informants’ model not only as spatially but also as temporally 
unyielding to the physical forces or magnitudes of power that can and do overwhelm human-
animals in their entanglementsxxxiv. Again, this power is always scaled to the ecological 
possibilities of biometabolic change. Significantly, such framing defines in time what is then 
schematized as the limit human agency can conceivably have in space, which, markedly, tends 
also to delimit the conceivability of what is physically possible in time-space by the framing of 
such possibility in terms of the synergistic continuity of material experience and conceptual 
proficiency in dwelling within that physical space of the entangled domain. Tenzing, for 
example, sitting cross-legged in his empty stock pen, stated quite frankly: 
Glaciers are too old to disappear, but, yes, changes in size and shape do occur. I have spent almost half of 
my life here and have never heard of glaciers disappearing.  
 
Echoing Tenzing is the statement of the 49-year-old trader also from Rigmo, who said: 
Glaciers are too old to disappear completely, but there might be changes in size and shape.  
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Additionally, a consistent response among informants referred specifically to the 
imperviousness to time of sacred Phoksumdo Lake itself, with many informants commenting 
similarly to the 62-year-old woman interviewed in her kitchen garden in Rigmo who reasoned 
simply in response to a question about the possibility of whether or not the lake could ever dry 
up or disappear: 
 The lake is too old.  
 
The Geshe living in the ancient gompa on the shore of the lake echoed this point: 
Um, depending on the season like winter and summer the size of the lake changes but it can never be dried 
up completely. 
 
Intimating the same logic of synergistic awareness concerning glaciers as Tenzing above is the 
response of the 30-year-old trader from Rigmo who claimed to a question about the impossibility 
of change to the lake: 
 This is true. When I was a child the lake was the same as now.  
Notably, 87 percent of survey respondents confirmed these opinions, claiming that it is “true” 
that “Phoksumdo Lake is too old to be affected by changes in the snows in the high mountains.” 
The point is that such an outcome as the lake’s disappearing for whatever reason is beyond the 
frame of possibility as defined by the Dolpo-pa’s model of their entangled experience.  
 
CAUSALITY, ‘FUZZY LOGIC’, AND THE KNOWN UNCERTAINTIES OF CHANGE 
The wording of the previous survey statement about Phoksumdo Lake was very 
deliberate, as it suggests how causality is modeled by that synergy through which informants in 
Dolpo frame the physical asymmetry of their entanglements. Indeed, causality is uniquely 
conceptual in that though it expresses a second-order relational abstraction of material 
experience, it ostensibly describes first-order physical interactions and intersections. As such, 
material experiences of causality should be understood as being no less influenced by 
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interpretive conceptual representations of physical possibility than are second-order frames 
through which physical force and magnitude are interpreted and attended to. This suggests that 
‘causality’ is as synergistically constructed a schema as any other interpretive frame through 
which first-order physical forces and magnitudes are understood. As such, conceptual schemas of 
causality in Dolpo are produced through material experiences with physical reality and then 
constellated conceptually within the Dolpo-pa’s model of their domain of entanglement, looping 
back to confirm or contest or alter such models by further material experience. In such a way, 
Tenzing sitting cross-legged in his empty stock pen can explain without discernable (to his 
framing) incongruity that although the temperature in Rigmo is consistently warmer than it used 
to be and that the mountains regularly do not have as much snow as they once did, the glaciers, 
which, according to him, “are almost useless expect for the one good thing that they provide 
good scenery,” could never melt away completely.  
The point is that just as conceptions of human agency in the Dolpo-pa’s model are 
limited by the breadth of material experience, so too is the framing of causal possibility of 
physical change at the scale of ecological processes also limited. For instance, 87 percent of 
respondents said that it is “true” that “The amount of snow that falls each year determines what 
the temperature will be.” An illuminating part of my interview with Luhuk, the 31-year-old 
woman who runs a seasonal tea tent and weaves blankets near Phoksumdo Lake, illustrates the 
material basis of schemas constellating in explanation of the characteristics of physical weather 
events at the scale of ecological processes: 
G: Is the temperature different at this time of year now than it was in past years?  
L: I’m not sure. If the snow falls, it is cold; if not, it is warm. It depends upon the amount of  
     snowfall. 
G: Is it possible that there is not much snowfall because it is warmer? 
L: No. 
G: It’s not possible? If the snowfall continues to decline and there is less snowfall, will the   





To Luhuk, as to that preponderance of survey respondents who schematize the casual 
relationship of snow controlling temperature, snow is a physically perceivable phenomenon, a 
material certainty. As such, snow differs markedly from temperature, which is a more abstract 
phenomenon, immaterial and uncertain, immeasurable in such a place as Dolpo except for how it 
affects an animal’s conditionally-structured surface, which is an attribute of the animal and not 
of the cold. Within such a high desert entanglement, where temperatures can sometimes quickly 
drop fifty and more degrees in the short spaces of day to shadow and night and traders without 
the benefits of radars or forecasting technologies are often encamped over 4,700 meters in 
passage between valley settlements, snow, therefore, as schematized through extended 
engagement with physical possibility within that domain, is one palpable indicator of what might 
be expected of somatic sensation from so intangible a physical phenomenon as temperature. In 
this way, a guesstimate is rendered of what would otherwise be nothing more than a guess in 
enduring longer the true uncertainty of the existential present in such a domain.  
Such rendering by an autochthonic population like the Dolpo-pa is not a ‘fuzzy logic’, 
however, as it is often described as being even by those ‘indigenous knowledge’ enthusiasts 
(Berkes 1999; Berkes and Folke 1998; Bourdieu 1990) who ostensibly affirm and advocate for 
its social advantages through their observer’s frame of over-accentuated second-order linear 
sequentiality; no, through a frame of first-order holistic similitude the schema that snowfall 
controls temperature derives from neither a fuzzy nor an irrational but from quite a useful and 
apposite logic in terms of immediate ecological circumstance within a specific domain of 
entanglement. This is true even as awareness of the essentially opposite nonlinear physical 
processes by which snow is ‘explained’ in forming and falling as modeled by the methodologies 
of linear ‘science’ becomes through that frame—and somewhat ironically if not itself fuzzily—
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un-useful and certainly unfathomable and perhaps even illogical to a trader encamped on a high 
Himalayan pass, survival through the existential present of being still conditionally structured a 
little longer and not international prizes or tenured positions being in that context the most 
pressing of concerns.  
Even though, that is, such observers as Berkes and others who study ‘indigenous 
knowledge’ and ‘traditional ecological knowledge’ (many of whom I admire for their work, I 
should note) are proponents of its holistic simultaneity, they do it no favor in distinguishing it as 
a ‘fuzzy logic’ because of how, as Ardener (1989:173; see also Lakoff and Johnson, 2003; 
Abrams, 1997) states quite perspicaciously, “our worlds are inescapably contaminated with 
language.” What this means, of course, is that language is both a constituent and a constructive 
aspect of conceptual reality for the human-animal. As such, a holistic logic very distinct from 
that of Enlightenment reason’s linearity and denoted as ‘fuzzy’ becomes marked and thereby 
subjugated to the same circularly distorting frame by which that tradition’s “arbitrary fixings” of 
symbols as “neither-idealist-nor-materialist” (Ardener 1989:184) become, as with the 
environment, dense and rigid and reified as actually existing sequentially and somehow in an 
object-world that is somehow separate from the physical reality of entanglement that is that 
worldxxxv. In being thusly legitimized, therefore, as researchers like Agrawal (1995) and Nadasdy 
(1999) importantly argue, those knowledges that are termed ‘fuzzy’ are actually even more 
insidiously delegitimized in terms of their own schematic constellations of holistic simultaneity 
as they are drawn into that distorted frame of linear sequentiality within which they are often 
marked thus as ‘fuzzy’ and considered as merely another type of data, superficially assuaging 
contemporary sensibilities while carrying on with the perfunctory and uncritical acceptance of 
the distortions of the Enlightenment frame.  
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Put differently (and more experientially), encamped at 4,850 meters in early October, I 
was confidant and calmed in knowing that our yak wrangler Nyma knew, even though I am 
rather confidant that he did not know—despite his considerable intelligence and wit—what 
specific combination of physical force and phenomenon must converge within the nonlinear 
dynamics of atmospheric science for snow to form and fall or for wind to blow witheringly, that 
based on various observations he had made of the day and into twilight there would be neither 
snow nor more than a whisper of wind despite the temperature plummeting with the setting of 
the sun at that high camp below the pass at Numala Bhanjyang (5,238 meters).  
Through his quite apposite frame, that is, without having precisely calibrated 
instrumentation or training in the voodoo fetishism of inferential statistical analyses, he was quite 
competent in analyzing and hypothesizing, though he certainly did not schematize it as doing so, 
how the weather and wind would break that evening, which close to 5,000 meters on the cusp of 
winter was far more consequential within the existential present than any ‘scientific’ reasoning 
could want to be. Indeed, this is my concern with a recent analysis of Mongolian pastoralists by 
Marin (2010), whose excellent analysis of the ‘contributions’ of nomadic herders’ observations 
in analyzing climate change, though it does validate the knowledge of local pastoralists through 
their own synergistic awareness in experience and proficiency, still couches that knowledge 
without due contestation within the circular reasoning of Western science, thereby delegitimizing 
pastoral knowledge at a root level even as it validates such knowledge at a more superficial level 
by considering it solely within the sequentiality of the linear frame.  
Even though it differs at its root from the linear sequentiality of Enlightenment 
methodological experience, such emphasis on logic grounded in the first order does not imply 
that the Dolpo-pa through such a practical frame of holistic simultaneity cannot or do not see 
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physical causality over space and time (see Huntington 2000; Preston 2002; Turner 2005). They 
certainly do. The point is that they schematize such physical causality through a frame that is 
largely grounded in diachronic material experience that loops recursively back through the 
conceptual proficiency of their holistic awareness, the former continually confirming, contesting 
or altering the latter in being shared and transmitted both individually and culturally with each 
subsequent looping back into further material experience through time-space. For example, to the 
survey statement, “The amount of snow and ice in the mountains directly affects how much 
water will be available for use in the village,” 77.8 percent (mean = 4.52) of respondents 
answered “strongly agree” and 9.3 percent answered “agree,” with only 5.6 percent answering 
“strongly disagree” and 1.9 percent answering “disagree.” The same percentage (5.6 percent) 
that strongly disagreed answered that they did not know.  
Even more interesting is that the same percentage of informants (87 percent) who either 
agreed or strongly agreed that the amount of snow and ice in the mountains directly affects 
Rigmo’s water supply also said that Phoksumdo Lake is too old to be affected by changes to 
snow and ice in the mountainsxxxvi. The ostensible contradiction in this crosstab (Table 10) is not 
(I caution those who are unable to readily defamiliarize themselves from the observer’s gaze)  
 
Table 10. The amount of snow and ice in the mountains directly affects amount 
of water available in village * Phoksumdo Lake is too old to be affected by 
changes in snow and ice in the mountains 
 
PL too old to be affected by 
changes in snow 
Total True False 
Amount of snow and ice in 
mountains directly affects 
amount of water available in 
village 
Strongly 
Disagree 3 0 3 
Disagree 0 1 1 
Neither/Nor 3 0 3 
Agree 3 2 5 
Strongly 
Agree 38 4 42 
Total 47 7 54 
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actually so, however, as such physical variables are framed not through an observer’s but 
through a practical logic of synergistic awareness scaled biometabolically to ecological processes 
(see Sillitoe 2002; Smith and Wintherhalder 1992)xxxvii. Through such a logic, that conceptual 
sequentiality that is so adroit at observing such physical causality has neither been 
operationalized nor ever been required in operation in order for the phenotypic human-animals 
that are the Dolpo-pa who dwell within that domain to thrive in surmounting the known range of 
uncertainty expected of forces and magnitudes after a millennia-long entanglement there.  
 
SYNERGISTIC AWARENESS AND THE PHYSICAL POSSIBILITIES OF CHANGE 
Change at the biometabolic scale of ecological processes, at which all perceptible change 
occurs to those human-animal Dolpo-pa who are themselves fully physically entangled as 
conditionally-structured surfaces through that scale, becomes, thereby, not what change is 
physically possible in the shifting and cleaving of force and magnitude at that scale but how the 
synergy between material experience and conceptual proficiency frames what is physically 
possible of and to change at the undifferentiated scale of the conceptual. Differences in how 
snow and ice are temporally schematized and constellated within the model provide a telling 
example.  
Snow, in this way, is not only material but is also ephemeral, falling in the cold seasons 
(and making them cold) and melting away with each warm season (thus making them warm). 
Glaciers, on the other hand, are like Phoksumdo Lake believed to be too old and too big to ever 
melt away completely; such an eventuality has never happened before so that it could ever 
happen in the future is considered inconceivable. As Tenzing in Rigmo affirmed: 
My opinion is that glaciers could not disappear completely. I think we should take you up into the 
mountains and show you how much glaciers we do have. Every year I go to China and I know every one of 




Concurring with Tenzing, 50 percent (mean = 2.74) of survey respondents on a 5-point scale 
“strongly disagree” or “disagree” (38.9 percent and 11.1 percent, respectively) that “The glaciers 
in the mountains could melt completely and not return ever,” while 13 percent did not know, and 
37 percent answered “agree” or “strongly agree” (11.1 percent and 25.9 percent, respectively). 
Tellingly, a crosstab (Table 11) of this statement and education level reveals that a high  
 
Table 11. The glaciers could melt completely and never return * Formal education  
 
Formal education 
Total 0 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 10 12 15 
the glaciers could 
melt completely 
and never return 
Strongly 
Disagree 16 0 1 0 3 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 21 
Disagree 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 6 
Neither/Nor 3 1 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 7 
Agree 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 2 0 1 0 6 
Strongly 
Agree 6 0 0 1 1 0 2 2 1 0 0 1 14 
Total 30 1 2 2 5 1 2 4 4 1 1 1 54 
 
 
preponderance of those 50 percent who “disagree” with the statement have no formal education 
(21 of 27 respondents, or 78 percent), 16 of whom “strongly disagree” with the statement. Three 
individuals with no formal education answered that they did not know, while only 11 percent 
with no formal education answered that they “strongly agree.” In contrast, 65 percent of 
respondents said it was “false” that “The snow in the high mountains could not disappear 
permanently.” A crosstab (Table 12) of this statement with education levels was also revealing, 
with 63 percent (22 respondents) of that 65 percent (35 respondents) of the total having no  
 
Table 12. The snow in the mountains can't disappear permanently * Formal Education  
 
Formal Education 
Total 0 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 10 12 15 17 





8 1 1 1 4 1 0 1 2 0 0 0 19 
False 22 0 1 1 1 0 2 3 2 1 1 1 35 




formal education. On the other hand, 8 of the 19 respondents who claimed this statement was 
“true” had five or more years of formal education. The contrast between these two statements is 
especially interesting because it suggests the distinction informants make between the physical 
changes possible of snow and of glacial ice, which are framed very differently through the Dolpo 
model.  
 More compelling, however, is what further cross tabulation reveals of these frequencies 
(Table 13). For instance, for the survey statement on the effects of the amount of snow and ice in 
the mountains on Rigmo’s water supply and the statement on snow in the mountains completely 
disappearing, a crosstab indicates that 25 respondents both “strongly agree” with the former 
statement and believe that the snow in the Mountains can disappear permanently. Only 17 of the  
 
Table 13. The snow in mountains can't disappear permanently * The amount of snow and ice in mountains 
directly affects amount of water available in Rigmo 
 
The amount of snow/ice in the mountains directly affects the amount of 
water available in village 
Total 
Strongly 
Disagree Disagree Neither/Nor Agree Strongly Agree 
The snow/ice in the 
mountains can't 
disappear permanently 
True 0 0 0 2 17 19 
False 3 1 3 3 25 35 
Total 3 1 3 5 42 54 
 
total number of respondents “strongly agree” with the former statement and do not believe the 
latter. No more than three respondents answered in any other way, suggesting an interesting 
extreme in opinions in Rigmo that further study may reveal epistemologically reflects the social 
changes so swiftly occurring now in Dolpo. In contrast, when the second statement in the 
crosstab is replaced by the statement about the glaciers melting away and never returning, again 
17 respondents “strongly agree” with the former statement but those 17 respondents also 
“strongly disagree” that the glaciers could not melt completely (Table 14). Indeed, for both 




Table 14. The glaciers could melt completely and never return * The amount of snow and ice in the 
mountains directly affects the amount of water available in Rigmo  
 
The amount of snow and ice in mountains directly affects amount of 
water available in village 
Total 
Strongly 
Disagree Disagree Neither/Nor Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
The glaciers could melt 
completely and never 
return 
Strongly 
Disagree 0 0 1 3 17 21 
Disagree 1 1 0 0 4 6 
Neither/ 
Nor 1 0 1 0 5 7 
Agree 0 0 0 2 4 6 
Strongly 
Agree 1 0 1 0 12 14 
Total 3 1 3 5 42 54 
 
the village water supply but only 14 “strongly agree” that the glaciers could melt away 
completely, of which 12 are a part of the former group of respondents. Spread otherwise evenly 
with five answering that they did not know, 13 other respondents who answered that they 
“strongly agree” about the village water supply answered with middle values to the statement on 
the glaciers melting. In this crosstab, only one other value had three respondents who answered 
that they “agree” that the snow and ice in the mountains affect the village water supply but 
“strongly disagree” the glaciers could melt completely.  
Further supporting this interpretation of how the Dolpo-pa operationalize their model of 
entanglement is the response to one further survey statement that is very revealing. To a query, 
“If the spring from which we get our water stops flowing, we can always get water from the 
river,” which intimates the conceptual causality of the previous several statements but at the 
immediate scale of material experience, 81.5 percent of respondents answered “true.” A crosstab 
comparing snow and ice in the mountains’ effect on the water supply in Rigmo with the last statement 
about the river always being available for water even if the spring stops flowing is telling (Table 15): Of 
the 44 respondents who said the latter is true, 88.6 percent also “strongly agree” or “agree” (36 and 3 
respondents, respectively) with the former. As the representative response of the 30-year-old trader in 
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Table 15. The amount of snow and ice in mountains directly affects amount of water 
available in Rigmo * If there is no spring, we can always get water from the river  
 
No spring, we have the river 
Total True False 
The amount of snow and ice 
in mountains directly affects 
amount of water available in 
village 
Strongly Disagree 3 0 3 
Disagree 0 1 1 
Neither/Nor 2 1 3 
Agree 3 2 5 
Strongly Disagree 36 6 42 
Total 44 10 54 
 
Rigmo intimates: 
 Whether the glaciers melt completely or not does not matter. The river will always remain the same with no 
 change. 
 
 Such preponderance is striking exactly because of its intimation of the tradeoffs inherent 
to the human-animal’s evolutionarily emergent conceptual proficiency in modeling material 
experience. In framing such experience, what is known to the framer excludes by definition both 
what has been reckoned negligible of that experience and, importantly, what is unknown of the 
physical domain (at any scale) with which that experience is entangled inextricably. Known 
uncertainty as induced through synergistic awareness, that is, becomes the focus of a further 
looping of synergistic awareness, naturalization of such arbitrarily emergent synergistic 
awareness providing the phenotypic advantage that assures genetic propagation in optimizing 
metabolism within that entangled domain. The human-animal framer, however, to remain apace 
with the entangled domain as a surface conditionally structured against the physical forces and 
magnitudes arrayed against it at the scale of ecological processes must continually operationalize 
those schematic constellations that enable coherent action within the physical reality of the 
asymmetries of the object-world. The Dolpo-pa do this, and the logic of their cultural model is 
reflected in their proficiency after such extended engagement in dwelling so synergistically as a 
distinct and unique phenotype within that high mountain domain of entanglementxxxviii.  
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Exhibiting this contrast rather compellingly is the frame through which Magli Budha, the 
twenty-one year old from Rigmo who, having been away from Dolpo for four years and only 
having recently returned to visit her family after graduating from nursing school in Kathmandu, 
can conceptualize both that the snows and glaciers could melt completely if warming in the 
mountains continues to increase and that the river would eventually dry up if those water sources 
never returned. In our English interview, however, despite these quite ‘rational’ causal schemas, 
Magli Budha, though trained in scientific practice grounded in methodologies derived directly 
from that distorting Enlightenment circularity so often framed as reason, continues to model the 
world by her material experience as culturally Dolpo-pa, intimating as she did that the water 
from the rivers that feed into and out of sacred Phoksumdo Lake is not the same as those sacred 
waters that constitute the lake itself: 
    G: So, the water that’s in the lake, the water in the lake, where does it come from? 
MB: Water? Water is, uh, mixed . . . [Nepali to translator for clarification]. You mean about this    
          big river or lake?  
    G: That lake, where does the water in the lake come from? What’s the source of the water in the    
          lake? 
MB: Regarding . . . I have, I heard about one history. Um [Nepali to self], Guru Rinpoche, he     
         came here, and he destroyed one, uh, um . . . 
    G: Demoness. 
MB: Yeah, one woman demoness [G: uh-huh], and I have heard, like, um before we don’t have  
         this place [. . .] houses in place where lake is right now. 
   G: Yeah. 
MB: So, he, he destroy one demoness, and he make the lake. He, uh, he, uh, he made the lake. I  
         have heard these things, but . . . 
    G: That’s . . . OK, I’ve heard the story, too, but I’m wondering . . . we are staying at the office  
         right at the mouth of the river, and when we cross the bridge, the water from the lake is              
         flowing into the river, all right, and it flows down the river [MB: . . .], yeah, so, does the lake  
         ever go down? Does new water ever come into the lake? 
MB: The, the, the big river, you know, the one river, small river, is coming from this side [points  
         to far side of the lake], and one’s coming from this side [points to near side of the lake], so it  
         didn’t makes . . . and, um, th-, that water is running here. 
   G: Ah, OK. 
MB: That’s, uh . . . this river is . . . I don’t think this river is the water of lake.  
 
In Magli Boudha’s operationalization of the constellated schemas of the Dolpo-pa, Phoksumdo 
Lake is described as not being constituted of those waters of the rivers that are fed by the glaciers 
and snows in the high mountains and that are used for everyday practice such as drinking, 
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cooking, laundry, and making chang (barely beer). Instead, the lake is constituted of the 
practical-sacred waters of the lake’s mythical formation. As such, its waters are schematized as 
extending well beyond the uncertainties of the existential present and into the karmic and 
cosmological realms that provide such solace in the face of such uncertainty. As such, regardless 
of what future threats the glaciers and the rivers and the springs (and those softer 
biometabolically-scaled surfaces that depend on those shifting, cleaving surface asymmetries) 
face, Phoksumdo Lake is modeled culturally as always remaining unaffected by the uncertainties 
of change; it is, that is, schematized according to a material logic that has never experienced nor 
conceptualized the lake’s not being there in its unbearable and lifeless turquoise hue and so 
frames its not being there as an impossibility within the known metabolisms of ongoing 
ecological processes. 
 
INVERSE PROPORTIONS: CULTURAL DISENTANGLEMENT & EXISTENTIAL DISSONANCE  
The key point here is that even though a sizeable percentage of informants in Dolpo do 
schematize causal connections between the glaciers and snows in the mountains and the water 
supply in Rigmo, nearly 10 percent of them do not see such connections. Even many of those 
that do see the connection do not schematize any possible repercussions of those observations of 
shrinking glaciers or less snows on their lives and livelihoods because the emergent synergy of 
their extended material experience and conceptual proficiency are not and never have been 
operationalized in such a way as to adduce any repercussions of such causality within the domain 
of their entangled experience. The snow and ice in the mountains have supplied without 
interruption the river with water for as long as anyone (who has noticed the connection) can 
remember and even longer. Change of this sort is therefore framed as an impossibility, which is 
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through that experiential model as logical an inference as the no less constructed logic through 
another, increasingly hegemonic frame of conceptual distortion that infers one distinct and rather 
soft surface as separate from all the others at the biometabolic scale of ecological processes of 
some reification labeled the environment.  
The intersection of these two frames in Dolpo, as in other domains peripheral to the core 
areas from which such hegemonic frames first emerged in their present form and have since 
spread as a basis of social organization (Ross et al. 2010:70; Hornborg 2007:9), is, however, 
increasingly contesting the logic of the biometabolic frame of the Dolpo-pa even as it further 
empowers as ‘truth’ the illusions of the technometabolic frame of growth and industry. At the 
same time, very real and technometabolically-scaled phenological change, a direct outcome of 
those latter ideas' cognitive distortion of the physical root of all such frames, is becoming more 
readily observable with the “social transfer of entropy” that is the first-order physical root of 
what is actually distorted by such second-order circular framing as economic “growth” and 
international “development” (Hornborg 2001:11). The resulting spaces of uncertainty are unlike 
any known in Dolpo since at least the first human-animals migrated into the area at least a 
thousand years ago and began to experience and model the physical forces and magnitudes from 
which and of which the Dolpo-pa’s variant of Tibetan culture has emerged and thriven from that 
time. A discussion of the present parameters and likely intensification of this uncertainty based 
on acquiescence to change adduced in the previous chapter informs the second part of this 






PART II – WINTER LIGHT: PHENOLOGICAL UNCERTAINTY & CHANGE 
 
INTRODUCTION: INDICATORS OF AVERAGE WEATHER (I.E. CLIMATE) CHANGE  
All of my informants have noticed some changes in weather patterns in Dolpo over the 
past many years, and most have noticed significant change. Gotza, the former schoolmaster and 
community leader in Namdo in Upper Dolpo, for example, said that he knows a little about 
climate change with “the kind of knowledge that is with scientists” that he said the people of 
Dolpo don’t know much about, but that he also has the synergistic awareness of his own material 
experience and conceptual proficiency. Indeed, he stressed that he has both kinds of knowledge, 
saying: 
Ten years ago not much heat was here but now there is much heat . . . what’s this? This is change. Snowy 
mountains are vanishing, this is change. This change is called climate change. I haven’t learned that by any 
medium. Once the [Shey Phoksumdo] national park [officials] had a one day class, and I’ve learnt in that 
program but also in seeing the changing environment in my experience from childhood until now. Crossing 
this river you can see Norbu Himal [mountain]. It had always been covered with snows; we couldn’t see 
any rocks or soil at all. But now all the snow has gone, and it is only bare rocks and soil. Twelve years ago, 
I think, from Karmal Lake the Himal was seen but now four years ago when I went, there was almost no 
[snow in the] Himal. Here, in July it would always rain or snow would fall. But nowadays there is little rain 
sometimes, and sometimes no rain at all. This place used to be cold but now it’s hot. All of these changes 
are called climate change in my experience. 
 
As noted above, because individuals experience temperature differently, therefore, some 
divergence in informant responses to queries about temperature is expected, especially to a 
question about material experience vaguely framed about the past, as with the 70-year-old man 
from Rigmo who responded to a question about temperature change: 
 No, no, it’s quite similar with the temperature of the past. 
The 30-year-old trader who claimed that the river will always be there regardless of melting 
snows or glaciers concurred, claiming: 
 Warmer? No, no, it’s quite similar.  
Survey data belie such responses, however. To the statement, “In general, it is warmer here now 
than it used to be,” for instance, 85.2 percent of respondents answered “true,” while the same 
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percentage agreed on a 5-point scale to a similar statement further on in the survey: “It is 
generally warmer here now than it used to be” (72.2 percent “strongly agreed” and 13 percent 
“agreed”; mean = 4.35). To this statement, 3.7 percent did not know and only 11.1 percent 
answered “strongly disagree.”  
 Compellingly, informant observations of both phenological and sociological indicators of 
temperature change such as those referred to by Gotza, which suggest the material orientation to 
first-order physical reality of the Dolpo model of entanglement, especially among those 
respondents who denied any change to temperature in interviews, further belie this divergence. 
For example, both the 70-year-old and the 30-year-old who claimed above that there is no 
temperature difference from the past agreed that there is regularly less snow in the mountains 
than there used to be. As the 30-year-old trader stated: 
This is true. These days we get less snow and there is no more snow in the mountains. Snow seldom falls 
and it melts easily. 
 
The 63-year-old grandfather in Rigmo spoke similarly of this pattern: 
In the past when snow falls, we used to stay in the home for 7-8 days as we were not able to get out in the 
snow. But now the snow melts so quickly, within 2-3 days. And there are no more snows in the mountains. 
 
The 56-year-old woman in Rigmo spoke similarly, connecting material experience with 
conceptual framing in saying: 
Before we used to have heavy snowfalls that remain on the mountains almost all year, and we used to 
consider it a good omen, but now there are no longer snows in the mountains. 
 
Survey data supports these responses, which were echoed by numerous informants: 88.9 percent 
said, for instance, that it is “true” that “The mountains no longer have as much snow as they once 
did,” while to the statement, “There is less snow in the high mountains than there was in years 
past,” 85.2 percent (mean = 4.69) of respondents answered “strongly agree” and 9.3 percent of 
respondents answered “agree” on a 5-point scale. Only three respondents (5.6 percent) answered 
“strongly disagree” and no one answered “disagree.”  
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KNOWN UNCERTAINTY AND THE SHIFTING, CLEAVING SURFACES OF CHANGE  
Changes in expected snow frequency and intensity as well as in snowpack are having 
especially significant impacts on known uncertainties such as avalanches in Dolpo. The 63-year-
old lama at Shey Gompa in Upper Dolpo who has caravanned with yak since he was a boy had a 
ruinous experience with such changes the year previous to this study, for example, stating in our 
interview: 
When I was young, huge snowfalls occurred all the time, but for the last 10-12 years not much snowfall has 
occurred. I thought huge snowfalls would not occur again, but it happened . . . a bigger snowfall occurred 
in the past year. It was not abnormal in my experience, it was normal but I used to anticipate the avalanches 
and used to save my yaks. But this time unfortunately I didn’t do that . . . I had 12 yaks but lost 11 in an 
avalanche last year. I tried to save them, but I didn’t anticipate . . . I had to save myself. 
 
The 70-year-old man from Rigmo who claimed that there has been no temperature change has 
definitely noticed a change in the pattern of avalanche occurrence, stating: 
In the past, we used to get avalanches only after heavy snowfalls, but now the number of avalanches has 
increased with slight snowfalls. 
 
The 63-year-old woman from Rigmo also commented on a change to avalanche patterns, stating: 
I think, yes, avalanches have become more common in the past few years. Now we get avalanches after 
slight snowfalls.  
 
The 38-year-old Geshe at the gompa on the shores of Phoksumdo Lake made the same claim: 
Avalanches have not become more but more frequent with less snowfall. In the past, we used to get 
avalanches after heavy snowfalls and now when we get little snow we get avalanches.  
 
 Frequencies from structured interviews support this altered schematic constellation that 
avalanches are becoming both more common and more difficult to predict. For the statement, 
“Avalanches have become more common in the last few years than they were in the past,” for 
example, 74.1 percent of respondents answered “true,” while for the statement, “It is becoming 
more difficult to predict when avalanches will occur,” 77.8 percent (mean = 4.57) and 9.3 
percent of respondents answered “strongly agree” and “agree,” respectively, on a 5-point scale. 
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Only one respondent answered “strongly disagree” and two respondents answered “disagree.” To 
this statement, 7.4 percent of respondents answered that they did not know or were not sure.  
Possibly the most significant problem with such alterations in the nature of such hazards 
is that not everyone models them the same way or even agrees that they have occurred, which 
certainly impinges on the synergy between material experience and the acquisition and 
transmission of conceptual proficiency within such an entangled domain. Such impingement 
significantly increases uncertainty, both experientially and culturally. For example, the 30-year-
old trader from Rigmo who denied any change in temperature despite the currency of this 
opinion and the phenological indicators that belie his own belief also claimed: 
 No, no, this is not true. Avalanches occur after heavy snowfalls now as in the past. 
 
Notably, the trader’s response does not constellate the most current schemas of avalanches and 
slight snowfalls that other Dolpo-pa have begun to model, a knowledge inconsistency that 
demonstrates how an alteration of material experience can significantly increase not only overall 
psycho-physiological patterns of cognitive stress (Dressler and Bindon 2000) but can also effect 
immediate existential uncertainties for an individual who is not consonant with the current 
schematic constellations of change within an ecosystem. The increased material threat to life and 
livelihood resulting from this altered physical pattern is obvious: If this model of avalanche 
threat is not operationalized in conformance to this newly arisen physical trend that some like the 
30-year-old trader have no experience or proficiency with, the possibility of substantial and 
immediate existential consequences increases significantly.  
 Individuals like the trader, that is, cannot forefend against hazards that have not been 
schematized within their most current iterations of the model. To such individuals, events like an 
avalanche after a light snowfall are outside the bounds of logical possibility as possibility is 
currently framed regardless of the changed physical pattern. In this way, basing decisions on 
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prior experience and outdated models leaves them increasingly blind to the physical realities of 
the existential present. Decreased consonance with such a changed model in such a place as 
Dolpo not only leads to increased psycho-physiological stress, as Dressler and Bindon have 
rightly argued, however, but it is also leads to a progressively more invidious existential threat to 
the material substructure that is the first-order root of that cognitive stress and physical response. 
This existential threat is far more precarious, as even considerable cognitive stress is of little 
consequence to a conditionally-structured surface that is no longer conditional but has made the 
existential leap into the dissipative and always outstretched arms of entropy. All life dies, that is, 
and humans die more readily when their evolutionarily emergent selective advantage is usurped 
by such an existential dissonance, a concept to be explained in more detail in the conclusion.  
Similarly, precipitation in the form of rain, as Gotza intimated above, no longer conforms 
to schematized expectations of the majority of informants in Dolpo, also increasing the 
existential threat. Although the Tarap Valley has a traditional system of river-fed irrigation, for 
example, most of Dolpo’s fields are rain-irrigated, which means that they are highly susceptible 
to weather variability, which is especially consequential because cultivation in Dolpo can 
typically provide only enough food for three months of subsistence every year (Field Notes; 
Bauer 2004:24). Gotza commented specifically on fluctuations in rainfall, stating: 
There used to be more or less rain, and it was regular in summer but these days, either there is no rain or 
there is unusual rain.  
 
Interestingly, the Geshe, who claimed earlier in our discussion that great lamas can control local 
weather events like rain, was unsure in his response to the same question about expectations of 
rain, saying: 
Prediction is obviously hard and rain patterns fluctuate very much. Sometimes there is more rain, 




Tenzing made the most telling comment, however, echoing problems several individuals spoke 
of during informal conversations throughout Upper Dolpo: 
It is true that rain has become less predictable. We had experience with this last year when there was much 
too little rain in the growing season, which directly harmed the crops and people’s lives. But this year we 
had heavy rainfall which also did affect our houses. We had leaking problems, difficulty in collecting 
timber, and our crops did not ripen properly. 
 
 Survey data supports this emerging model of rain unpredictability, especially in terms of 
cultivation. For example, 92.6 percent of respondents responded affirmatively (85.2 percent 
“strongly agree” and 7.4 percent “agree”; mean = 4.74) to the statement, “It is more difficult to 
predict how much rain there will be in the growing season than it used to be.” Only three 
respondents answered “disagree” and only one answered “strongly disagree.” Indeed, cultivation 
patterns are themselves commonly referenced phenological indicators of climate change. For 
example, changes in the dates of sowing and harvesting are often used to signify and track 
changes in statistical climates. In Rigmo, structured interviewing indicates that a slim majority of 
respondents agree with the statement, “Crops ripen earlier now than they used to,” with 48.1 
percent answering “strongly agree” (mean = 3.33) and 7.4 percent answering “agree” on a 5-
point scale. To this statement, 33.3 percent of respondents answered “strongly disagree” and 3.7 
percent answered “disagree,” with the same percentage as the latter saying they did not know.  
An even more incontestable indicator of significant change in Dolpo than the altering 
schema of crop ripening, however, is that new crops have only over the past several years 
become cultivable in Dolpo. Numerous respondents claimed that various vegetables are now 
commonly grown, including cauliflower, lettuces, green onions, carrots and radishes. Gotza from 
Namdo said that they had been growing such vegetables for 10-12 years, emphasizing that the 
heartier ones like carrots could be grown first followed by the leafier greens and scallions a few 
years later, a pattern certainly indicative of ongoing physical change in Dolpo. Similarly, Kedar, 
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the founder and principle of the Crystal Mountain School in Tarap who many years ago 
introduced the simple greenhouses that now dot the valley, affirmed that he had tried to cultivate 
lettuces and carrots outside the greenhouse several times a decade or so earlier but because of the 
harshness of the climate that they would not grow. Now, however, they regularly grow lettuce at 
over 4,200 metersxxxix, which if not so portentously disturbing would be astounding. As the 
Geshe near Phoksumdo Lake claimed: 
Yes, yes, the temperature now is a bit warmer than in the past. Now, we can see various kinds of green 
vegetables available everywhere. This is because it is getting warmer here than it used to be. Yes, it’s 
generally warmer 
 
A 49-year-old trader in Rigmo made a similar deduction: 
 It is warmer here than before, that’s why we are getting various kinds of vegetables. 
 
 Structured interview data confirm these semi-structured interview (and observational) 
results. To the statement, “New kinds of vegetables can be grown here now because it is 
warmer,” for example, the only responses on a 5-point scale were “strongly agree” (96.3 percent) 
and “agree” (3.7 percent), a noteworthy consensus based on experience. Also noteworthy, 
however, despite the benefits of this new availability of produce, is the response to a more 
conceptual statement—“My expectations of the weather in each season have become less reliable 
over the last several years”—that garnered a similar majority, with 94.4 percent of respondents 
answering that this was a “true” statement in their experience. A crosstab of these two statements 
indicates the true extent of the preponderance, with 49 (92.5 percent) of those respondents who 
“strongly agree” that new vegetables can be grown because it is warmer also claiming that it is 
“true” that their expectations of the weather in each season are less reliable than they were in the 
past. Needless to say, the short-term benefit intimated by the former statement in conjunction 
with the long-term hardship and anguish adumbrated by the latter is foreboding. 
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THE PLEASANT SHOCKS OF SHORT-TERM CHANGE . . . OR WINTER LIGHT IS LOVELY 
 Many of those who have observed such phenological changes also expressed shock at 
how such changes are impacting their daily lives. For instance, many people are both pleased and 
surprised by the clothing they now wear in the colder months compared to what they used to 
wear, even as their traditional home construction and heating systems are unchanged. Tserap at 
Samling Gompa (4,120 meters), for instance, provided a demonstration during our interview, 
putting on his traditional thick yak wool and hide lokpa (overcoat) and taking out his sumpa 
(woolen boots), saying that he only ever sleeps in the former and never wears the latter anymore. 
Instead, he now only wears knockoff brand name hiking boots and jackets made in India or 
Kathmandu and sold now in Dolpo and that are suitable for the warmer conditions even in the 
winter. The fact is that life in the frozen valleys of Upper Dolpo would have been inconceivable 
just a few years ago without the warmth provided by material artifacts like lokpa and sumpa.  
 Even though cheap, factory-made clothes are now sufficient for warmth in Dolpo, a 
material alteration that loops back cognitively to reinforce alterations to how expectations of 
winter temperature and weather are currently being schematized, such newly constellated 
expectations are consistently accompanied by increased ecological uncertainty as a part of those 
altered schemas. This alteration was illustrated above with the experience of the older lama at 
Shey Gompa who, in a season when snow and subsequent avalanche activity was once the 
primary expectation, lost over 90 percent of his herd to what had become an unexpected snow 
event. At the community-run campsite in Saldang, which had been destroyed by what was 
referred to as almost inconceivable flooding only two weeks prior to our overnight there, the 
attendee also put on the lokpa that he no longer wears to show materially what a representation 
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in words simply could not tell of what life in Saldang in late September once looked like only a 
few years ago.  
Such experiences with the altogether positively framed but no less shocking effects of 
increased warming are also common in Rigmo, which lies at the frontier of Upper Dolpo. The 
incredulous 70-year-old man, for example, concurred with the experiences of the others above, 
saying in our interview: 
That is true. I used to wear heavy woolen clothes and woolen boots, which were very warm, but now new 
clothes like nylon trousers are fine. 
 
Similarly, the Geshe near Phoksumdo Lake claimed: 
 Maybe the temperature in winter is warmer now than in the past because people wear less clothing 
 now. I also use less fuel for fire now but . . . however, the reason is, I think, due to the fact that it is 
 generally warmer now. 
 
The 63-year-old woman in Rigmo commented similarly: 
 We don’t use as much fuel as we did before.  
Interestingly, the 30-year-old trader who does not think it is warmer also says that people wear 
more clothes in the colder months now than in the past, but he importantly distinguished between 
the types of clothes that are worn: 
No, no, we wear more clothes than we used to in the past. It is true that new clothing is not like woolen 
clothes, but as compared to the past, we wear more clothes . . . now. 
 
 Structured interview data from Rigmo also reflects these changes in experience in terms 
of clothing and fuel in colder months; of course, each person is different in their susceptibility to 
cold, so variance, as expected, is observed in the results. For example, to the statement, “I have 
to wear less clothing in the colder months than I used to,” 61.1 percent (mean = 3.89) of 
respondents answered “strongly agree” and 11.1 percent answered “agree” on a 5-point scale, 
with 20.4 percent and 3.7 percent answering “strongly disagree” and “disagree,” respectively. 
The same percentage as the latter response answered that they did not know. Similar results were 
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recorded to the statement, “I have to wear less clothing in the colder months than I used to,” with 
68.8 percent (mean = 4.04) of respondents answering “strongly agree” and 7.4 percent answering 
“agree” on the same scale. To this statement, 18.5 percent and 3.7 percent answered “strongly 
disagree” and “disagree,” respectively. 
  
PART III – THE SILENCE, SCALED TECHNO-DIABOLICALLY 
 
TEARING THE TOPS OFF MOUNTAINS: THE BALLAD OF TENZING’S PLOW 
Such a preponderance on indicators of change as framed in terms of the synergy between 
material experience and conceptual proficiency is also quite worrying, however. For a significant 
alteration to a model to become current within a population, each individual within that 
population must either have experience of those physical patterns that lead to such change or 
must have proficiency in schematizing and sharing and transmitting those schemas of that 
modeled change, both of which require an extended engagement within and practical experience 
of an entangled domain. Kempton (2001:56) supports this proposition in arguing from the 
evidence of ethnomedical knowledge that entangled cultures like the Dolpo-pa, who “have 
passed centuries interacting in similar ways with the same environment” and whose members 
widely share and transmit specific sets of knowledge, more likely acquire such knowledge 
through incremental discoveries of trial and error over long periods and mimetic transmission 
through generations in holistic simultaneity than through “occasional great discoverer[s]” who 
come along every couple of hundred years in linear sequentiality, standing, as it were, on the 
shoulders of their epistemological predecessors. Such phenological changes as are being 
experienced by the Dolpo-pa are, however, though exhibiting effects at the scale of ecological 
processes, not emanating from that scale but from the technometabolic scale of industrial 
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processes, which produces physical forces and magnitudes that the Dolpo-pa have neither 
experience with nor proficiency or understanding of, a configurative divergence from that 
calculus of model alteration that is of tremendous and heretofore inadequately appreciated 
consequence, especially because of the rapidity of the change. 
This point is most markedly supported by Tenzing’s actions and responses while we 
talked on a fine, abnormally warm—though, according to several respondents, increasingly 
normal—day in mid-October in Rigmo. His legs were crossed on a thin, dusty cushion in the 
hoof-packed dirt beside his house, a few tools scattered orderly nearby, a smooth-surfaced stone 
for working wood surrounded by shavings on the ground in front of him. The unfinished plow 
handle he was hand-planing lay across his bent knee. Still pointing in illustration to the rather 
inconsequential crest reaching an elevation of nearly 4,000 meters just west of the village, the 
towering tops of the snow-dusted southern peaks of the Kanjiroba Range reaching 5,500 meters 
and more in the distance behind, I had only a moment before informed him that there are 
machines in the world powerful enough to tear the tops off mountains. He looked up from his 
work, smiled and traced the extension of my hand with his dark, narrow eyes, settling his gaze 
somewhere out there for a moment. Then, looking up into the aching blue of the high Himalayan 
sky, he shook his head, incredulous. At sixty-three years of age, Tenzing had bested the life 
expectancy in Dolpo by thirteen years (Bauer 2004:3), and his eyes were alive, intelligent, a 
lifetime of devotion to the ancient Bon faith and attention to the patterns of subsistence through 
the continuity of the seasons in these mountains entangling with the sly smile spread over the 
creases of his smooth face in the moments before he responded, “it’s not possible.”  
I continued querying him about his understanding of the force and magnitude of the 
technometabolic scale, asking if he had ever heard of a factory or knew what types of things 
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factories produce. He responded: “Yes, I have heard of factories, but I have no idea what they 
produce.” I then explained that there are factories in the world that are bigger than the entire 
village of Rigmo and that quite realistically burn more fuel in a day than the entire village 
combined burns in a year. He remained incredulous, however, hesitant to call me out as a liar but 
supposing no less that I was telling some form of tall tale. Focusing in on the plow handle 
overlying his knee, I then asked how many plows he thought he could produce in a day. He 
looked around at his work area for a moment, then looked back at me and responded, “Maybe 
two or three.” I followed up without hesitation, asking “How many plows do you think a factory 
might be able to produce in a day?” His expression immediately changed, growing uncertain as 
he shook his head to indicate that he did not know. I responded not in triumph, by any means, but 
with the earnestness of a bearer of bad news, saying that although I did not know an exact figure, 
I knew that the answer would be somewhere between one hundred and one thousand times that 
amount. Listening to the translation of my response, he continued shaking his head, his 
expression remaining saturated in that same incredulous uncertainty. 
Portentously, his never having seen or really well-understood the forces and magnitudes 
possible at that scale of production, Tenzing’s incredulity upon learning of the power of industry 
with which he has no experience carries over to his attitude about those phenological changes 
that he as most informants in Dolpo (expatiated above in Part II of this chapter) sees now 
throughout Dolpo. In truth, only a small number of Dolpo-pa, even among those few who have 
lived in Kathmandu or even traveled abroad, have experience with such power and even among 
those individuals who do overall understanding of it is quite limitedxl. What this means, of 
course, is that the Dolpo-pa in general have not endured the extended engagement with industrial 
power necessary to provide them with the awareness to frame the causal link between the 
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changes they see and such power at that dark, diabolic scale with which they have so little 
experience. As such, the majority of Dolpo-pa informants are now saddled with an abiding sense 
of befuddlement similar to that expressed by the 49-year-old trader and harvester of yartse 
gumbu in Rigmo who stated: 
It’s true that the temperature now is much warmer than before. We hardly see snow in the mountains, but 
we just don’t know why. 
 
Further evidence of this sense derives from the intriguing symmetry of response to an illustrative 
survey statement: “Industries in India, China and the USA can affect the water supply in 
Rigmo.” Response on a 5-point scale to this statement was split precisely in thirds, with 18 
individuals answering that they do not know, 18 individuals answering “strongly agree” or 
“agree,” and 18 individuals answering “strongly disagree” or “disagree.” The only variance was 
that one more individual answered “strongly disagree” (15) than answered “strongly agree” (14). 
Even in (or because of) their befuddlement, however, most informants also remain 
incredulous to the possibility that such a causal link could exist between the changes they see in 
local weather patterns, the increased phenological uncertainties within Dolpo, and that 
technometabolic scale beyond the entanglement of which they know so little. Indeed, reflective 
of the responses from the first part of this chapter in which numerous Dolpo-pa informants 
indicated a schema of the limits of human agency at a global scale, such a linked interconnection 
is contrary to one of the most basic components of the Dolpo-pa’s cultural model of 
entanglement as identified in Chapter 4 of this thesis: Within the first-order physical reality of 
material experience, humans are arrayed asymmetrically relative to the forces and magnitudes 
possible of such surface hazards at the biometabolic scale of ecological processes against which 
they contend daily in dwelling through the uncertainties of the existential present of that Dolpo 
domain of entanglement. As such, a causal link between recent experiences of observed weather 
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uncertainty, palpable phenological change within the entanglement and physical emissions from 
the technometabolic scale of industrial production at which a preponderance have no experience 
and which is far removed in terms of both space and power from their proficiencies is framed by 
most Dolpo-pa as being beyond the bounds of reasonable possibility in the contemporary 
operationalization of that emergent Dolpo-pa model of entanglement.  
Just after making the statement above, for instance, the 49-year-old trader in Rigmo 
responded to a question about whether industries in India, China, or the US could be responsible 
for warming in the area: 
I have never seen industries harming nature, and I don’t believe this could be true for the fact that those 
industries are very far from us, so they can’t warm up this place. For example, we make fire in our homes 
to get warm and cook food, but if industries do harm here too then we could make fire in one home to 
warm up the whole village, but this is not possible. 
 
The trader’s response is remarkable not only in its logic, which is incontestable as reasoned 
through the schematic constellation of the Dolpo-pa’s model of entanglement, but also in how 
material experience of a home fire is conceptually schematized in contesting the possibility 
framed by the Western methodologies operationalized through the ‘logic’ of the question. Other 
respondents answered similarly, such as the 70-year-old in Rigmo whose response to a question 
about the possible role of human activity in the warming trend that he has noted over the last 
several years suggests this abiding contemporary sense of befuddled incredulity: 
No, human activities can’t be the reason for warmer temperatures here. I don’t have much idea about this, 
but if I see the whole process then maybe I would believe it. 
 
The Geshe at the gompa on Phoksumdo Lake near Rigmo also spoke with such an abiding sense, 
intriguingly identifying that a schema of human-caused warming might be no more than a way of 
framing one possible understanding of the world: 





THE INVISIBLE CLOTHES OF VISIBLE MEN SOWING SEEDS OF PACKAGED FIELDS  
Despite this rather generalized sense of befuddled incredulity, a few individuals in Dolpo 
do frame at least the possibility of a link between their recent experiences with uncertainty and 
an unknown, extra-entanglement cause, though, significantly, such possibility is schematized 
only through their experiences within the entanglements of their domainxli. In this way, effects 
that are produced by the unknown power of the technometabolic scale of industrial processes can 
be proficiently conceptualized today by the Dolpo-pa only as they are downscaled to experience 
at the scale of their experiences. As such, only those short-term effects that are visible to the 
Dolpo-pa in their experience can be schematized conceptually even though such effects as 
schematized at that local scale can ever be no more than adumbrations of the long-term 
destabilizations of technometabolically-scaled changes that are in fact occurring rapidly in Dolpo 
(and that are indicated by those phenological changes) but that are invisible to the Dolpo-pa 
through their framing of causality based on limited experiences with the diabolic power of 
industrial reality.  
For example, although a 50-year-old woman from Rigmo said that she knows factories 
produce smoke, her only basis for conceptualizing that technometabolically-scaled production of 
smoke is through that same biometabolically-scaled experience of home-fire smoke that the 
trader above referred to in contesting the ‘logical’ question about warming being caused from 
processes far afield from Dolpo: 
I don’t know whether the smoke that comes from factories is harmful to people around here [far removed 
from where those factories are]. 
 
In this way, smoke is like snow to the Dolpo-pa in that it is a physical phenomenon with which 
they have palpable experiences from which their conceptual frame of the schematic category of 
‘smoke’ is culturally modeled. As such, several informants framed smoke as being dangerous to 
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people’s health, but each supported this frame only through specific reference to their local 
experiences with fire, subsequently basing their conceptual understandings of industrial 
emissions on these local experiences.  
The point is that such understandings do not proficiently frame the not merely more 
voluminous but also most always more toxic and chemically-complex emissions of industry that 
can be very damaging at longer distances and for longer spans of time than such local 
experiences can proficiently model. In essence, the realities of industrial emissions are currently 
invisible to the emergent proficiencies of the Dolpo-pa based on their current awareness, which 
means, ironically, that the distortions of the Enlightenment framing of reality by the cognitive 
trick only makes such conceptual framing appear to be progressive through the distortions of the 
industrial power that such circular framing has generated but that is, by the first-order physical 
realities mystified no less by that trick (Hornborg, 2001; see also Georgescu-Roegen 1999), as 
impossible to sustain in the long term as it is impossible for biometabolically-oriented peoples 
like the Dolpo-pa to see based on their current understandings.  
An interesting example of how this works comes from the same 50-year-old woman 
above, who said that home-fire smoke is  
Not good for health, especially producing sore throats, chest pain, etc, but only if it stays in the home. If the 
smoke goes out of the home to the sky, then it has no harm anymore.   
 
Notably, numerous Dolpo-pa informants frame the sky as being an empty space between the 
earth and the stars, so one schema through which they reason is that as long as smoke from 
emissions are not trapped in a physical space like a house, which is of course made of 
conditionally-structured surfaces with which they have material experience, then no harm can 
come of it. As long as it is not so thick as to remain on the ground or is not trapped in a physical 
structure, that is, then smoke from a fire just disappears into the emptiness of the sky; once it has 
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become invisible materially/perceptually, that is, it is framed as having vanished (and is therefore 
harmless) into empty air.  
In this way, responses to several survey statements indicate that the connection between 
the industrial entropy that is increasing ecological and existential uncertainty within their 
entangled domain and the influx into that domain of machine-made clothes and packaged foods 
that have become increasingly available with money acquired through the sale of yartsa gumbu 
remains invisible to the Dolpo-pa. The few negative effects individuals in Dolpo have associated 
with these new products of far-off industry are downscaled similarly to smoke, becoming visible 
only through their own experiences at the local scale. To the survey statement, for example, 
“Compared to my old woolen clothing, the clothes I wear today are impacting snows in the 
mountains,” only 22.2 percent of respondents answered “agree” on a 3-point scale. To that same 
statement, however, 35.2 percent of respondents answered “disagree,” while 42.6 percent of 
respondents answered that they did not know. In contrast, to the statement, “Packaged foods are 
impacting snows in the mountains,” the highest response (40.7 percent) on the same scale 
answered “agree,” while 33.3 percent answered that they did not know, and only 25.9 percent of 
respondents answered “disagree.” What this means, of course, is that these experiences are 
schematized as short-term problems (if as problems at all, uncertainty about what is happening 
ecologically remaining rife as implied by the frequency of mid-value responses) that do not, as 
such, conflict with the limits of human agency as constellated in primary schemas of the Dolpo 
model of entanglement. 
The differences intimated by the variations in response for the two previous statements 
are in themselves intriguing, but they become even more so in terms of informant responses to a 
third survey statement: “Packaged foods are littering the local environment.” To this statement, 
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92.6 percent of respondents answered “agree” on a 3-point scale, while only three respondents 
answered “disagree” and only one respondent answered that she did not know. The 
preponderance of response to this third statement is significant because it reflects the experience 
the Dolpo-pa have had in recent years with a growing litter problem that consists mainly of food 
wrappers and beer cans along the trails throughout Dolpo. Knowledge of this litter problem as 
derived from semi-structured interviews clarifies the much higher affirmative response to the 
statement about packaged foods than about machine-made clothes impacting snows in the 
mountains. All informants, even those who schematize such products as being both materially/ 
perceptually and conceptually beneficial on the whole, are averse to this experience of this new 
kind of waste that is increasingly being tossed about the caravanning routes throughout the 
domain of Dolpo.  
In truth, as a transhumant population with centuries-long experience of trade through the 
high mountains as a primary subsistence strategy, the Dolpo-pa have more extended engagement 
with and therefore possibly better understand than many other populations might the 
dissimilarity between the materials from those disparate scales of the technometabolic and the 
biometabolic that are used to package products in preparation for trade. Numerous informants 
commented on this difference, which is quite visible to them, especially in the form of these new 
experiences of industrial litter. An excerpt from my conversation with Gotza from Namdo just 
after I had asked him about what changes he has seen in the types of goods traded by the Dolpo-
pa in this contemporary period provides an interesting insight into just what people see, in terms 
not only of these changes but also in how these changes are being framed: 
G: In previous years when you brought the salt [from Tibet], how was it packaged? 
Go: Yaks. Skin of yaks, hair. We would sew and make [woolen] sacks. 
G: And what do you bring it in now? 
Go: In plastic sacks and woolen sacks. Both. 
G: Ok, if beers comes in cans and biscuits come in plastic, what’s the difference environmentally  
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      between the woolen sack and plastic bags/tin cans? 
Go: Yes, there are differences in effect on environment between woolen sacks and tin cans and  
       plastic sacks because plastic bags and tin cans never decompose and woolen sacks can be  
       reused a certain number of times and they decompose. 
G: And when you were younger, the woolen sacks, where were they made? 
Go: Here in the home. 
G: And tin cans, plastic bags, the things that come in them are . . . where are they made? 
Go: In China . . . in factories. 
 
Luhuk, the 31-year-old single woman who runs the seasonal tea tent and weaves blankets near 
Phoksumdo Lake, commented similarly in our conversation about the drawbacks of these new 
products in the form of industrial litter and the problems it causes: 
G: When we arrived to Upper Dolpa we saw new kinds of packaging like sacks, plastic, biscuits,  
     glass along the whole trail. Is anything negative about such things? 
L: Its makes the place dirty. 
G: So, what happens if the place becomes dirty? 
L: If it becomes dirty, diseases are caused. 
G: Do you know how people get sick? 
L: I don’t know.  Hahhaaa.. (Speaking in Tibetan) 
G: Are there any other problems with these plastics and cans we see everywhere? 
L: If people walk with naked feet they get injured . . . If children use old cans to drink water, they  
     become sick. If dzoa eat plastic they die. After that plastics and needles are found in their  
     intestines. 
The 62-year-old woman interviewed in her kitchen garden commented similarly, explicitly 
bounding the limits of such new waste in conformance to the model of entanglement: 
I don’t think there is any harm to the environment [of such packaging], but, yes, it harms our animals. Dzoa 
and yaks eat plastic which makes them die by chocking and distention. 
 
Finally, the 46-year-old trader also commented on this problem, intimating not only its visibility 
by his concern but also his limited understanding of an effective solution in his taking action to 
address the growing problem: 
Stuff like glass, plastic, nylon clothes, etc. doesn’t decompose easily even after 5-6 years, so I personally 
dig in some place far from water resources and homes and cover these wastes with earth deep enough not to 
expose them to the outside again. But all villagers, they don’t do this.  
 
Significantly, however, the most severe and long-term impacts of industrial production of 
such products as clothes and packaged goods (among a slew of other products) that have made or 
will soon make their way into and be framed in the short-term, both positively and negatively, 
 
 162
remain all but invisible to the Dolpo-pa. This is especially true as they disentangle more and 
more from the domain of Dolpo with the pull of progress in the development narrative and the 
push of an easier life with acquiescence to the short-term benefits of those new products from the 
technometabolic scale of industry. Informant responses to a statement from the structured survey, 
“Litter is the only drawback of economic success and development,” indicates this point, with 
79.6 percent of respondents on a 3-pont scale answering “agree” and only 13 percent answering 
“disagree” (7.4 percent answered that they did not know).  
Especially corroborative is how this point increasingly contrasts with how the 
phenological changes that have been witnessed within Dolpo (see Part II above) are now 
commonly schematized positively. For example, when I asked him near the end of our 
conversation if he was worried at all about what he readily admitted was unexplainable warmth 
over the previous several years, Tenzing responded: 
I think it is good to be warmer than colder. There is no need of fire, no need of more clothes, less harm to 
animals, and so forth. 
 
Others concurred with his positive schematization of these uncertain changes. The 25-year-old 
new mother who runs the tea tent near Phoksumdo Lake in Rigmo, for instance, agreed with 
Tenzing, claiming that with warmer temperatures people in the village have had better health and 
better harvests, not to mention the variety of food they now have. Kedar in the Tarap Valley, 
even though he does worry about such changes, also emphasized the positive aspects of these 
changes, especially how people in the valley are cleaner now that they have better access to 
warm water and no longer spend the long winter months huddled together in dark rooms by 
perpetual, sooty fires. Indeed, many respondents commented similarly during participant-
observations of cultivation and harvest in Upper Dolpo, Tarap, and Rigmo that the variety of 
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foods and fresh vegetables now available is only beneficial and without real drawback or 
consequence.  
 In contrast, a few individuals like Gotza from Namdo, who was referenced at the 
beginning of this chapter in suggesting that he has a little understanding of the universalizing 
abstractions of Western science, has a different opinion about the uncertainties produced by these 
physical changes than do most Dolpo-pa; interestingly, however, his understanding is no less 
material/perceptual than others as it was acquired through his participation as a community 
leader in a climate change education program organized by WWF Nepal near the provincial 
capital of Dunai a few years prior to our discussion. As such, his unusual experience among the 
Dolpo-pa has in fact altered the model by which he conceptualizes such physical changes, which 
is reflected in his response to a question in our semi-structured interview that implicitly inquired 
about whether he and others model such physical changes that they perceive as something to be 
worried about: 
Yes, it worries us. Last year there was very little rainfall, and if there is no rain, how can humans survive? 
For agriculture, irrigation, for animals we need water. Last year, I was in Kathmandu and in phone 
conversation with villagers they said that there was little rain and snowfall and this river Namdo was also 
dried out. If the river dries out then no survival of human is possible here. 
 
Tserap from Samling Gompa, which is at least three days from Namdo over the formidable 
Nengla Bhanjyang (5368m), similarly worries about these changes, but he also attended the 
WWF program, an experience which had a similar affect on him.  
 The opinions of these leaders are, however, in the considerable minority in Dolpo. The 
majority of the Dolpo-pa contentedly and enthusiastically reference the various phenological and 
sociological indicators of change to prevailing weather patterns in Dolpo that wholly support 
their overall positive experiences with and subsequent hopeful modeling of what warmer 
temperatures and decreased snowfalls and increased varieties of foods and greater availability of 
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different clothing suggest despite the greater and greater unknowns with which they are 
increasingly contending as they fare forward into a future of uncertain entanglement.  
 
IN ADUMBRATE SILENCE, FORESHADOWED ARREARS  
The crux of this discussion lies within the silence, worryingly scaled techno-diabolically. 
The silence in this context refers of course to that first-order physical reality that often spreads 
into invisibility in the second-order framing of that reality, a consequence of the evolutionarily 
emergent conceptual proficiency of the human-animal that typically disregards change except as 
synergistically conceptualized from the material experience of its most pressing physical reality 
at the biometaboli scale of ecological processes. Because of the tradeoffs inherent to this second-
order framing, the Dolpo-pa, like individuals from any tradition, even increasingly hegemonic 
ones, frequently do not know what they do not know in dwelling by such synergistic awareness 
as is generated after extended engagement within the first-order physical reality of that scale.  
This lack of awareness, which is again an ordinary constituent of being a phenotypic 
human-animal with an evolved cerebrum from which has emerged the selective advantage of 
conceptual representation, is especially worrying in times when change, in terms of force and 
magnitude, results from power at a scale that is different from that of the biometabolic and to 
which, arguably, no human-animal—even those human-animals who are the direct progeny of 
the cognitive trick of the distorted framing of the European Enlightenment who have the 
shrewdness to maintain (and even grow) that technometabolic scale but not such awareness as to 
see its full first-order physical reality—has material experience or conceptual proficiency enough 
to comprehend adequately. Even less synergistically aware of such power are those cultures still 
relatively well-entangled within the domains of their extended engagement at the biometabolic 
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scale of ecological processes. Beyond comprehension, the silence is deafening, smoothing out 
every distortion in its ultimate and inevitable adumbration of the existential leap at every scale 
into the disordering and always outstretched arms of entropy. 
As Alf Hornborg (2001:12, emphasis in original) insightfully notes, “the environmental 
debate increasingly focuses on ways in which economics and ecology do not harmonize . . . 
[even though] industrial technology is a product of this disharmony. Its power to conduct work 
‘in itself’, as it were, is a cultural illusion.” The basis of this cultural illusion is the cognitive trick 
of tautological distortion that accepts as reality a reification of one tradition’s cultural model of 
an arbitrary but since naturalized separation from human activity of a space framed as the 
environment, which is “the ‘material’ world [schematized] as natural, nonnegotiable, open to 
scientific revelation and manipulation, but in its fundamentals immune to contamination by 
human thought and society” (Hornborg 2001:12). In short-term acquiescence to the premises no 
less to the promises of this conceptual illusion to ameliorate the very real uncertainties 
increasingly befuddling their awareness, however, the Dolpo-pa are essentially positioning 
themselves in arrears to a foreshadowed future of penury and peripheralization in an 
environment, increasingly framed as the environment, with which they are becoming less and 
less entangled and within which they increasingly lack the proficiency to dwell without extreme 
existential peril. This peril can be expressed as an existential dissonance, a concept to be 










CHAPTER 7 – CONCLUSION: EXISTENTIAL DISSONANCE                                           
& THE FRAMING OF THE QUESTION 
 
WHAT YOU KNOW CAN KILL YOU 
 Early, when day has long since swathed the empty sky of stars in a woven spread of light 
though the sun will not top the jagged nubs of sheer rock rising two or three hundred meters east 
of camp in the deep valley at Danigar (4631m) for three more hours, Nyma flakes frost from the 
tent zipper and pokes his head through the narrowly opened aperture, espying the morning. He is 
only twenty-four, yet he has caravanned with yak and dzoa through this isolated area between the 
passes of the Numala Bhanjyang (5238m) and the Bagala Bhanjyang (5214m) in trade between 
Rigmo and the Tarap Valley and up through Saldang onto the Tibetan Plateau for over 15 years, 
having accompanied his father (as his father had accompanied his father and so on) from the time 
he was a boy. Having acquired over years of entanglement the synergistic awareness of material 
experience and conceptual proficiency that makes him Dolpo-pa, not only a person but also a 
part of Dolpo, he knows well the range of physical uncertainties with which he can expect to 
contend in caravanning through these remote mountains.  
 Nyma does not, however, know how old the Himalayas are. Nor does he know how old 
the earth is. When asked these questions after we had dashed with numb toes and steep cheers to 
bathe in the first, warm rays of sunlight to strike the valley floor a hundred and more meters 
away from our encampment, the long, exhausting trek up to the Bagala Pass and then down into 
the Maquwa Valley still ahead for the day, he merely flashed his sly smile, not as a defense 
against embarrassment for being unknowing of such “facts” but more as an implicit retort 
querying the expediency of such a question in such a place at such a time when the possibility of 
snow falling later in the day, he had commented earlier, was distinct. Not surprisingly, to a 
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multiple choice question on the structured interview, “How old is the world?” 85.2 percent of 
respondents answered that they did not know. The next most frequent response was 10,000-
100,000 years at 9.3 percent, followed by two respondents claiming over 1,000,000 years and 
one respondent claiming 1-1000 years. Similar frequencies were recorded to the question, “How 
old are the mountains?” with 79.6 percent of respondents answering that they did not know, 
followed by 9.3 percent answering 10,000-100,000 years, 7.4 percent answering over 1,000,000 
years, and 1.9 percent each answering 1-1,000 years and 100,000-1,000,000 years.  
 What Nyma and other agro-pastoral traders in Rigmo do not know is that according to the 
best science available today, as summarized by no less an authority than the US Geological 
Survey, the Himalayas began to form when the Indian subcontinent slammed into what is now 
the land mass called Asia some 40-50 million years ago (USGS 2011). The earth formed, 
according to that same best science from that same best source, some 4.5 billion years ago. 
Neither of these numbers is scaled to the biometabolic processes of ecology, however, nor is 
either really comprehensible to human-animals whose evolutionarily emergent conceptual 
capacities to truly comprehend let alone take any action on such abstractions beyond the purely 
representational but no less physical action of aligning letters, colons, numbers, zeros, commas, 
and decimals are rather limited: 
        Himalayas: 40,000,000.00 – 50,000,000.00 years old 
     Earth: 4,500,000,000.00 years old 
Too seldom reflected on, on the contrary, is that what those authorities of ‘science’ typically do 
not know is how to know and then surmount the uncertainties of the existential present of being 
so asymmetrically structured a conditional surface as a human-animal is as arrayed within the 
shifting, cleaving forces and magnitudes of ecological reality at the biometabolic scale of 
mountains and rivers and avalanches and insects and marmots and snow leopards.  
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 For all of their usefulness in one reified reality, that is, neither models nor statistical 
inferences nor historical aggregations nor symbolic markers of black text on white background 
(like these) are, in themselves, at all useful in the existential present of the first-order physical 
reality of being Dolpo-pa caravanning across the isolated, wind-swept pass of the Bagala 
(5214m), tattered prayer flags fluttering and cairns gradually crumbling and grey snow-heavy 
clouds gathering and a dzoa corpse rotting without hurry at that elevation. Such scientific 
markers are neither edible nor insulating nor sinewy and brute nor conceptually proficient by an 
evolutionarily emergent selective advantage that continually loops back into experience to 
confirm or contest or alter the proficiency of shared schematic constellations that are transmitted 
over extended engagement of synergistic awareness within a domain of entanglement. No, the 
Dolpo-pa do not know the age of the mountains in which they dwell or the happenstance of their 
formation, but they do know how to remain dissipatively structured a little longer in caravanning 
through them. 
The point, as argued in this thesis, is that the assurances framed by the distortions of the 
cognitive trick and confirmed through the unassailable evidence of its technometabolically-
scaled productions are effectively ameliorating in the short term the growing uncertainty the 
Dolpo-pa are progressively more regularly confronting as their conceptual proficiencies less 
consistently and reliably frame the realities of their ongoing experience within the ecological 
realities of that entangled domain of Dolpo. In other words, children are increasingly being 
framed as better off knowing how old the mountains and the earth are than being aware of how 
to subsist through them. A withering irony arises, however, in that the growing uncertainty that 
has been ameliorated through such acquiescence in the short term has actually been brought 
about and continues to progressively increase by what in the long term has and will continue to 
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be a source of that growing uncertainty, which has begun to disentangle that very awareness that 
has made the Dolpo-pa unique and distinct within the environments of that entangled domain of 
Dolpo.  
Such uncertainty is rapidly increasing among the Dolpo-pa as their proficiencies at being 
the people of Dolpo begin to less consistently and reliably frame the realities of their 
contemporary experiences within that domain. This diminished proficiency is directly 
attributable to the social order that has resulted from the force and magnitude possible in terms of 
production, consumption and transport of the technometabolic scale of industrial processes, the 
emissions of which have so altered the planet’s physical atmosphere that ecological conditions 
have grown increasingly unstable in once thoroughly entangled domains throughout the world, 
especially at the poles and in what is often referred to as the third pole of the high Himalayas.   
Data from this study indicate that in Dolpo such disentanglement is occurring through the 
increasingly pressing push-pull tensions of at least two interconnected subjugations to the power 
possible of the world system. First, the majority of Dolpo-pa, whose synergistic has emerged in 
holistic similitude with the existential present at the biometabolic scale of ecological processes, 
have neither experience of nor proficiency with the forces and magnitudes possible at the 
technometabolic scale of industry; indeed, intimation of such power as possible at that scale in 
discussion with most informants in Dolpo is met with incredulity. Despite such incredulity, 
however, the Dolpo-pa are increasingly framing altogether positively their limited experiences 
with those goods—mainly machine-made clothing and packaged foods—produced at that scale 
that have only within the five years or so since 2005 become regularly available to them. Such 
positive schematization reflects how inexperience and lack of proficiency with the forces and 
magnitudes possible in production at that technometabolic scale distorts those short-term 
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benefits. This is true even as growing uncertainty of the effects of the production of those 
benefits, readily observable in phenological changes to the physical environments of which the 
Dolpo-pa remain a part, ever more rapidly belies as illusory the assurances of material certainty 
that are thus adumbrated in such schematization of those industrial products as they are 
increasingly integrated as short-term benefits into the less and less reliable patterns of the Dolpo-
pa’s emergent synergistic awareness.  
Second, such positive schematization of the short-term benefits of the now known 
products of otherwise unknown industrial production is being more and more invidiously 
(insidiously, more honestly) reinforced by one contemporary formulation of that cognitive trick 
of circular distortion, the discourse and graft of the increasingly hegemonic narrative of the 
International Development ‘industry’. This narrative is confirmed by the short-term benefits of 
those known industrial products that have recently materialized from the reified (and ever more 
emissions-laden) air of the unknown scale of industrial power somewhere physically outside of 
the Dolpo entanglement and therefore of the schematic constellations of the Dolpo-pa’s 
proficiencies. Through the machinations of this ‘industry’, however , the Dolpo-pa are 
increasingly being cognitively conditioned to re-frame—no less through the insidiousness of this 
graft—the awareness from which and of which they have emerged and thrived culturally for so 
many centuries as the backwardness, ignorance and irrationality of humans who are not as 
culturally evolved as they could and should be.  
Thus re-made techno-diabolical as industrially human, the Dolpo-pa have also now begun 
to teleologically frame themselves as underdeveloped by their conceptual subjugation to a newly 
accepted and insidious and increasingly hegemonic cultural model grounded in the linear 
sequentiality of one tradition’s conceptual circularityxlii. Only through such a frame could a 
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deputy director from the Nepali government’s Department of Livestock Services (DLS) 
comment in a report from the mid-1990s that cattle rearing in Dolpo “is still in the primitive and 
traditional and has not entered into the modern age” (Kumar, 1996:1); indeed, only through such 
a frame could so many Dolpo-pa concur in so many ways with the logic intimated by this 
comment, even when an appreciably increased existential threat to their continued resilience is 
the outcome of such a distorted re-framing.  
The push-pull tensions of this subjugation are beginning to sunder the conceptual from 
the existential, creating a situation in which the Dolpo-pa are becoming gradually more 
consonant with the linear sequentiality of the distorted conceptual model of international 
development even as they are becoming more and more existentially dissonant from the 
emergent synergistic awareness of their experience and proficiency after extended engagement 
within the domain of Dolpo. This existential dissonance is especially disconcerting because of 
how phenological changes to the characteristics of that domain that have resulted from the 
transition (in core areas, note, far removed from the periphery of Dolpo, thus instantiating a new 
form of colonial oppression) from a biotmetabolic to a technometabolic scale of force and 
magnitude will only increase this dissonance by altering, through the physical effects underlying 
the conceptual discourse of atmospheric ‘climate change’, the very entanglement to which the 
Dolpo-pa have been for so long so existentially and culturally consonant.  
In this way, cognitive anthropological frameworks like Dressler’s cognitive dissonance 
theory, even as they are effective in identifying and assessing the effects of such conceptual 
changes as are currently taking place in Dolpo, remain blind to the existential effects of such 
physical alterations to the experiences of people on the ground who are becoming less and less 
engaged with their entanglements and therefore increasingly likely to perish as a result. Such 
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blindness is the result of the tendency in cognitive anthropology (among so many other 
disciplines) to de-emphasize the experience of ecological reality in uncritical accedence to the 
those very distortions of the Enlightenment frame, especially in perfunctory and uncontested 
acceptance as indelible ‘truth’ of such cognitive-cultural constructs as the environment that are 
only the models of very specific places at very specific times in the history of the human-surface 
cum -animal.  
FRAMING THE QUESTION, OR ADUMBRATIONS OF A SAD, SUPERFICIAL SALVATION   (AN END 
IN SIGHT, PROGRESSIVELY OUTPACED AND OUT OF REACH) 
 
As Hornborg (2001:146) states: “The special way in which machines conceal significant 
aspects of social reality, while at the same time constituting that reality, certainly deserves to be 
made more ‘transparent’.” Although referring specifically to machines, I take this reference more 
metonymically as representative of the entire technometabolic scale of production and 
consumption and unequal exchange within which the schema of progress is centrally constellated 
especially as the foundation of that most Huxleian of industries, International Development. 
Indeed, transparency and contexts and defamiliarization are indispensable if full comprehension 
of contemporary representations of ecological reality as it is constituted and framed by cultural 
conceptualizations are to be approached and comprehended. Arguably, for example, the keen 
popular interest in Point Four of Harry S. Truman’s Inaugural Address in 1949, which promised 
“a bold new program for making the benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progress 
available for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas [where] more than half the 
people of the world are living in conditions approaching misery” (quoted in Rist 2008:71), was a 
reflection of how the models of the technometabolic scale of industry had become hegemonic to 
the progeny of the distorted framing of the Enlightenment even before the end of WWII.  
 
 173
Only through such a cognitive trick could a circularly distorted frame that reifies second-
order conceptualizations and takes them as first-order physical reality, as with one of Truman’s 
central conclusions, that more than half the world has an “economic life [that] is primitive and 
stagnant . . . [and that] their poverty is a handicap and a threat both to them and to more 
prosperous areas” (quoted in Rist 2008:71), make any sense. Indeed, the trick of this distorted 
frame is the central thesis of the development narrative that emerged from Truman’s address, 
confirming the reality of the reification of a world as framed contemporarily no less for those 
who perpetuate it in the core than for those who buy into it in those areas of the periphery that 
have been thus deluded, as with the framing of the Nepali DLS deputy director (above) who 
situated himself so compellingly within that frame in his perfunctory statement about the 
primitive and traditional state of livestock production in Dolpo nearly fifty years and fifteen 
thousand feet in elevation later.  
To be sure, the Dolpo-pa have begun to similarly schematize themselves as economically 
deficient because of their continued orientation to the biometabolic scalexliii, especially in not 
more efficiently commodifying and exploiting the(ir) environment as a resource through which 
they might develop (as others have, obviously, since they can make such astounding industrial 
products) into some future point of production and consumption capacity (a re-scaling to the 
technometabolic) when their present will coincide with the ever-present present—the benchmark 
present, that is—of the modern age of progress as framed by Truman (and many before himxliv) 
that, according to the evaluation made by that DLS deputy director’s report, they at present lag 
so far behind. In truth, such framing of these scalar disparities coupled with the ironic 
interconnections in Dolpo of growing ecological uncertainty and the ameliorating/denigrating 
assurances of graft through the international development ‘industry’ are even now drawing the 
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Dolpo-pa closer to that conceptual tipping point when they will fully embrace the odious 
schematic brand of the scarlet U of underdevelopment, framing themselves as existing in a state 
of subsistence, penurious and pitiable in a domain of disentanglement.  
Once past that point, they will have wholly acceded to a technometabolically-scaled 
system within which they might somehow continue to subsist meagerly but only with 
development aid or outmigration or resource commodification or some combination of these 
“choices” but which altogether will always remain, because how they culturally model 
possibility within the environment is so different at a root scale than those industrial distortions 
of the environment, all but impossible for those who remain truly Dolpo-pa, people of Dolpo, and 
not merely people from Dolpo to truly comprehend. Such an ominous and imminent future for 
such synergistically aware people after such extended engagement within such a domain of 
entanglement should give pause to those eager humanitarian liberalists who belie the underlying 
superficiality of their linear certainty in the passionate but no less imprudent insistence on always 
asking those who would not ‘salvage’ culture but who would reframe the assurances promised by 
a distortion of ecological reality that only will and ever only has disentangled holistic similitude, 
“Who are we to tell them what they should have or be?” The answer, of course, lies within the 









                                                 
ENDNOTES 
 
i Until it is not, of course, which, in terms of the Enlightenment framing and subsequent progress of the industrial 
human-animal as adduced by the Drake Equation, is becoming more and more likely sooner and sooner. 
 
iiFor example, at www.uniquetreks.com, Dolpo is described as “a truly isolated corner of Nepal [where] time has 
stood still . . . for centuries as inhabitants of Tibetan stock continue to live, cultivate and trade the way they have 
done since time immemorial” (accessed 21.08.11). Such a description is common, as demonstrated by the results of 
a simple Google search for “trek in Dolpo.”  
 
iii In two weeks of trekking from the literal end of the road nary a Twin Otter made the forty-five minute flight from 
Nepalganj on the Terai to Juphal . . . and better to be soaked than to be going nowhere for two weeks! 
 
iv I enlisted the Dolpo-pa dzoa wrangler and guide I hired for the circuit of upper Dolpo for Tibetan to Nepali 
translation on the circuit. The translator I hired from Kathmandu, the former park ranger at SPNP, only spoke 
Nepali, but I chose him because of his many connections in Dolpo. He and the dzoa wrangler were great friends 
from the past, so the double-translation worked well-enough for my purposes.  
 
v I remember well the morning I approached her outside her father’s lodge and asked in a slow, drawn tone if she 
would be interested in helping me by translating an interview or two from Tibetan. She smiled, starring at me for a 
moment as if she was unsure of what I meant, then said simply, ‘sure.’ I then asked how much she would charge, 
and she smiled even more widely, her eyes narrowing to slits, as she looked at me under the blanket of the too blue 
sky, seemingly searching for words. Finally, her lips parted and, a bit haltingly, she said, “volunteer,” her voice 
rising as if she were asking me for her help with something or other extremely important to her.  I think now that she 
was unsure whether or not she had the correct word, but it was the correct word to express what she meant. And so, 
for the next six weeks, Yungdrung the informant became Yungdrung the research assistant, significantly benefiting 
the success of this project.  
 
vi Geshe is a title equivalent to doctor for a lama holding the most advanced terminal degree in Buddhist/Bon 
studies. 
 
vii Reference to livelihood designations is meant only as a vague indicator since almost all Dolpo-pa pursue a variety 
of livelihood strategies. Listed are primary livelihood strategies as indicated by individual respondents, nearly all of 
whom engage in other activities to supplement these primary activities.  
 
viii Interestingly, the village shopkeeper was originally sent to Rigmo by the government to be the village 
schoolteacher. In the late 1990s, however, an hour (and 400 meters down) from the village, an American woman and 
a Dutch charity had funded and now operate the Tapriza Boarding School. He no longer has any students, so he now 
operates the shop. Indeed, Rigmo was interesting partially because all school-aged children from the village attend 
the boarding school, so no children older than five or six actually live there during the school year.  
 
ix Is it even a ‘legitimate’ way? Note how the tautology becomes thereby the arbiter of its own legitimacy of 
representations. 
x This perspective is true of plant life, as well, of course, but plants are more readily conceived of as being 
contiguous with an environment, importantly intimating both the limits and the duplicities of perception. Because of 
this perceptual contiguity, plants will be left except in terms of animals out of this analysis. 
 
xi Even more notably, descriptions of the products of such functioning are never more than linguistic representations, 
‘schemas’, ‘models’, ‘cultures’ all existing only conceptually as reifications of an emergent mechanism of the 
evolution of the human cerebrum. Words are not actually what they mean, as the dictum states. More so, however, 
neither is the result of the genetic evolution of the eagle’s eye the actual vision of the eagle that enables actual 




                                                                                                                                                             
 
xii Originally, I wrote, “by filling a specific niche,” but then I realized, guided by Ingold (1992), that the notion of 
‘niche’ belies an understanding of entanglement, each component of an entanglement emerging through and by its 
particular interaction with the entanglement in its surmounting of entropy bearing down on the entanglement. 
 
xiii Such enskiled awareness suggests Merleau-Ponty’s ‘fields of care’, a culture reframing to which, Evernden 
(1985:47) argues, though trying of the patience of readers inured to thinking of the world as an assemblage of 
discrete objects in a neutral landscape would “fundamentally transform” our distorted understanding of ourselves as 
separate from the environment. 
 
xiv Graft is “the practice of offering something (usually money) in order to gain an illicit advantage.” If international 
development, especially as framed by a neoliberal world order, is not graft, then what is? 
 
xv Note how in nested reality, each level constellates schema that were in a previous level themselves models 
composed of constellated schema. Only at the root level of the object-world are surfaces before cognition 
unschematized, though they do ‘nest’ in materials and particles in and infra/ultra to the scale of the ecological. 
 
xvi Kedar is an exceptional person. Though Nepali, he has dedicated his life to assisting the Dolpo-pa in the Tarap 
Valley, and he is very knowledgeable of and shares many of their fundamental beliefs. In found the Crystal 
Mountain School, he said that he wants it to be a place where children from Dolpo can continue to learn the 
traditional forms of practice that “make them who they are” (i.e. Dolpo-pa) but also supplement those practices with 
education that will enable them to cope with new situations arising in the contemporary world.  
 
xvii Not one informant knew where the water from the spring up on the mountain comes from, although, having 
climbed up to it, we could with high confidence determine that it seeps through the several meter thick rock on the 
opposite side of which is a very large, ever present glacier that feeds Phoksumdo Lake.  
 
xviii The pronoun ambiguity of their welfare/them is intentional here, as, according to the model of karma, concern 
for welfare applies equally both ways, humans being distinct from other creatures and material forms only in terms 
of karmic accrual, which can be gained or lost by any creature by any act that is sinful, which means, as will 
explained more fully in the text, as a material/perceptual action that sunders the continuity of the entanglement. 
 
xix Of course, this near certainty was based on indices and geo-historical indicators more than on on-the-ground 
realities, which were dire no less at the time but were dire in a different way than merely in aggregate as the 
statistical outputs of the development industry that frame such realities according to a logic foreign to local peoples 
trying to cope with them. 
 
xx Of course, the majority of this excessive amount on the “world market,” of which the vast majority of the Dolpo-
pa have never heard, never returns to them or to anyone, for that matter, to whom they sell (not with whom they 
trade, notably, the difference in preposition prodigiously suggestive of the difference) this commodity.  
xxi This is especially true in the geopolitically globalized earth, wherein a remote peoples like the Dolpo-pa who are 
not yet intimately tied to the world system but who nonetheless have suffered significantly by its machinations, 
leading those within to frame them as poor and ignorant even as the Dolpo-pa continue to adapt to situations 
completely out of their control. For instance, trade in yartse gumbu became necessary because of geopolitics but the 
scalar disparity is leading to a situation of unequal ecological exchange and uneven development. 
 
xxii Note the subtle shift from the adjective to the adverb as descriptor, from essential to essentially: The former case 
describes the absolute necessary, vital nature of the human-surface cum –animal; the latter describes the essence of 
but not the actual being of. It’s a similar difference between saying that a person is cognition as opposed to saying 
that a person has cognition—the former is not separated from its physical evolution, cognition being as much a part 
of the person as the nail of the big toes, while the latter is possessed only of a reification of that evolution that does 
not actually, as all reifications, exist as an object in the world. 
 
xxiii Reference to Huxleian (often compared to Orwellian) totalitarianism and subjugation derives from the model 
framed in Aldous Huxley’s classic novel of ideas, Brave New World. In it, individuals are subjugated by a social 
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order that is implicitly totalitarian, providing drugs, games, and sex to a Fordist culture of socially and genetically 
segregated social classes who are each in their own ways too superficial and pathetically entertained by the 
productions of industrial society to question the problems of being so superficial and pathetically entertained by the 
productions of industrial society. Huxleian often also references Thomas Henry Huxley, ‘Darwin’s bulldog’ and 
Aldous’s grandfather, to whom, though admired greatly, this thesis does not refer. 
 
xxiv Of note and consequence is how this shift to the penury of underdevelopment circularly reifies that very idea, as 
if it were a scarlet U stitched to the breast of every Dolpo-pa as an identical Hester Prim, which would be ironic if it 
weren’t so intentional of Huxley to make each of the lower classes in BNW identical and simian-like in their 
underdevelopment, both physical and cognitive. In counterpoint, of course, is how the Dolpo-pa’s domain is never 
unchanging, at any scale, even as the changes perceivable on the ecological scale have driven them for several 
decades to modify their long-held trade practices, which they have done (not without great struggle) and continue to 
do in still subsisting within their domain, which is rather the point. 
 
xxv In Tibet, interestingly, yak butter is revered and ubiquitous as an offering to be burned at monasteries and sacred 
sites like the Jokhang, the holiest temple in Tibet. In Dolpo, however, observations indicate that yak butter is seldom 
wasted, suggesting the greater physical exertion required to caravan through the high Himalayas as compared with 
that required in nomadism across the Plateau, which is certainly difficult but not as difficult. Furthermore, it also 
suggests lower carrying capacity of Dolpo, which is also at least partially a consequence of that more difficult 
geography. 
 
xxvi Notably, at this altitude and area, there was no landslide danger to forefend. 
 
xxvii Nyma did not, however, engage in this same practice most other days on our trek, and he claimed never to have 
been to that part of Upper Dolpo before, which illustrates the holism of his synergistic awareness of what to do 
where and when to such detail within that domain of human-animal culture that is Dolpo. 
 
xxviii Magli Budha, the recently graduated nurse from Rigmo, is one exception who proves the rule, of course. Also 
well-educated in the Western model of pedagogy that of course includes science education is Kedar from the Tarap 
Valley and a few other health workers, who may also know a little of the science of electrolyte replacement, though 
this has not been confirmed.  
 
xxix Alf Hornborg’s (2001:17) comment on difference between the ecological and industrial scales (what he calls 
“biomass” and “technomass” is telling, especially in terms of sustainability: “Both are dissipative structures, 
requiring inputs higher than outputs and subsisting on the difference. A crucial difference is that biomass us a 
sustainable process whereas technomass is not. For biomass, energy resources are virtually unlimited, and entropy—
in the form of heat—is sent out into space. For technomass, resources are ultimately limited, and we are left with 
much of the entropy in the form of pollution. For biomass, growth is a morally neutral reward granted by nature 
itself, whereas for technomass it is a reward resulting from human ideologies and generating unequal, global 
relations of exchange.” 
 
xxx As Gibson (1979:8) importantly notes, “The fact is worth remembering because it is often neglected that the 
words animal and environment make an inseparable pair. Each term implies the other. No animal could exist without 
an environment surrounding it. Equally, though not so obvious, an environment implies an animal (or at least an 
organism) to be surrounded . . . The mutuality of animal and environment is not applied by physics and the physical 
sciences. The basic concepts of space, time, matter, and energy do not lead naturally to the organism-environment 
concept or to the concept of a species and its habitat. Instead, they seem to lead to the idea of an animal as an 
extremely complex object of the physical world.” 
 
xxxi Especially worrying is that many of these institutions are boarding schools, such as the Western funded Tapriza 
School a two hours hike down a steep 700m descent from Rigmo where all children from the village between the 
ages of six and fourteen live for at least six months of the year. In this way, Rigmo importantly illustrates how 
fragmentation upsets not only the transmission of traditional knowledge with acquiescence to the model of progress 
as expressed through the thimblerig of development but also the interwoven fabric of everyday life in Rigmo—from 
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its most sublime trials to its most ruthless moments of joy—that is an essential and often uncritically acknowledged 
loss through such acquiescence. Indeed, the wanting for children over the age of six in Rigmo was palpable, almost 
as if the people’s rejection of their conceptual awareness of themselves entangled in their domain found physical 
representation in their casting out from the village their children into the low world about which they do not know 
just how much they do not know. 
 
xxxii Arguably, this selective advantage that enables humans among all other animals to conceptually model and thus 
respond to new moments through such synergistic awareness also promotes such the naturalization of such 
synergistic awareness, which would be, though further study would be required to confirm this hypothesis, both 
genetically and phenotypically advantageous. 
 
xxxiii I am loathe to use the term indigenous any more as it has been appropriated by an indigenously Enlightenment 
system (and discourse) that even more nefariously subjugates as it continues to claim that it does not subjugate by 
transitioning from an Orwellian to a Huxlian totality. Furthermore, I am using the term not to claim that the Dolpo-
pa have genetic origin there but that have phenotypic and cultural continuity long enough there to warrant the 
appellation. 
 
xxxiv Many informants, as will be seen below, do see changes to glacier size and lake levels over the course of the 
year, which they consider normal and has been naturalized in their models. Unchanging here refers to their 
constancy in never disappearing, which actually supports their contentions that they cannot disappear, since they 
change but not so much ever to ever vanish completely. 
 
xxxv Maybe I should have noted this previously, but I will state it now: I am not claiming in this thesis that the 
methodologies of Enlightenment framing have not benefited humanity. By so many means, it has, and it will 
continue to long into the future. Specifically, within such a linear methodological system, Newtonian mechanics was 
vaunted until Einstein, becoming thereby not merely an historical novelty but still very useful at scales at which its 
capacities remain effective and explanatory. The problem with such thinking is that it has become itself a paradigm, 
a la Kuhn, most believing it is the only legitimate way to truly frame and understand the world, when it, too, has its 
limits but has been framed now tautologically as if it is the only legitimate way to frame and understand the world. 
This is the distortion of the frame, which should at this point be quite evident, if I have done well in writing this 
thesis. 
 
xxxvi Only within the last three years has Phoksumdo Lake and the river flowing from it not been the main source of 
water to the village. With the installation of the provincial government funded taps, most now do not regularly 
acquire their water from the lake, though some still do. As one survey statement to be discussed below in the text 
indicates, this recent change can reasonably be construed as having no impact on the validity of these responses. 
 
xxxvii See also (Agrawal 1995; Turnbull 1997; Ingold 2000; Berkes and Jolly 2001; Vedwan and Rhoades 2001; 
Nadasdy 2003; Byg and Salick 2009; Turner and Clifton 2009) 
 
xxxviii What the distortion of the cognitive trick of European Enlightenment modeling does, in contrast, is illusorily 
claim that the frame is the actual, accepting as truth, thereby, the de-emphasis inherent to framing and framing that 
truth in turn as an ultimate truth, confirmed by the linear sequentiality of progress as adduced through a frame of 
progress that thus disparages any other holistically produced frame as untruth, illogical and primitive. 
 
xxxix Notably, Tarap is 400-500m in elevation higher than Namdo. Rigmo and Phoksumdo Lake, just to restate, are at 
~3740m. 
 
xl Kedar, the principle of the Crystal Mountain School in the Tarap Valley, who has traveled to Europe and 
understands the basic Western scientific model of Global Warming, interestingly mistook the steam that he once saw 
being released from nuclear power plants in France for the factory emissions he had heard were causing the 
problem. His material/perceptual experience in observing the steam release confirmed his limited conceptual 
proficiency in understanding Global Warming, which caused him to frame his observations incorrectly. 
Interestingly, when I explained to him that what he observed was just steam and not the factory emissions he had 
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heard about, he remained incredulous for a while as I continued to fill in his experiential gaps with my higher 
proficiency, at which time he acquiesced and altered his constellation in conformance to the new information he 
learned from me.  
 
xli In 70 days in the field, we only heard an engine once when a rescue helicopter flew over Rigmo toward Upper 
Dolpo to collect a French tourist who was injured. This occurred during my conversation with Tenzing, who had just 
expressed his incredulity about the power of machines. I asked him if he had heard of helicopters before he saw one, 
and he said he had but, interestingly, did not believe they were real until he saw one fly over Rigmo for himself a 
few years back. In other words, an direct experience was required to confirm what was otherwise to him only rumor. 
 
xlii Hornborg (2001:12) makes an interesting point about the odd place of machines and I would add industrial 
facilities in our models of production. As he says, “We seem to have difficulties understanding that machines, being 
material structures, for their very existence depend on social relations,” which, I would add, are often taken as actual 
objects in the world and so are reifications. As Hornborg continues, “Machines occupy an ambiguous position in the 
Cartesian scheme: they are material, yet products of mind. This is probably why we have such a hard time grasping 
them as the social phenomena that they are.” Again, I would add that industries typically exist far from the actual 
dwelling places of two extremes of the social order in the world, those with power at the core and those who are at 
the margins of the periphery, the former as thoroughly disconnected (both physically and cognitively) from the 
destructions they perpetuate as the latter, even though the latter is overall materially and cognitively subjugated to 
the former in terms of (both social and material) ‘negentropy’. This odd and subjugating relationship between these 
two poles of social typology within the world system is certainly, though it is beyond the focus of this thesis, worth 
further future study. 
 
xliii Such an orientation is often framed disparagingly as being ‘subsistence’, as if “The state of existing in reality; 
having substance” was somehow ignoble or shameful 
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INFORMED ORAL CONSENT SCRIPT 
 
I am a student from Colorado State University in the United States. I am interested in 
understanding how you see the world around you, especially in terms of the high 
mountain glaciers and your livelihoods. I am also interested in learning about your way 
of life and how you explain and are adapting to environmental changes you see 
occurring in this valley that are affecting your way of living. Finally, I am interested in 
knowing your thoughts on the explanation some people from outside of this valley offer 
for the environmental changes happening here. 
 
I think how you see the world and your adaptations to environmental change can prove 
important to many people beyond this valley. I hope that eventually this research will 
contribute to development planning that includes local understandings and adaptations 
and emphasizes more local or village control of resources and implementation. Such a 
model of development would not dismiss all forms of well-being beyond economic 
growth but would integrate economic well-being into a full determination of well-being 
that includes religious, cultural, social and personal health and welfare.  
 
I want to emphasize that participation in this study is entirely voluntary. Such 
participation will involve, generally, allowing me to work with you in tending your 
herds and harvesting your gardens, discussing with me one-on-one or in a group 
sessions your views of the mountains and water resources, and how your lives are 
changing as the environment around your changes. In some cases, I wish to tape record 
our conversations. Such one-on-one conversations will take no more than 2-2.5 hours at 
a time, and I may ask to speak with you again to follow up on our conversations. Again, 
your participation is voluntary and you may stop these interviews at any time. Group 
sessions you may be invited to participate in are expected to be between 2-3 hours. 
Your time commitment will be a total of approximately 5-7 hours over 10 weeks. I will 
protect these recordings of our discussions and will not share them with anyone except 
for research purposes; they will be kept in my possession under my personal protection, 
as a source of knowledge about my time spent here among you that can be compared to 
future work here. For these more formal, recorded discussions, I hope you will honor 
me by accepting compensation of 20 Nepali Rupees per hour. 
 
I have come all the way from the United States to listen to you. I think your voices are 
very important and your knowledge and wisdom about the environment of this valley 
and the changes that are occurring here is deep and valuable. There are no known risks 
associated with this research or to the discussions we have; however, I want to repeat 
that any information that could in any way harm you or your community—as for 
example when you might have something critical to say about the state—completely 
confidential. I will eventually write about this research to communicate with different 
people what I have learned here. In these contexts, I will do everything I can to protect 
your interests and to protect you against possible dangers. If you wish your names to be 
identified with certain local knowledge, I will do so. If you want your identity hidden, I 
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will do so (I will even hide the name and exact location of your village if not doing so 
could jeopardize your personal or community safety). 
 
I think people in the United States, in other places in the world and in other places in 
Nepal have a lot to learn from your knowledge, especially how you see and interact 
with the environment and how you are adapting to changes in it. In many other places 
around the world, conversations are taking place about how to better see, interact with 
and adapt to environments and change. I am very grateful for your help in teaching me 
to better understand these issues from your important perspective. 
 
I ask you for your oral consent to participate in this research. No written document will 
be kept regarding our understanding; however, I hope you will trust me fully to protect 
and further your well-being as individuals an as a community. Research of this kind can 
increase your voice in conversations with powerful outside forces like the state and 
foreign development organizations. Providing you with the opportunity to have a 
greater voice in determining for yourselves how your future will look while also 
protecting your well-being are my two primary motivations for conducting this 
research. 
 
If you have any concerns about your participation in this research or about this project 
in general, please speak with me immediately. I am grateful for your help and 
involvement in this project. I think it is important work, both for your community and 
nations, for my country, and for the world.  
 
Do you have any questions? 
Do you give your permission to participate in this study?  
 
 
Contact Information Sheet: 
 
Thank you for your participation in this study.  If you have any further questions about 
the study, please contact: 
 
Gregory E. Pierce     Dhiraj Pradhananga 
Department of Anthropology    The Small Earth Nepal 
Colorado State University    626 Bhakti Thapa Sadak 
Fort Collins, CO  80523    Naya Baneshwor 
gregory.pierce@lamar.colostate.edu   P O Box 20533, Kathmandu, Nepal 
001-303-496-1353     +977-1-4490834 
 
If you have any questions about your rights as a volunteer in this research, contact 














1. My expectations of the weather in each season have become less reliable over the last 
several years. 
2. The mountains no longer have as much snow as they once did. 
3. In general, it is warmer here now than it used to be. 
4. I am envious of my neighbor’s increased wealth. 
5. Phoksumdo Lake was formed by a demonness which was killed by Guru Rinpoche. 
6. A village once existed where Phoksumdo Lake is now. 
7. Avalanches have become more common in the last few years than they were in the 
past. 
8. The amount of snow that falls each year determines what the temperature will be. 
9. Nature cannot exist without humans. 
10. Great lamas can control local weather events. 
11. The calendar controls the change in the weather each season. 
12. The snow in the high mountains could not disappear permanently. 
13. If the spring from which we get our water stops flowing, we can always get water 
from the river. 
14. The primary purpose of nature is for human use. 
15. It is a sin to kill wildlife. 
16. Phoksumdo Lake is too old to be affected by changes in the snows in the mountains. 
17. I sometimes drink bottled beer or soda to show that I can afford such things. 
18. Knowledge of the Bon Dharma is more important to me than knowledge that enables 
me to earn more money. 
19. Knowledge consists of the skills that help a person survive in the world. 
20. The knowledge I learned from my parents and neighbors is less important than the 
knowledge children learn in school today. 
21. I can earn more money now than I could 5 years ago. 
22. I spend more money on food now than I did 5 years ago. 
23. I spend more money on clothing now than I did 5 years ago. 
24. My standard of living has increased over the past 5 years. 
25. I am happier now than I was 5 years ago. 
26. My life is easier now than it was 5 years ago. 
27. I worry more now than I did 5 years ago. 
28. I worry about different kinds of things now than I did 5 years ago. 
29. Yartze Gumba is the biggest reason why I have had more money to spend over the 
last several years. 
30. I have left some of my plots uncultivated in order to search for Yartze Gumba. 






II. 3-Point Scale (Disagree—Neither Agree Nor Disagree—Agree) 
 
32. Nature is more resilient than humans. 
33. Humans are a part of nature. 
34. Nature is more powerful than humans. 
35. I cannot do anything to prevent an avalanche from wiping out my entire herd. 
36. Humans are too small and insignificant to be able to harm nature. 
37. There have probably been human societies that have done so much harm to their local 
environment that those societies have collapsed and disappeared. 
38. Nature exists in a balance that humans can alter as they please to satisfy their wants. 
39. I can do little stop an earthquake from destroying my house. 
40. Humans can destroy nature. 
41. Cutting down one tree is a sin. 
42. Human technologies can alter nature. 
43. There is much I can do to stop a blizzard from forming when I am crossing a pass. 
44. Nature will exist regardless of whether or not humans exist. 
45. Human technologies can alter nature for short periods of time only. 
 
III. 5-Point Scale (Strongly Disagree—Disagree—Neither Agree Nor Disagree— 
      Agree—Strongly Agree) 
 
46. Humans and nature are mutually dependent on one another. 
47. My beliefs directly affect the amount of snow that falls in the mountains. 
48. Nature is too vast for humans to be able to harm it. 
49. I destroy nature every time I plow my plots. 
50. I am powerless to do anything to stop the river from washing away the bridge I use 
regularly. 
51. Like an insect is to me, so am I to the forces of nature. 
52. If caught in a landslide, I would be lucky to survive. 
53. It is becoming more difficult to predict when avalanches will occur. 
54. Humans can destroy local environments but cannot have global impacts on the natural 
world. 
55. A swollen river is more dangerous to me than I am to it. 
56. A great lama could stop the seasons from changing. 
57. There is little I can do to stop hail from destroying my crops. 
58. I worry that a predator like a snow leopard will kill my herds. 
59. The way a person lives his or her life can cause long-term harm to nature. 
60. Humans can alter nature so much that they end up destroying themselves. 
61. Industries in India, China and the USA can affect the water supply in Rigmo. 
62. I do not worry about natural disasters like avalanches killing my animals. 
 
IV. 5-Point  
 
63. I have to wear less clothing in the colder months than I used to. 
64. There is less snow in the high mountains than there was in years past. 
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65. It is more difficult to predict how much rain there will be in the growing season than 
it used to be. 
66. I don’t have to burn as much fuel now as I used to to keep warm in the colder months. 
67. The temperatures on the way to Dunai are more similar to those in Rigmo than they 
were in years past. 
68. The amount of snow and ice in the mountains directly affects how much water will be 
available for use in the village. 
69. The glaciers (snow and ice flows) in the mountains could melt completely and not 
return ever. 
70. Crops ripen earlier now than they used to. 
71. It is generally warmer here now than it used to be. 




73. My faith prohibits me from intentionally harming the environment or nature. 
74. Litter is the only drawback of economic success and development. 
75. If I know my actions are harming someone else, I must stop doing them. 
76. Increased standard of living equals increased incomes. 
77. Compared to my old woolen clothing, the clothes I wear today are: 
a. warmer 
b. of better quality 
c. cheaper to buy 
d. a sign of status and success 
e. more durable 
f. impacting snows in the mountains 
78. Packaged foods are: 
a. healthier than locally grown foods 
b. easier to prepare than locally grown foods 
c. more convenient than locally grown foods 
d. changing how people in Dolpo are living their lives 
e. making some people wealthy 
f. tastier than fresh foods 
g. more interesting than local foods 
h. a sign of status and success 
i. littering the local environment 




79. I can unintentionally harm someone I’ve never met by consuming packaged foods or 
bottled drinks. 
80. I can unintentionally harm someone I’ve never met by wearing clothes made in China 
or India. 
81. With increased wealth people are less interested in spiritual development and duties. 
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82. The standard of living of a village can increase without the individuals in that village 
making more money. 
83. Economic development impacts the environment negatively overall. 
84. People in this village are lazier now that they have increased wealth and incomes. 
85. Yartze Gumba will continue to provide higher incomes to people in this village. 
86. Increased standard of living means increased consumption of previously unavailable 
goods. 




88. Age (gender)? 
89. Primary source of income? Has that source changed in the last 10-15 years? 
90. Marital status? 
91. Number of children? Grandchildren? 
92. Formal education in years? 
93. Have you ever lived anywhere but the Phoksumdo VDC? If so, where and for how 
long? 
94. How long do you usually spend in KTM?  For how many years have you been 




95. How old is the world? 
a. 1-1000 years 
b. 1000-10,000 years 
c. 10,000-100,000 years 
d. 100,000-1,000,000 years 
e. 1,000,000 + years 
f. I don’t know 
 
96. How many times do you drink packaged drinks (e.g. Coke, Frooti, San Miguel beer, 
etc.) in an average month? 
a. 0 
b. 1-3 times 
c. 4-10 times 
d. 11-20 times 
e. 20 + times 
 
97. How many times do you eat packaged foods (e.g. biscuits, noodles, candies, etc.) in a 
month? 
a. 0 
b. 1-3 times 
c. 4-10 times 
d. 11-20 times 
e. 20 + times 
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98. How much debt do you currently have? 
a. 0 




f. Prefer not to say 
 
99. How much savings in currency do you currently have?  
a. 0 




f. Prefer not to say 
 







101. How many pack animals do you own? 
 a. 0 
 b. 1-5 
 c. 6-10 
 d. 11-20 
 e. 21 + 
 
102. How much of your current wealth do you attribute to Yartze Gumba? 
 a. < 10% 
 b. 10-25% 
 c. 26-50% 
 d. > 50% 
 e. 0 
 
103. In a word or phrase, name one thing that would improve the quality of your life  
        today. 
 
